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Editor’s Note
The Struggles of Civilization
Is mankind rational? Does logic reside within civilization? Dr. Andrew Targowski, our
former president, argues in a paper he has written for this issue that we are now facing a
set of crises of civilization but are not addressing them reasonably or successfully.
These crises are inter-related, yet our scholars, he says, only bring forth yesterday’s
methods and shopworn theories as they fail to inspire us with solutions, or even present
us with meaningful alternatives to impending disaster.
It may be true that with modernity science and business have built for us an iron cage.
But does Max Weber’s iron cage of rationality now lead beyond the disenchantment of
the world to a failure to cooperate, to foresee, to plan? Prof. Targowski asks: Where are
the applied sciences? Have we simply been beguiled by inertia and habit, misled by
greedy corporations, inadequate government, and hidebound disciplines wrapped by
inadequate curricula in antiquated universities? Have all our social institutions failed to
prepare us to address critical, pressing needs that may destroy us?
It is not easy for civilization to mount an effective challenge to any or all of the sixteen
contemporary crises Dr. Targowski describes. Exacerbating it all is our failure, as he
writes in a new book, to harness the power of wisdom. Is this the nadir Homo sapiens
have arrived at, after 200,000 years of existence? As a result of our failures, are we, and
world civilization itself, doomed?
Certainly, a logical person might easily despair, but there can also be hope. General
Lynn Rhodes writes in this issue of the challenges facing Mongolia. Abundant,
valuable minerals have been discovered in the ground of that ancient, vast land. Extract
them at all costs and make the country rich quickly, argue both a number of massive
corporations and the neighboring country of China, which covets the products of
Mongolia’s earth. But facing them, on the other side of a titanic struggle, is a traditional
society, a pastoral society, one which wants to preserve its way of life.
If the world’s most advanced scientists and educators can’t apply what we know to stop
the world’s population from blindly tripping down the road to destruction, especially on
account of what Prof. Targowski identifies as the unforeseen implications of
globalization, can a newly emerging democracy hold back against the very same,
ineluctable pressures? Well, Gen. Rhodes shows us that the battle for the Mongolian
future has only begun. Perhaps in that country sustainability will triumph over
exploitation, reason will prevail, and a peaceable civilization will be preserved, as least
in part of the national territory.
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In this issue authors look at how geography has played a critical role in creating the type
of societies and civilizations that have risen to dominate much of our planet today.
James DeMeo explains that 6,000 years ago huge sections of savannah, verdant land in
North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia teeming with vegetation and animal
life, suddenly became desert, leaving large swaths of the earth’s surface hostile to
human life. Thus was born, he argues, armored Patristic societies in which intolerance,
male dominance, and violence became supreme; these replaced unarmored Matristic
societies in which democracy, egalitarianism, and toleration dominated. Then, the
aggressive, Patristic societies radiated out from the deserts and they continue to
challenge Matristic cultures worldwide.
Senior editor Laina Farhat-Holzman continues the emphasis on geography and culture,
tracing the rise of humanity’s chief cities and examining problems that have occurred
with the recent development of huge megacities worldwide, especially in the Third
World. The majority of humanity now lives in cities, and reason must be applied if we
are to solve problems of poverty and disease caused by inadequate planning for new city
dwellers. Harry Rhodes discusses the development of three types of weaponry that gave
mankind fighting capabilities equal or superior to those of the animals: the spear, the
atlatl, and archery. While these weapons may have been used to obtain meat in the
beginning, they became useful also as man fought his enemies. Finally, Toby Huff
builds on Durkheim and Mauss’s definition of civilization and on ISCSC founder
Benjamin Nelson’s concepts of cultural heritages and civilizational complexes as he
looks at the origins and meaning of the unique and powerful European civilization.
A comparative civilizationist isolates, examines, and weighs the often countervailing
trends civilization confronts over the years, with the future of societies and cultures
hanging on how the challenges are met. Today a near universal struggle between
progress and regress continues to play out, but some of the most hopeful trends are
found in the advanced, peaceful, democratic republics.
On the one hand, there are clearly arrayed the forces of violence, of xenophobia, and of
intolerance, the evidence of which is all around us. But perhaps a Hegelian dialectic
operates, and the wine of old conflicts is poured into new bottles, moving history.
Thus, there are many in the United States who are seeking to improve our immigration
laws, recognizing in these new Americans a resource which will advance the country,
its economy, and its universality. Or, observe the workings of tolerant men and women,
as the world seeks to follow Churchill: “jaw, jaw which is better than war, war.” When
we honor those who help stop wars, welcome immigrants, heal the sick, rescue the
downtrodden, free the enslaved, visit the prisoners, and advance the cause of justice, we
honor what is best in our character.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013
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Standing on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. during the sweltering heat of
August, I joined hundreds of thousands of others to mark the 50th anniversary of the
1963 March for Jobs and Freedom, the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. “I Have A Dream”
march. As I was a marcher in that earlier demonstration, as well, it was impossible not
to consider how far we have come in these many years. Today, sadly, the United States
Congress has abandoned many of its responsibilities. But we have a President whose
ancestry is both African and American; could we have imagined that fifty years ago?
There is much to celebrate, to give us joy, even amidst the ongoing struggle against
those who would pull us back to the dark days of the past.
The patterns and meaning of history, a topic that engaged many philosophers in 19th
century Europe, are always open to interpretation. If a creature from outer space were
to stop us on the street and ask what had been the sum total of mankind’s contribution
since we emerged from the Great Rift Valley of Africa three million years ago, how
would we respond? Would our answer be negative – that, on balance, we have
produced centuries of great, bloody violence? Or would it be positive – the Statue of
Liberty, the U.S. Declaration of Independence, the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man, Lincoln’s Second Inaugural, and the tolerance we are able to show for others?
Are we but little lower than the Angels?
Was the Age of Reason correct, and is there a tableau that lays out the progress of the
human spirit? Hiding from his murderous adversaries during the French Revolution,
Jean Condorcet thought so. He wrote that man would be restored to his rights, delivered
from oppression, and proceed with rapid strides in the path of happiness; forgetting his
own misfortunes, he would no longer live in adversity, calumny and malice. Francois
Fourier, a man whose stars were decidedly mixed, traced our path: from savagery to
patriarchy to barbarism to civilization. Locke, Mill, St. Simon, and Comte all saw
progress, and Gandhi, Boas, Mead, Kallen, and Dewey taught us tolerance.
Were they right? Or, does the violence of the 20th century mean that we have moved
back a stage, to savagery? Do we sing a song of ascents or descents? Do we take a turn
with Kohelet, Ecclesiastes, and conclude that there is a time for everything under the
sun?
Civilizationists search out what is greatest in mankind’s patrimony, employing the
largest unit of social analysis we have in an attempt to understand the pathways of
human history. I hope that this journal and this issue help us continuously to refine our
purview, examine the options, and reach with optimism into the future based on an
informed understanding of the past.
Joseph Drew
Editor-in-Chief

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol69/iss69/17

8

Review: Full Issue

4

Number 69, Fall 2013

Saharasia: Geographical Comparisons of World Cultures and
Civilizations
James DeMeo

demeo@mind.net
What is the source of the human impulse towards violence and war? Is it in our genetic
structure, as some claim, or the product of Original Sin? Is it purely economically
determined? Do all cultures share the same innate qualities of violent aggression, which
lurks just beneath a surface facade of our civilizations, waiting for the right excuse or
provocation to break loose and wreak havoc upon the world? A simple review of the
daily news reports certainly might lead the casual observer to believe this is so.
However, a geographical review of newer but mostly neglected findings on the issues of
infant and child treatment, on the basic human needs for love and emotional bonds of
affection, including sexual bonding, with comparisons between peaceful versus violent
societies, leads us towards entirely different conclusions.
Various methods for comparing world cultures have been used over the years, some
allowing for greater or lesser insights. One new method I developed in the early 1980s
involved contrasting cultures and civilizations by their social institutions, behavior and
belief systems, as recorded in the literature of anthropology and ethnography.1 Rather
than using the nation-state as a basic unit of comparison, my cross-cultural comparisons
employed data from individual cultural units, such as tribes or distinctive ethnic groups,
from around the world. And because these data were recorded from native, subsistencelevel cultures as described at approximately 1900 CE, my method also allowed a limited
but nevertheless valuable stripping-away of a good portion of the culturally-skewing
influences of European colonialism.
My task began around 1980, as a graduate student of Geography at the University of
Kansas, seeking to make simple world maps of human behavior traits. I worked from a
theory that human behavior related to family life – on subjects such as human sexuality,
marriage, childbirth customs, and the status of women – would show a pattern related to
climate types. Notably from my interests in desert climates, and the attending severe
problems of drought and famine, it was pretty clear to me that entire social groups and
regions were being devastated whenever the Sahara Desert atmospheric conditions
expanded a little bit, as to affect for example Ethiopia and the African Sahel, wiping out
rains and turning the landscape into dry barren conditions.
Over generations, this would work through the mechanism of famine and starvation to
destroy certain biologically-determined social behaviors, such as infant care and child
nutrition, and also the relations between male and female. The effects of long-term
drought and starvation would impose a deleterious influence on behavior that would be
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absent from those regions characterized by wet and lush conditions of food-abundance.
From this, a drought-starvation influence upon social violence and war was anticipated.
To address this question, I firstly investigated the Human Resource Area Files2
compiled by Yale University. These were then in every major university library, but not
in any machine-readable form, which was necessary if I wanted to complete a
dissertation study on this matter in a few years, rather than a few decades. A sizable
subset of the HRAF material had been summarized within the Ethnographic Atlas3 of
George Peter Murdock, one of the “founding fathers” of American anthropology. It
presented tabular codes for around 100 social variables on a global sample of 1170
different cultures. Murdock and his associates had reviewed original source materials
from the most definitive ethnographies, made summary codes of their variables – such
as Circumcision: present or absent; Bride Price: high or low, or non-existent; Descent:
matrilineal, patrilineal, etc. – and then published those coded variables in the journal
Ethnology,4 for peer-review and possible correction.
This process ran between 1962 and 1967. I was the first to plot Murdock’s data on
world maps, as his Atlas was a slim book filled with data tables only, and no maps. His
Atlas data had just been made available on IBM punch cards, easing my task of data
review and writing a computer program to assimilate and plot the Murdock data on
world maps as well as to make the necessary cross-cultural codings for evaluation of my
larger desert-climate-behavior theory. Six years later, having also surveyed a significant
amount of archaeological and historical materials, and undertaken additional fieldwork
in the deserts of the American Southwest, Egypt and Israel, I could speak with some
confidence on the subject of desert influences on behavior, as well as comparative
regional variations in behavior. Here I shall briefly summarize these findings.
Theoretical Foundations: Patrist versus Matrist Culture
Looking around the world today, with its present difficult situations of violence and
open warfare, one could easily succumb to the notion that the human species suffered
under the burden of “violent, selfish genes”, a concept which I am convinced has no
more scientific validity than the psychoanalytic “death instinct”, or the Catholic notion
of “original sin”, or the “mark of Cain”. My study rested upon the foundational
assumption that humans at their basic nature are spontaneously peaceful, cooperative
and loving creatures – an assumption that was confirmed in the variable but highly
structured nature of cultural data as reviewed geographically. Moreover, placing such
cultural information on a time-line strongly suggests the existence of an early peaceful
period in human prehistory where social violence and warfare was the rare exception,
and not the rule.
A starting point in my work was the sex-economic theory5 of Wilhelm Reich, in whose
writings one will find discussion of various forms of neurotic and violent armored
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol69/iss69/17

10

Review: Full Issue

6

Number 69, Fall 2013

character structures, versus a more peacefully-cooperative but nevertheless vigorous
and healthy-aggressive (in the sense of a healthy striving towards goals or meeting of
needs) un-armored or genital character structure. The term armoring was coined by
Reich to describe the way in which modern humans protectively hold back their deeper
emotions, like a medieval knight in metal armor. When raised with punitive violence
from adult caretakers, infants and children develop emotional armor as a survival
mechanism, putting up a deadening emotional wall between themselves and the outer
world.
This emotional armoring also reduces the capacities for joy and love in all their
expressions, Reich argued, leading to sexual dysfunctions and distortions of both
compulsively moralistic and pornographic natures (i.e., sexual frigidity and impotence,
the “hatred of love”, sadomasochism, sexual insatiability, “group-sex,” rape, pedophilia,
etc.) with a consequent buildup of undischarged emotional-sexual bioenergetic tension.
In the growing adolescent and adult, this accumulated undischarged energy pushes for
release through overt or covertly violent expressions. Such violence is usually directed
towards anything that provokes anxiety within the armored character but is generally
bound up within complex social institutions and expressed ritually. Out of this develop
belief systems advocating the “goodness” of pain and compulsive joylessness, and the
“badness” of pleasure and love, especially as related to sexual and reproductive
functions.
This is the emotional background for such incredible social “rituals” as are designed to
destroy the maternal-infant bond during the early periods of infancy, childhood and
adolescence. Examples include: 6
•
•
•
•

•

Demands for infants to be swaddled or denied the mother's breast;
Cutting of the genitals of infants, children and adolescents with knives
(“circumcision”);
Beating of children into compulsive obedience to irrational adult demands;
Taboos to crush down the child's budding curiosity in sexuality, or to
literally murder children if they fall in love, or to cruelly push them towards
suicide (i.e., the miserable fate of Romeo and Juliet, or countless young girls
murdered for “honor” in Islamic regions);
Compulsive or arranged marriage systems, to insure that even adults should
not experience romantic love or sexual bonding, thereby insuring the
persistence of such cruel institutions as concubinage, sexual slavery and
coercive prostitution.

The reader will note how all these various expressions of family life are likewise bound
up with authoritarian social structures, where Kings, Priests, Warlords, Tsars,
Commissars, or Mullahs occupy positions of totalitarian rule, and males in general live
within strict social hierarchies, with women and children occupying the lowest
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013
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positions. The argument laid by Reich was that State Structure Mirrors Family
Structure, 7 be they either cooperative and peaceful or authoritarian and violent, a point
that found exacting support in my work.
Table 1 gives a summary of the two different cultural expressions, 8 which I have
termed Matrist and Patrist to denote their emphasis upon either satisfying the needs of
infants, children, adolescents and adults, or the denying of those needs. In the
destructively sadistic family-social “rituals” summarized on the “armored Patrist” side
of Table 1 and incorporated into religious ideologies as well as into law, women play a
role just as large as men in spite of the fact that they may suffer disproportionately as
the victims of violent Patrism.
Female genital mutilations, for example, are uniformly carried out by older women,
mercilessly using razor blades on the genitals of young girls, and often they are the most
emphatic supporters of the practices. Also, “honor killings” of young girls who violate
sexual taboos, as in the Islamic world, are often initiated by the female gossip system or
demanded by the girls’ own mothers; these mothers put the men of the community and
family under extreme pressure to “do something to restore the family honor,” which
also affects their own social standing among women’s communities.
The murder of such a “sinful girl” restores “family pride and honor” for both males and
females. Certainly, the role of the man is central – he typically carries out the murders,
and disproportionately is the one who abuses and terrorizes women and children in the
family home and often is murdered himself by other males in spasms of warfare which
periodically erupt. But women also can be big supporters of wars, enslavement and
murder of the “hated enemy” even when their own children are offered up as sacrificial
victims to the gods of war. Emotionally softer males in armored Patrist cultures also are
subject to abusive treatment by both males and females.
Table 1: Dichotomous Behaviors, Attitudes, and Social Institutions8
Trait
Infants,
Children and
Adolescents:

Sexuality:

Patrist (armored)
Less indulgence
Less physical affection
Infants traumatized
Painful initiations
Dominated by family
Sex-segregated houses
or military groups
Restrictive attitude
Genital mutilations
Female virginity taboo

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol69/iss69/17

Matrist (unarmored)
More indulgence
More physical affection
Infants not traumatized
No painful initiations
Children’s democracies
Mixed sex children’s
houses or age villages
Permissive attitude
No genital mutilations
No female virginity taboo
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Patrist (armored)
Adolescent lovemaking
severely censured
Homosexual tendency plus
severe taboo
Incest/pedophile tendency
plus severe taboo
Coercive concubinage,
prostitution

Matrist (unarmored)
Adolescent lovemaking
freely permitted
No homosexual tendency
or strong taboo
No incest/pedophile tend.
or strong taboo
No concubinage or
prostitution

Limits on freedom
Inferior status
Vaginal blood taboo (hymenal,
menstrual & childbirth)
Cannot choose own mate
Cannot divorce at will
Males control fertility
Reproductive functions
denigrated

More freedom
Equal status
No vaginal blood taboo

Cultural
and Family
Structure:

Authoritarian
Hierarchical
Patrilineal
Patrilocal
Compulsive lifelong
monogamy or polygamy
Military structure
Violent, sadistic

Democratic
Egalitarian
Matrilineal
Matrilocal
Noncompulsive monogamy
or occasional polygamy
No full time military
Nonviolent, no sadism

Religion
and Beliefs:

Male/father oriented
Asceticism, pleasure-avoidance
pain sought & emphasized
Inhibition
Fear/hatred of nature
Full time religious specialists

Female/mother oriented
Pleasure welcomed and
institutionalized
Spontaneity
Nature worshiped
No full time religious
specialists
Male or female
shamans/healers
Absence of strict codes

Sexuality
(cont.)

Women:

Male shamans/healers
Strict behavior codes

Can choose own mate
Can divorce at will
Females control fertility
Reproductive functions
celebrated

However, I wish to break away from the usual finger-pointing and look at the
unconscious and robot-like manner in which both men and women carry out a wide
variety of pain-inflicting and destructive actions against infants, children and
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013
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adolescents, as well as against themselves and their neighbors, to twist and warp the
softer parts of the human character into the hideous armored expressions we now see in
varied expressions globally.
Natural biology reproduces the peaceful and cooperative nature of Homo sapiens in
every newborn child, but the various religious and cultural “rituals” found within the
anger-laden and emotionally-damaged, authoritarian type of family structure work to
destroy the softer human qualities and distort them into their exact opposite. Reich’s
theory allows us to find commonalities, from the pain-inflicting, obedience-demanding
and sex-negating patriarchal authoritarian family structure to understand the creation of
millions of armored adults who, for example, supported the medieval burning of
“witches” and who later collectively marched to the political slogans of Hitler, Stalin
and Mao or who considered Pharaoh or Hirohito as a god.
Every culture suffering under the patriarchal authoritarian family and state structure,
Reich argued, created its own quanta of un-discharged rage, which people misdirected
internally in masochistic impulses of violent self-abuse, or outwardly against sociallyapproved targets who almost always were emotionally softer and more sexually alive
than themselves: the “immoral” sexually-active female, the “pornographic” Jews and
Americans, the “naked savage” Indians, the “over-sexed” blacks, the capitalist “pigs” or
“evil” counter-revolutionaries, the “infidel” non-believers. Those who live a life of
greater freedom and pleasure stir up the anxiety of those who do not, and thereby incur
their provoked wrath.
Superficially, historians have detailed these types of mass-murdering social movements
according to economic or religious factors, or to ideology only, but their commonalities
in family structure and emotional-sexual behavior have been almost systematically
overlooked. And yet, a focus upon those neglected factors gives us a new perspective
not previously possible.
Geographical Review of the Cross-Cultural Data
Early in my work I was impressed with the magnificent libraries of the universities
where I studied, and viewed their collections, in total, as “time-machines” – vast
repositories of knowledge about archaeology, history and anthropology, as well as of
our biological nature. They surely must contain the answers, I felt, if only we could
review and assimilate that information all at once, in a comprehensive manner. With
thousands of cultures having been observed and described, it became apparent, this
might be possible though presentation on world maps of the myriad facts of human
behavior as observed by large groups of scholars, using geographical and cross-cultural
methods of analysis combined.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol69/iss69/17
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We all regularly use maps to orient ourselves and our place on the Earth in relationship
to other locations and nations, whether this is to drive from one state to another or to
understand where the next weather-front is and how its motion will affect us. We gain a
deeper understanding by knowing where things exist and their spatial and temporal
relationships to each other as placed on a map. Maps are used in nearly all disciplines,
from geology to meteorology to economics, allowing different kinds and forms of
phenomena to be displayed in a location-specific manner, after which some of their
deeper aspects are quite spontaneously revealed as a simple expression of their spatial
relationships. But they have never been widely used in anthropology, perhaps due to
specialization or a bias against the inevitable diffusion theories which arise when
cultural data are mapped.9
My first cross-cultural evaluations used the data set of Textor, 10 which employed a 400culture regionally balanced subset of the original Murdock data, with 63 different
variables that mirrored those summarized in my Table 1, above. This effort proved at a
high level of statistical significance the following: Cultures with the highest levels of
social violence are characterized by harsh and abusive treatment of babies and children,
by sex-repression of adolescents and the unmarried, by compulsive marriages and
deeply hierarchal social structures which push women down, and by a predominant
religious authoritarianism. Cultures with the lowest levels of social violence are
opposite to this description in nearly every respect.11 These ideas were firstly argued by
Reich in his seminal works, 12 later validated in the cross-cultural work of Prescott, 13
and finally confirmed and expanded within my own cross-cultural evaluations.14 From
that starting point, the first global maps of human behavior were composed.
From both the Murdock and Textor data sets, and also from several new data sets I
assembled myself using both hand-drafting and computer methods, I made numerous
individual world maps of various cultural characteristics: i.e., male and female genital
mutilations, swaddling and infant cranial deformation, female virginity and post-partum
sexual taboos, segregation of boys, the bride-price, male-favoring inheritance rules,
patrilocal marriage customs and patrilineal descent, class stratification, castes and
slavery, and belief in a “high god” whose Earthly representatives invoked divine
authority. A separate World Behavior Map was also developed, from a composite of
many different factors, as described below. All of these maps showed a very similar
and profoundly striking geographical pattern. The mapped core-source regions for the
various armored Patrist behaviors in my Table 1 were not randomly or uniformly
distributed over the world map. In fact, a clear-cut global geographical pattern in
human behavior was apparent from the very start of my work in this direction.
Before describing these maps, the time-line of the Murdock cultural data must be
brought into discussion.
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The data themselves were developed from the peer-reviewed published descriptions of
aboriginal native cultures, as recorded from c. 1850 to 1950 (centered on c. 1900 CE) by
hundreds of different anthropologists and ethnographers. Given the focus of these
scholars on studying aboriginal native subsistence-level cultures, this approach tended
to minimize the influences of European-derived and contemporary North and South
American nation-state cultures. Those modern cultures appear in the database as only
one of many hundreds of aboriginal native cultures, even though numerically by
population they may be the largest groups. This approach thereby minimized their
cultural expressions on my maps.14
In Oceania and Island Asia, the influence of European-derived culture was also
diminished in the maps for similar reasons, though Mongol-Turk and Islamic influences
from earlier centuries of invasion and conquest clearly do show up, such as across North
Africa, the Middle East, Asia and within the Indonesian archipelago.
Murdock's database also excluded evaluation of contemporary homogenized European
nation-states, relying for Europe instead upon published ethnographies of culturally
isolated village societies that did not reflect the turbulent and bloody conditions that
afflicted Europe during more recent centuries. The Americas therefore appear on the
maps as relatively unarmored, Matristic and peaceful in character, though with a smaller
percentage of extremely violent individual cultures.14, 15 This was the general condition
in the pre-Columbian past, but certainly is not the condition today.
The maps therefore must be viewed in their historical context.
Figure 1 shows my composite World Behavior Map.14 The map reveals the most
extremely armored Patristic and violent cultures, with the harshest treatments of infants
and children and the most sex-repressive rules directed against women and the
unmarried, dominant across the vast Old World desert regions encompassing North
Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. To more easily identify this large region of
relatively similar armored-Patrist human behavior, which also is not accidentally the
harshest and largest region of uninterrupted world desert, in the early 1980s I coined the
term Saharasia. Notably, the farther one travels away from Saharasia, as a generality,
the more one finds softer and lesser armored, more Matrist cultures.
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The Saharasian Desert Belt and its Behavioral Consequences

Figure 1. The World Behavior Map: For the period roughly between 1850 and 1950,
as reconstructed from aboriginal cultural data given in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas,
with minimal historical interpretation.14
Why should this profound cultural pattern exist, and why should the behavior of people
in harsh deserts be characterized by such violent Patristic social conditions? What is it
so special about this Saharasian region? As mentioned, Saharasia is also the location of
the world’s largest and harshest desert region, what I have termed as the Saharasian
Desert Belt, 16 which extends nearly halfway around the planet. As previously
determined in other global-environmental maps I prepared, Saharasia is the most
extreme environment on the planet from climatological and biological viewpoints, with
the world's largest regions of vegetation-barren and uninhabited space, the highest mean
monthly maximum temperatures, the lowest precipitation quantities and the highest
precipitation variability.16 Life in this large region is exceedingly difficult and often
“hangs on by its fingernails.”
Figure 2, the Budyko-Lettau climate map, 16, 17 reveals the Saharasian Desert Belt most
clearly, identifying the most severely harsh desert regions on the planet – and the
Saharasian Desert Belt is defined as such. The overlapping spatial correlations between
the harshest desert-climate landscapes in Figure 2, and the most extreme armored-patrist
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human cultures in Figure 1, are immediately apparent. The geographical aspects of
human behavior, as extracted from the cross-cultural data and revealed for the first time
in my behavior maps, suggest something profound happening within the Saharasian
region over the course of human history. Something happened to allow emotional
armoring, Patrism and social violence to develop and take root within Saharasia, after
which, we may postulate, it slowly spread outwards over the centuries.

Figure 2. Budyko-Lettau Dryness Ratio: Contrasting the relative dryness of different
arid lands around the world. Values reflect the ratio between precipitation and
evaporative energy; values of 2 receive twice as much evaporative solar heat as
moisture from precipitation, while values of 10 receive ten times as much.16, 17
Several aspects of the mapped data support such an astonishing line of argument.
Surrounding the core-source region of extreme Patrism, seen on the World Behavior
Map in Figure 1, there exist regions of intermediate Patrism, which fully surrounds the
central core of Saharasia proper. This intermediate zone of Patrism eventually gives
way, with increasing distance from Saharasia, into world regions of a predominant
unarmored Matrism, as found, generally speaking, across Oceania and the Americas.
Southern Africa, Southern India, much of Island Asia (outside of Islamic regions) and
the high Arctic regions – at even greater distances – generally escaped significant
Patristic influences. Move farther away, into the Americas and, with notable
exceptions, the regional evaluations are even more Matristically and peacefully inclined.
This profound geographical pattern suggests a major role for human migration and the
diffusion of culture, and is supported by much, but not all, of accepted history and
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archaeological findings on the subject. The mass-migrations of ancient Semitic and
Indo-European languages out of Arabia and Central Asia into surrounding borderland
regions is one such example of accepted theory which is mirrored in the World
Behavior Map. The Kurgan/Battle-Axe peoples, Scythians, Huns, Mongol-Turks and
Islamic Armies are other examples discussed in the historical sections of my
publications.18 Patristic warrior nomad groups dominated Saharasia at different
historical periods, irrupting outwards into the Saharasian borderlands to periodically
invade and wreak havoc and destruction upon pre-existing peaceful Matristic cultures in
the moister non-desert regions.
Those conquered lands were then converted into extreme Patristic or intermediate
Matrist-Patrist cultures, by virtue of transplanted social institutions, generally through
violent destruction of male populations and becoming dominant overlords of surviving
women and children. Their culture and behavior was thereby passed on to the next
generations, and so on from then on down to relatively recent times. We can get a very
good view of this process, and its relationship to the overall Saharasian patterns, by
looking at Figures 3 and 4, which presents the mapped expression of maximum
occupied territory of two of the most recent expressions of such warrior-nomad groups
bursting out from core Saharasian desert regions into surrounding territory. These are,
respectively, those of the Arab/Islamic conquests after 640 CE, 19 and the Turko-Mongol
conquests after 540 CE.20 Together, they dominate 100% of the Saharasian Desert Belt,
plus a significant percent of the moister borderlands regions.

Figure 3. Areas Conquered by Arab/Islamic Armies Since 640 CE.19
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Figure 4. Areas Conquered by Turko-Mongol Armies Since 540 CE.20
Figures 5 and 6 present a generalized first-approximation reconstruction of the
migratory pathways out of which the earliest armored Patristic and socially violent
cultures emerged, to diffuse and migrate around the world.21

Figure 5. Core Spreading Centers (1. Arabia, 2 Central Asia)
for Origins of Armored Patrism Within Saharasia.21
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Figure 6. Diffusion of Armored Patrism from Saharasia to
Other World Regions (a first approximation).21
As noted particularly in Figure 6, my behavior maps also imply a wide-ranging
diffusion of Patristic culture suggestive of pre-Columbian contact theory, where
armored Patrism was eventually carried into the Americas through trans-oceanic
voyages originating from different parts of the Old World; there, seaworthy ships and
navigation knowledge had been available since c.2000 BCE. The mapped patterns and
archaeological data as discussed in my other publications suggest large regions lacking
in significant prehistorical social violence, and this allows us to develop a new
postulate, as follows: The original migrations into the Americas via Beringia starting
some 15,000 years ago was fully Matristic and non-violent in character, composed of
peaceful, cooperative groups.
Only later, after c.2000 BCE, did Patrism appear in the Americas, primarily along
coastal regions (Pacific NW), in isolated clusters along navigable rivers (central
Mississippi Valley), or in highland regions formerly associated with a coastal entry of
extreme Patrist peoples (Inca and Mesoamerica regions). When Europeans later
migrated to the Americas, for this reason they found a mix of both peaceful-Matristic
and violent-Patristic Native American cultures. The idea of pre-Columbian contacts
injects yet another controversy into the overall Saharasian theory, but this cannot be
avoided. I have more fully addressed the issue elsewhere.15, 22
Ancient Gardens Into Hyper-Arid Wastelands
The Saharasian discovery contains new insights, as well as controversy, from other
viewpoints as well, notably as regarding the existence of an early peaceful period in
human prehistory. We should not shy away from this question, as it helps us to
understand why human violence is not equally distributed around the globe, and also
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how the distorted modern expressions of violent and repressive human behavior could
have gotten started in the first instance.
The Saharasia behavior maps suggest a core region of armored Patristic behavior, no
differently than the temperature and precipitation data which defines the Saharasian
desert proper. This fact has quite astonishing implications when we consider that prior
to c.4000 - 3000 BCE, Saharasia was not a desert. Prior to c.4000 BCE, most of North
Africa, Arabia and the Middle East, as well as the large deserts of Central Asia, were
semi-forested grassland savannas, cut through with broad rivers and gigantic freshwater lakes. They were thick with large browsing animals like elephant, rhino, horse
and giraffe, with hippos and crocodiles and fish, as well as early human habitations
engaged in hunting, fishing, animal herding and early agriculture. Bones of such large
browsing animals are scattered across the open desert regions, and old long dried-up
river valleys, remnant lakeshores and abandoned human settlements are found,
sometimes covered over with layers of desert sand.
The early inhabitants of all these regions left behind rock paintings and carvings, as well
as the remnants of their settlements. This gave us evidence of an early wet and lush
environment where peaceful social conditions were the dominant rule, and warfare or
social violence was the rare exception. After the drying up of Saharasia, human
settlements are abandoned as the nomadic way of life predominates, rock art
degenerates into scenes of warfare and chaotic graffito, and only the long-dead bones of
the large browsing and aquatic species can be found. I have elsewhere provided
exceptional detail on these astonishing and immense climate and environmental
changes, from wet and lush into bone-dry conditions, detailing a dramatic shift in
climate starting around 4000-3500 BCE.18
I’ve also reviewed those isolated exceptions of very early social violence within slightly
moister or even wet environments,22 such as found in Jericho, or in isolated European
digs. Contrary to the many popularized claims that these exceptions are a “proof for
very ancient violence”, these archaeological sites frequently show only the most
ambiguous kinds of evidence, or the pop-writers are not being careful in reporting
where in the archaeological strata one sees the first appearance of violent behavior. An
ancient settlement may show thousands of years of habitation without any signs of war
weapons, crushed skulls or destruction layers, but then violence suddenly appears late in
the habitation sequence, whereupon popular writers seize upon it to ignore evidence for
a prehistorically peaceful period in favor of claims for “ancient violence”.22
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While I cannot go into detail in this short article, my research has made it clear that such
“exceptions” are associated with one of two basic factors:
1) The early violence developed during an early sub-phase of harsh drought or
desert conditions, or
2) The violence existed among peoples who migrated out of such a harsh
droughty-desert region.
Those examples are thereby exceptions which prove the rule that the original trigger for
human violence connects back, by historical migrations, to some period of long-term
exposure to a harsh, arid desert environment, with its attending famine and starvation
conditions.
Let's consider the mechanisms at work, revealing how large desert wastelands could
generate human violence. My review of archaeological evidence suggests human
violence developed earliest within the larger Saharasian Desert Belt, at the same time its
individual desert regions began to form. Later historical and anthropological/
ethnographic evidence shows more widely distributed spatial cross-cultural correlations
between persisting social violence and the harshest desert regions.
The most obvious and in fact correct mechanism is the link of famine and starvation
attending increasingly severe droughts and desertification, as surely would have
occurred during the formation of the Saharasian deserts. As I have shown elsewhere
hard drought and desertification is the primary cause of famine, starvation and massmigrations throughout history, and many specific examples have been recorded by
careful observers and clinicians.
It is also known, that the death-dealing conditions of famine and mass-starvation trigger
a severe damage to human social existence, where family bonds of love between men
and women, and between mothers and babies, are destroyed utterly. Food-seeking and
self-preservation take over all other concerns, and mass-migrations also ensue, from
drier to wetter regions, triggering additional social tensions as groups firstly cluster
around remnant water sources, and later conflict with neighboring regions where water
and food still exists.23
Starvation and long-term malnutrition also does severe damage to the human neural
system, including to the brain, and particularly to the growing infant.23 And from that
we see an increase in the numbers of emotionally suffering and damaged people, with
the ascent of strong-man leaders and a turn of hunting tools into war weapons. Violence
and cruelty then increases, along with sexual sadism, disturbances in male-female and
adult-child relationships, and all the rest which has too often become an integral, yet
self-defeating part of most civilizations.
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Such dramatic and deadly drought-famine conditions most surely afflicted prehistorical
human tribes in Saharasia after c.4000 BCE, when the deserts began to dry up. And
archaeology across Saharasia records dramatic destructions of the early peaceful,
cooperative and pleasure-supporting societies which once lived and thrived there.
I would argue this transformation of climate and landscape most certainly would also
have been directly observed and remembered by those early humans, of their gardenlike environments converting over into harsh desert conditions.
This message appears in both myth and the holy books of many world religions,
especially for the “great desert religions.” The dramatic climate changes from lush and
well-watered grasslands, of “milk and honey” occupied by early hunter-gatherers and
pastoral herders, were remembered in ancient myth, alongside the degeneration of that
same landscape into harsh hyper-arid deserts of barrenness, famine and starvation. The
early humans were literally “cast out of the garden”, and cut off from their own deeper
loving and emotional roots. I have already given natural scientific and ancient historical
discussion on these matters, including what modern biology has to say about the
behavioral effects of famine and starvation.23
Another more disturbing aspect is apparent in the behavior maps, however. While some
degree of violence is today found in nearly every corner of the globe, it is not accidental
that the current fountainhead of international terrorism and slave-like conditions for
women is found predominantly within the modern desert regions of Saharasia, where
patriarchal authoritarianism is also at its most extreme. The cultural expressions of the
old Taliban regime in desert Afghanistan or of Wahhabist Saudi Arabia are perhaps the
most “extreme Patrist” one could find on the entire planet. And wherever such people
have dominated or migrated, carrying their desert-warrior social institutions and
behaviors with them, similar high levels of social violence can be found, irrespective of
climate.
Overall, my work on this question provides a clear and solid support for writers such as
Samuel Huntington, who notably observed, with respect to the modern ideology of the
Saharasian warrior nomads, that “Islam has bloody borders.”24 This is more than
merely a metaphor. It was anticipated and sadly proven out in my Saharasia maps from
the early 1980s.
Portions of the patterns revealed on my Saharasia maps have been discussed in a more
limited regional manner in the writings of scholars such as Maria Gimbutas25 and Riane
Eisler, 26 as I later discovered. Gimbutas in particular documented the migrations of
early Kurgan and battle-axe peoples, who subsequently invaded and destroyed the more
peaceful cultures in Europe. Griffiths27 has more recently detailed the spreading of
deserts, and widespread garden myths prevalent among cultures with roots in various
desert regions, a topic I also discussed in my Saharasia book.1 Modern
paleoclimatology has also recently verified an abrupt decrease in North African rains
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and vegetation at c.3500 BCE, triggering the onset of Sahara Desert conditions so fast
as to prevent easy migration, and hence being very destructive to the fabric of early
human societies.28
My own findings on culture and climate were globally comprehensive, however, and
made completely independently and earlier than all but Gimbutas. I also provided detail
on the historical destruction of early peaceful cultures in sub-Saharan Africa, India, SE
Asia, Europe and China, through invasions of conquest by warrior-nomad groups out of
Saharasia.18 Appropriate discussion and maps have also been given in my other
publications regarding violent Patristic regions of Oceania and the pre-Columbian
Americas.15
It is a pattern that has repeated itself over the course of history, and unfortunately
continues into modern times -- continued patriarchal authoritarianism and violence as
seen at the foundations of too many modern nation-states. Civilization as we know it,
while working to uplift humanity in both technology and spirit, has also acquired a selfdestructive aspect during the ascent of humankind, a dark side which has worked to
drag societies down after long periods of amazing growth and technological progress.
We can now identify the roots of that self-destructive process, which is neither in our
genes nor in our souls.
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Sixteen Related Crises and the Limits of
Civilization in the 21st Century
Andrew Targowski

andrew.targowski@wmich.edu
Background
Civilization is a whole greater than the sum of its parts. The added value for civilization
is generated by relations amongst its parts, the elements of civilization. As these
elements function, they influence other elements bilaterally. Thus, a growing
population increases the pollution of the environment. This speeds the exhaustion of
strategic resources. Devastated environments then increase yet further the depletion of
strategic resources. Sixteen crises of the 21st century are explored and their multilateral
influences and relations considered in an attempt to enhance our understanding of the
direction civilization is now taking.
The Centrality of Crises in the Early 21st Century
One central and founding crisis is the crisis of science; it’s the level of this crisis that
sways the future of civilization. Science is a measure of the current power of the human
mind, the motor of civilization. The great acceleration of current civilization took place
in the 16th century when theoretical science began to develop in physics and chemistry.
Today, the sciences of economics and the other social sciences overall cannot or do not
want to explain the effects of what is called “globalization." Without this research,
actions undertaken by politicians, business people, and professionals must be based
upon common sense. But common sense is incapable of explaining what is going on in
civilization, a complex phenomenon.
The crisis of science leads to the crisis of education, which is “blind”; it is not based on
any up-to-date scientific foundations. Badly educated graduates cannot be wise
politicians, business people or journalists (hence, a media crisis). The crisis of the
media misinforms the general public and thus lapses into a cultural crisis. The cultural
crisis exacerbates all the remaining crises. The crisis of religion erupts by ignoring the
population crisis, a serious, dangerous crisis-making factor of civilization. These crises
constitute the recognizable core of the overall current crisis of civilization.
The crises of the Civilization Death Triangle (caused by the interaction of the
population, ecological and resources bombs, all connected) are long-term ones.
Everybody talks about these but nothing is ever done about them; life goes on. Even so,
these crises will determine the coming collapse of what we can call automated
civilization.
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In addition, there are also mid-term crises. These follow from the core of the current
crisis of civilization. Such crises include:
• The crisis of technology (now overwhelming culture),
• The crisis of super-capacity (it is not true that the sky is the limit),
• The over-communication crisis (too frequent empty talk),
• The crisis of wars (terrorism), and
• The crisis of administration (ineffectual and too expensive).
Finally, the crisis in food production is ubiquitous: current, mid-term, and long-term.
How These Inter-related Sixteen Crises May be Eliminated
Where do we start? In order to minimize these inter-related crises, unfortunately one
needs to tackle all of the problems at the same time. This is obviously a very difficult
task and it is not really known whether it lies within human powers. To put it in plain
terms, we propose to enhance the intellectual capacity of man. People can do away with
the complex crisis processes.
To enhance knowledge and wisdom is a mission to be undertaken by science and
education. Unfortunately, it is evident that neither science nor education takes
responsibility for the plight of civilization. Even the term “wisdom” very seldom
features in academic terminology; the very topic is treated as something light-hearted at
all levels of education, including graduate education.
From 2009 to 2012, I was professor and director of the Center for the Sustainable
Business Practices at a major American college. We had 5,000 students and were a part
of one of the biggest American business colleges (25,000 students), with a few dozen
doctoral programs. The center wanted to introduce the topic of sustainable business to
its curricula.
The committee of faculty who teach graduate students accepted the strategies of
teaching business so conceived. However, the committee of undergraduate faculty
members refused to introduce this subject into lectures. They even refused to
acknowledge in the minutes that the motion had been proposed and had not been
passed. I resigned from heading the Center and the new director ironically and proudly
assured the professors who had gathered at his first presentation that they would not
deal with improving the curricula with this type of issue. Nobody protested. Is this not a
crisis of education? The professors at that college are rather passive, and this is no
different in other colleges; they are as if chained to the business textbooks of the 1950s
through the 1970s, the heyday of business and the era of Pax Americana.
Still as a director, and within a Dean’s level task force, which I headed, I resolved to
analyze whether we taught the right material in our curricula. The results showed we
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did not: what we were teaching was hardly aligned with the contemporary challenges of
civilization. The proposal to improve the curricula perished amidst academic inertia.
The improvements suggested (see Table 1) followed a classic scope of sustainability:
economic vitality, responsibility for the environment and social responsibility.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 1.
Examples of the Issues that were Recognized as Worthy of Inclusion in the Update of
Business Knowledge and Wisdom in the Early 21st Century at an American College
Main Foci:

Programs:

ECONOMIC VITALITY
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

MANAGEMENT

Global and local business
Wall Street vs. Main Street
Green economy
Social costs of business

FINANCE

Growth-based business?
Productivity vs. sufficiency
Short-term versus long-term in decision-making
Green economy
Deep economy
From shareholders to stakeholders
A worker or a robot
Outsourcing?
Managerial Capitalism

ACCOUNTING

How to keep books to account for all costs of business
The costs of the maintenance of the environment
The social costs of business

LOGISTICS CHAIN

Outsourcing abroad
Fuel for food
Shipping too much food
Walmartization
Unmanned factories
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COMMERCIAL CODE

Lobbyists
Environmental protection
Do corporations have consciousness?

ICT

The architecture of systems for a sustainable civilization
The systems of controlling the balancing of business and the environment.
Principles of sustainable automation, robotization and informatization.

BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS

Review of the examples of well-balanced solutions
From paranoia to metanoia (changes)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------These suggested topics would transform the teaching of business, based on
contemporary and emerging knowledge and wisdom, moving from the small picture to a
bigger picture, but in relation to each other. It goes without saying that these topics far
from exhaust the range of the necessary changes in business studies curricula. In other
words the point is for business people to move from being “dentists” to being “dental
experts.”
The State of the Economic Sciences in the Early 21st Century

The current state of the economic sciences reflects the situation of the 19th and the 20th
centuries rather than this century. Economic theories that proved workable in the past
are wrongly extrapolated to today. They are being placed within a completely different
civilizational context.
The worsening economic crisis of the Western Civilization (Europe and the USA) in
2008-2013 comes as a surprise to economists. There are no available economic
monographs that would explain the causes of the current crisis and the methods of
overcoming it. The theory of economics is out of touch with the current situation.
Some Nobel Prize laureates are publishing popular rather than scientific books that set
out to analyze the present economic crisis.
Economic theory has become an intellectual game, processed within itself, and so it has
lost touch with reality, becoming irrelevant for people dealing with the economy.
Academic economists have replaced the description of economic processes with
mathematical definitions of social behaviors, where it is of utmost importance to retain
the strict rigor of models rather than explain what is going on in fact.
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This way of developing economic theory has been criticized by a line of Nobel Prize
winners. The first to do so may have been Wassily Leontief (1906-1999), who noticed
that econometric models were more important than data. In 1982 he wrote that
professional periodicals were filled with mathematical formulas and every year
economic theorists produced novel models and carefully researched their
interdependencies in numerous situations that utilize the same set of data.2
Leontief was a practicing economist, and only later did he become an academic. He
was the unofficial author of the first five-year plan in the USSR, which was based on
the flows between industries. It was only after his escape from the USSR (1931) that he
became a theorist, but for the plan -- which was based on input-output analysis -- he was
awarded the Nobel Prize in 1973. His disciples at Harvard included the Nobel Prize
winner (1970) Paul Samuelson, a founding father of modern American economic
science.3
In 1997 Ronald Coase (b. 1910), another Nobel Prize winner (1991), complained that
present-day economics was a theoretical system that was in the clouds and hardly
connected with what is really happening. A further famous Nobel Prize winner, Milton
Friedman (1976), noted in 2007, at the end of his life, that economics is increasingly
becoming a branch of mathematics rather than an applied science.5
As was observed by the younger generation academic David Colander, in 2009, none of
these warnings by the most prominent American economists have had any bearing on
the way economics is taught in masters level courses in this country.6 The BritishAmerican economist Mark Blaug (2002) put it succinctly: we have created a monster
that is very difficult to stop.7
Protests by Nobel Prize laureates as well as wise economists are, unfortunately, ignored
by Western faculties of economics, which keep teaching Neoclassicist economics,
entirely mathematized and oriented towards just one model, the description of economic
dynamics. Other approaches are censored and specialists rather than Neoclassicists are
simply not hired by universities.
As things are, students have taken the matters into their own hands. In 2000 a
movement was started in France, called “Post-Autistic Economics,” protesting the
uncontrolled application of mathematics in economics as constituting a goal in itself.
They were followed by English doctoral students from the University of Cambridge,
who created the group “Cambridge-27.” They proposed making courses in economics
open to diverse approaches rather than sticking to one research approach. Other
countries followed, and the movement now has 10,000 members from 150 countries.
Neoclassicist economics rules in Poland, too. At least this is what it seems to be the case
if you look at how the University of Warsaw works, where in the English-speaking
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course Developmental Economics, the subject is in fact taught as if it were a branch of
mathematics.8 In the first year of the program, the lectures are mostly in a totally
mathematized economics. In the lecture Microeconomics there were two different parts,
one introducing the issue and the other, taught by another lecturer, presenting game
theory. If one must mathematize economic operations at all costs, I would advise
teaching line programming. This concerns the optimization of plans of production,
services, and transport pathways (i.e., having goods supplied to shops).
The theory of line programming would shed some light on the arrangement of the sale
of limited-availability goods (such as the tickets for the Euro 2012 soccer tournament),
or on the organization of renovation work. Theory of games? Is the heuristic simulation
of complex production plans à la Las Vegas (in an economy suffering from the surplus
of production capacity) a foremost task of business? Nobody applies that in practice
nowadays. Why, then, teach the theory of games in microeconomics to first year
students, neglecting other, more up-to-date methodological approaches?
The Neoclassicist theory of economics maintains that its objective is to manage limited
resources by way of the application of the capitals (means) created by man. This made
sense once, when the theory was being created and when labor and resources were in
abundance and the means to use them for human needs were relatively simple. The
Industrial Revolution replaced human labor with machines, which boosted productivity
on a scale that was incomparable to the period prior to it, when only manual labor was
used.
What is critical now in terms of supplies is natural capital.
Once it was the fisherman who was critical in fisheries; now it is fish itself which is in
short supply. Once an irrigation system was critical, as was its operation; now it is
water, or the lack of it. Once it took a lumberjack to get timber; now it is trees that are
running out.
No End to the Development of a More Productive Economy?
If economics were to be adapted to our day, it would not place an emphasis on the
development of the technical process in the replacement of human labor by machines in
order to boost the productivity of goods or services. Rather the objective would be for
the same output to be achieved by a decreasing use of natural resources.
This means that there should be a paradigm shift in the theory of economics. We must
move away from the subordination of the ecosystem to economics and toward one
where economics is subservient to the ecosystem. Alas, this is not happening even
though the concept of sustainable development is gaining ground across the world.
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In the years following World War II, Neoclassicist economics introduced the model of
infinite growth (Solow 1956,9 Stigliz 196910). This model, it was believed, would lead
to permanent growth in consumption and production thanks to our unlimited
resourcefulness in developing the means of production. This model proposed that a
“well-functioning market” would signal the shrinking of nature's capital and generate a
technology to replace it.
This model means that a cook baking a five kilo cake can boost it to a 100-kilo one by
an improved stirring method and by baking it longer in a bigger oven. Today a better
way of stirring will not suffice and neither will a bigger baking dish, as there may be
problems with the supply of flour and energy.
The Neoclassicist model was promoted to prominence in the 1970s when the limits of
growth11 were being widely discussed. It was being predicted that strategic resources
might run out, but no scenario dealt with the huge concentration of agricultural and
industrial production leading to a great rise in productivity and consumption. It went
virtually unnoticed that this generated, as well, huge waste during production and
consumption, all of which finally would lead to the destruction of the environment.
That is what has occurred, however.
Moreover, ethical issues such as animals' equal rights to coexist with people on the
planet were not weighed. It is strange that such a limited model of economics should not
have been amended and adjusted to conform to reality. Why does economics ignore a
situation where the cost of destroying the environment is greater than the cost of
producing goods for people? Environmentalists are now likening the dominant model of
economics to a car that is running downhill without working brakes. Neoclassicist
economists are unconvincing when they advise keeping the foot down on the pedal as
there will surely be somebody out there who will discover the brake in the meantime.
Neoclassicist economics had taken for granted “the well-functioning market.” In fact, it
is known that the market is controlled by big global business. Even governments are
being controlled by big business. This is in practice rather than in theory, of course.
No wonder that the economists who have been trained along the Neoclassicist model
encounter the forest and see no trees. The current structural economic crisis (called the
Great Recession of America and Europe) cannot be explained by means of complicated
mathematical equations.
The cause is that the economy of services in America and (particularly Western) Europe
is saturated and too weak to generate economic growth and a demand for goods and
services. Taking production away to Asia, and to China in particular, is abolishing the
middle class, which used to be the driving force of the Western economies. The crisis
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will go on until the middle class in the Western Civilization is reconstructed. This will
not come about soon as global business will not let it happen and neither will the
politicians who report to big business, so one should get accustomed to recession rather
than wait for better times.
Unlearned Lesson of the Old New Deal
The Keynesian model from the 1930s New Deal, which is often cited, was applied in a
situation where the American economy was a closed system. Now the system is open
and the stimulation of this economy best serves the economy of China.
Incidentally, it has been forgotten that there were two New Deals. The first New Deal,
blueprinted by the businessman Bernard Baruch, gave a carte blanche to big business
with a hope that they would create jobs, due to low prices. The opposite was the case –
cartels were created, prices went up, demand went down and so did employment. It was
only the second New Deal, strengthening the role of labor unions, that made salaries
grow. Demand followed, with businesses growing. It was particularly strong from 1945
to 1960, when the United States reached its fabulous years.
Unfortunately, no politician discusses the episode or the reason. We do not hear
economic scholars thus define the current problem of the Great Recession. There is no
mention, in this context, of globalization being the main cause of the high
unemployment in the Western civilization. Everywhere studies extol the glories of
globalization, treated as inevitable and lasting. There is little recognition of the fact that
the Internet as the driving factor of globalization is contributing to the disappearance of
the middle classes in the Western Civilization, which invented it and is now using it to
commit suicide. (In Poland this is less dangerous as Poland is a “mini-China” in Europe.
This is only for the time being, though).
The practice of commending all the new techniques in the replacement of human labor
with automated systems, based on robots and ICT, ought to be counted in the same
category of economic unreasonableness: in universities, in the media and in society, too.
The purpose of technology is not merely corporate profit (such as Apple's huge cash
surplus and no will to share it with stockholders in 2013), spectacular as it may be,
ignoring the social cost that will need to be paid once the plans and dreams of
technologists come true and total unemployment follows. Science is silent and so are
politicians. And then they are astonished that the Great Recession will not go away by
itself. Simply manipulating interest rates is not enough. One needs to have a clear
picture of the problem and do indicative planning, which France has been applying for
years.
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Summary
•
•

•

The great crisis of civilization in the early 21st century is made up of sixteen
specialized crises, but their interaction is only exacerbating the great crisis,
making it so complicated that the collapse of civilization might be triggered.
The central crisis is the crisis of science, followed by the crises of education and
population. The crisis of science means there are no intellectual foundations for
the resolution of most of these 16 crises, let alone all of them. The crisis of
education deprives people of sufficient knowledge, wisdom and qualifications to
solve the crises and uphold a sustainable operation of civilization. The
population crisis augurs great physical force that will devastate the environment
and exhaust strategic resources.
The Neoclassicist theory of economics is useless for the resolution of the
contemporary economic issues and civilizational problems, too. Worse still,
graduates actively involved in politics, media and institutions have lost common
sense, which is evidenced by current economic practices and the suicidal
financial system (based on gambling and going ever more into debt, as well as
bonuses that are bigger than lottery winnings, payment guaranteed).

It is worth reminding ourselves of the words spoken by a great 18th century Polish
educator, Stanisław Staszic: “Such will the republics be as is the education of their
youth,” which can be generalized into saying that the world will be modeled after the
education of its young people.
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Civilizational and Environmental Effects of Mongolia’s Transition
from a Pastoral to a Market-Driven Economy
Lynn Rhodes

Lynnrhodes2@hotmail.com
We are currently witness to the transformative influence of political power as a timeless
pastoral society is driven to conform to a market-driven economy.
In this paper I examine the influences of mining, democracy and a market-driven
economy on the traditional, pastoralist lifestyle of Mongolia and show how demography
and other descriptors of its society are shifting rapidly as a result. The newly emerged
democracy of Mongolia appears to be unable to defend itself from monumental
transformation, a change which is likely to result in ecological and cultural implosion.
One observing this phenomenon is forced to ask: Does a pastoralist culture of long
tradition have the innate right to continue? Will similar transitions now occurring
around the world bring about severe civilizational and environmental consequences
everywhere?
History
Mongolian pastoral life, occurring amidst the country’s vast, open landscapes, has
historically thrived. The land has provided a living commons for a variety of nomadic
cultures. But now neither the traditional structure of Mongolia nor its pastoral life, are
likely to continue, as current political forces eliminate what is traditional and shape
future civilizational aspects of the country and its people.
Mongolia benefits economically from the rapid acceleration of natural resource
extractions. Thus, the country’s GDP grew by an unprecedented 17.3% in 2011 and by
12.3% in 2012. 1 The majority of growth is due to extraction of coal and minerals, 80%
of all its exports, sent primarily to China. 2
Mongolian territory, at its height in the 13th century, comprised the largest continuous
land empire in history. From an often violent lifestyle, notably exhibited to the world at
first by Genghis Khan, the Mongols evolved a nomadic, pastoral life and developed a
form of Buddhism that created a relatively stable society.

1

World Bank 2012 Mongolia quarterly brief (February 2012)
Joel Brinkley, China’s Other Environmental Problems, World Affairs Journal, April 5, 2013 regarding
increasing demands
2
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Today, over half of Mongolia’s total population of 2,800,114 live in the capital city of
Ulaanbaatar. The rest is scattered across the country; most live as pastoralists in the
commons of the countryside. The traditional Mongolian family is the integral unit for
nomadic pastoralists. Individual families and small groups of families have historically
lived as one with the country’s landscape. It is this very culture that is in the midst of a
dramatic transformation.
The Tradition of Pastoralism
Mongolia is a large, sparsely populated country landlocked between China and Russia.
Winters are severe and long. Pastoral livestock production was the only primary
economic activity in the country for centuries and continues to be a primary economic
activity today. Pastoral livestock husbandry did not happen by accident in Mongolia.
To a large extent it was determined by a convergence of factors: geographical location;
soil unfavorable for agriculture; harsh weather conditions; the strength and abilities of
the Mongolian people to survive such an environment; and the ready (and primary)
commodity exchange of livestock.
Mongolia’s harsh terrain, natural and open pastures are the primary source of food for
pastoral livestock, which are managed using historic nomadic traditions. Livestock is
moved throughout the seasons and amongst varying pastures under traditional pastoral
grazing management strategies. These strategies have developed and adapted to
Mongolia’s ecological conditions and extreme climate. Further, these pastoral
management practices, which have evolved over the centuries, remain mostly intact, and
are found along with native breeds of livestock well suited to the environment.
The potential to continue pastoral life patterns in Mongolia today is aided by the
plethora of both natural resources and traditional pasture management practices.
Pastoralism remains an important sector of the Mongolian economy, contributing over
20% of the country’s GDP. 3 But there are risks and immediate threats to this ancient
lifestyle and the economy it helps to support.
First, Mongolian pastoralists face deteriorating social conditions. The living standard for
herders is one of the lowest in the world. Despite the flexibility of the herders, their
mobility, and their ability to live in harmony with the land, this centuries-old tradition is
now endangered.
A major reason is immediate environmental threats: diversion of water supplies,
pollution, respiratory illness, and displacement (relocation) largely caused by the mining
boom and rapid development.
3

National Statistics Office of Mongolia. 2009 Statistical Yearbook (National Statistics Office of
Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, 2010)
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The mining boom is fueling economic growth in the country at a rapid and alarming
pace. Thus, mining practices are affecting the governance of rural areas. This has taken
on such urgency that local herder-led resistance groups have forged alliances with nongovernmental organizations in order to respond to the land degradation of the commons,
direct and indirect, that is resulting from the mining.
There are also complex institutional innovations at work in rural Mongolia. Until
recently, the challenges of governance over the pastoral commons attracted little
attention. But, with the entry of the Oyu Tolgoi Mine, containing one of the largest
copper deposits in the world and the largest single investment in the history of
Mongolia 4, plus other mine projects such as the Tavan Tolgoi Coal Mine, world-wide
attention is now focused on the transformation of the Mongolian commons, its
governance and its capacity to handle the resulting challenges.
Threats
Near the formally-designated Protected Area of the Ikh Nart Nature Reserve and the
region of the Oyu Tolgoi Mine in south-east Mongolia are found dramatic examples of
challenges to management of communally-held lands and resource protection. Although
these two areas are not in the same province, they are neighbors and share comparable
issues.
Concerns are being raised by local pastoralists. These concerns have been outlined by a
rush of reports issued by the government, the United Nations Development Program,
various non-governmental organizations, and industry itself. Included are controversial
reports concerning the Oyu Tolgoi Project Management Plan and resource protection
plans such as the Special Protected Area Network Plan for the Ikh Nart Nature Reserve.
Major concerns include:
• Land acquisition and resettlement: Herders are worried about having to reduce
livestock due to decreasing pasture. The laying of new roads divides pastures
and disturbs ground and livestock, affecting herder livelihoods and income.
Changes bring increasing competition between herders for pasture and water.
Construction of infrastructure and the expansion of mining to yet additional
areas may trigger new waves of resettlement.
• Environment: This is happening quickly in Mongolia. There is a loss of
vegetation due to soil degradation. The clouds of dust and major noise impacts
are felt all along the roads. There is a negative impact on wildlife and a loss and
change of vegetation. As a result, cultural resources deteriorate.

4

Official Oyu Tolgoi Fact Sheet http://ot.mn/en/about-us
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Economy: Local companies as well as newly-minted entrepreneurs have a
limited understanding when forced to meet high volumes required by mining
projects. How should they maintain quality standards? Moreover, neither the
country’s government nor its private institutions have yet developed the ability
to oversee appropriately income, investment and wealth distribution.
Water Quality & Quantity: Water must be protected for human, wildlife and
environmental health. Herders report that more water must be made available to
maintain pastureland viability. They are concerned with reduction and pollution
of water supplies. Shockingly, World Bank researchers have concluded that
current known water resources have just 10 to 12 years left, unless additional
sources are located and utilized.
Cultural Heritage: The traditional nomadic herding lifestyle is changing rapidly.
Pastoralists are uncertain of lifestyle changes, cultural resources, cultural history
and their future livelihoods. They want to ensure protection of local culture and
keep their historically significant heritage and way of life. Can they?
Other Physical Issues: There are concerns for designated Protected Areas arising
from the construction of transport corridors in the buffer zones. Migratory
animals are being hampered by the impact of new roads in mining areas, by
fencing, and by the building of railways. To make matters yet more dire, the
Ministry of Industry and Trade is requesting that currently designated Protected
Areas, currently pastoral, be declassified so that mining may commence there.

Map of Oyo Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi Mine Project Areas
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Map of Mining Licenses and Protected Areas

I have interviewed herders, conservationists, mine employees, eco-tourism specialists
and local Mongolian officials. In the process I have observed an increased tendency to
adopt Western economic and Western conservation-related values concerning
pastoralist landscapes and open spaces. These Western practices and values often
conflict with the informal, flexible institutions of commons-management traditionally
used by pastoralists.
A report by one company, the Oyu Tolgoi LLC, outlines the impacts of coming water
diversion and spring relocation on the region’s water resources, flora and wildlife. See
Tables 16, 21 and 27; these are taken from the company’s Undai River Protection and
Partial Diversion Project’s “Detailed Environmental Impact Assessment” of 2012 5 . In
some cases the only available water source already has been fenced in by mining
companies and is no longer available for livestock. Thus, herders, nomads who make
up 40 per cent of Mongolia’s population, have seen their sole water source diverted.
They say that pollutants are poisoning their livestock.

5

5
Available at:
http://ot.mn/sites/default/files/reports/Detailed_EIA_Oyu_Tolgoi_Undai_River_Protection_2012_EN.pdf
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TABLE 16. RISK RANKING OF POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON WATER RESOURCE

Potential Impact

Loss of Bor ovoo spring
Interruptions of restriction on the base
flow in the wells and springs south of
license area (downstream of
diversion), e.g., Khukh Khad, Maanit
and Burkhant Springs
PAF or sediment laden water run-off
into the Undai River diversion
Hydrocarbon spills during
construction leading to contamination
of water resources
Groundwater level will decrease
around the area including diversion
dam to reprovisioned Bor ovoo spring
and dry excessively

Consequences Likelihood

Risk
Ranking

Local impact

Almost
certain

Local impact

Possible

H

Local impact

Unlikely

L

Local impact

Unlikely

L

Local impact

Almost
certain

H

H

TABLE 21. RISK RANKING OF POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON VEGETATION

Impact

Loss of vegetation associated with
surface water features, including Bor
Ovoo Spring and vegetation
communities associated with the
temporary flow of the diverted
section of the Undai River with 1.5
ha

Consequence

Likelihood

Local impact

Almost
Certain

Risk
Ranking

H

TABLE 27. RISK RANKING OF POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON FAUNA

Impact

Destroy wildlife water point and
wildlife habitat to be changed
Elm trees might be destroyed and
breeding location for several
carnivorous birds to be changed
Soil disturbance within project area
may impact on insect habitat

Consequence

Likelihood

Risk
Ranking

Local impact

Almost
certain

Local impact

Possible

M

Local impact

Almost
certain

M

M

Each of these risks is serious. Yet, the mitigation proposed tends to be minimal.
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The process for mitigation of these threats to the environment, when dealing with
mining companies, is complex. This is especially true for people who are widely
dispersed across the commons and for the most part do not have timely or traditionally
organized means of communication.
Here is an example which outlines the steps of one proposed Community Grievance
Procedure. Although relatively straightforward in appearance, each step throws huge
barriers in the way of herder communities as they try to see the process through to
meaningful resolution.
The process is different with each company.
Regulatory and Institutional Framework
In the past decade, the Mongolian government has evolved from being predominately
the owner and operator of mines to being a manager and regulator. This transformation
set in place a legal framework designed to help guarantee an environmentally
sustainable growth of the mining sector. The cornerstones of this framework are the
Mongolian laws on environmental protection and environmental impact assessment.
These laws include the application of a “polluter-pays” principle and the right of access
to environmental information.
They also address the promotional roles of
governmental, nongovernmental, and international entities in raising environmental
awareness through environmental education and technical training programs. Yet these
laws contain no provisions for a socioeconomic impact assessment.
The 1997 Mineral Law was designed to accommodate the government’s limited
institutional and financial capacity. While it provides a simple framework that takes
into account some of the key environmental and social impacts of mining, it fails to
formalize public involvement in the permitting process and lacks provisions to ensure
sufficient funding for ongoing and future rehabilitation. 6
Before 1992 and the shift to a market economy, the state-owned Mongolian-Soviet joint
ventures with Russia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary dominated
the mining industry. Back then, the mining ventures focused primarily on coal, gold,
copper, tin, fluorspar, and molybdenum. Since 1992, there has been a growth in the
number of local Mongolian companies along with other countries involved in natural
resource exploration and mining.
The mining companies establish industrial cities of various sizes to serve large groups
of people and provide support services for resource extraction and production activities.
Until recently, mining enterprises had been operating with minimal local recruitment or
6

Mongolia Review of Environmental and Social Impacts in the Mining Sector, May 2006, World Bank
www.worldbank.org/eapenvironment
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input from rural people. Possibly, new cooperation involving human outreach will
minimize negative impacts of mining and change the reality that mining activities
destroy the environment and make only minimal contributions to the overall economy.
But, lack of trust by rural pastoralists and others affected by mining operations has been
intensified because the regulatory and institutional support system(s) have not
adequately safeguarded the affected communities.
Until recently, collateral
involvement and development programs have been undertaken by mining companies as
simply incidental initiatives undertaken in order to help the companies improve their
relationships with the local herder communities.
Key unresolved issues include:
• complex, historical land-use practices,
• functioning financial policies that would contribute to local communities,
• informal, renegade or “ninja” mining by herders who practice free-lance illegal
mining, and
• the capacity of government oversight to ensure compliance with regulations and
laws.
Capacity
Mongolia’s Law on the Protection of Cultural Properties states that prior to allowing
land to be used in the construction of buildings, hydroelectric stations, industrial mines
and infrastructural improvements, a feasibility study must be conducted by authorized
historical and archaeological organizations. Costs related to the feasibility study are
covered by the organization in charge of such activities. Compliance with the law,
especially its requirement for feasibility study oversight and follow-through, is a
challenge. It is met with skepticism by government officials, herders, and nongovernmental organizations.
In February 2013, the United States refused to endorse the World Bank Mongolia (Oyo
Tolgoi) Mine Project. It cited numerous concerns about environmental oversight,
unresolved consequences to herders and inadequate governmental oversight capacity.
Due to these and other issues, the United Nations Development Program, with the
support of the British embassy in Mongolia, organized a meeting in January of 2013 of
government officials, international partners, citizens, academia and the media.
According to the UNDP, revenue from mining alone accounts for nearly one-third of
Mongolian government revenues, and makes up approximately 22% of the country’s
GDP. With the large influx of revenues come opportunities for transformation of a
country’s prospects -- and for the fabric of a traditional society.
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History tells us that presented with this opportunity, a country’s management decisions
are critical to failure or success and prosperity. UNDP Resident Representative Sezin
Sinanoglu has said “The sheer size of Mongolia’s mineral resources and potential
revenue flows are staggering, which places a huge responsibility on the government as it
faces tough policy choices on how to use this wealth wisely for the benefit of all. When
making those choices, the key words will be equity, sustainability and accountability, all
of which underscore human development.” With funds being accumulated rapidly,
perhaps Mongolia can expand the well-being of the people and also provide for future
generations. These mean different things to different people and varying interests and
require informed governance.
Because Mongolia’s economy today is heavily dependent upon mineral exports, there is
added risk should an expected revenue stream be interrupted by global prices. To
address expected fluctuations in market prices, Mongolia must ensure informed and
knowledgeable adaptability in order to safeguard pastoralism and the environment and
provide for growth that is compatible with law, policy, traditions and culture. In order
to innovate and continue making improvements, both the urban and rural population
face a choice: the decline of the pastoralist lifestyle may, in fact, be the offset cost for
the financial benefits of mining.
Innovations, Adaptive and Co-Management
Collaborative efforts are being attempted between herders, government officials, nongovernmental organizations, and developers in hopes to effectively manage land while
addressing livelihood issues contained in the mining v. pastoralist debate.
Dr. Caroline Upton, a researcher from Leicester University, writes that Mongolian
herders are facing multiple pressures on their livelihoods, traditionally based on
nomadic pastoralism, from climate change, mining, desertification and new policies on
land. She was the lead researcher on a recent project where national decision-makers
were brought together with affected parties and local stakeholders to evaluate key issues
pertaining to nomadic culture, livelihoods and identity in modern Mongolia.
Herders are being encouraged, through government policy and donor interventions, to
form herder groups. The groups are designed to collaborate in pasture management,
labor sharing, and environmental conservation, as well as marketing of their livestock
products, improving local livelihoods and resilience. 7 One such group with which I
work in the region is a woman’s collective called Ikh Nart is our Future.

7

“Community, Place and Pastoralism: Nature and Society in Post-Soviet Central Asia” Leverhulme
Trust, Caroline Upton et al.
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The Oyo Tolgoi Mine Cultural Heritage Program coordinated and outlined a series of
meetings in August and September of 2010 with local herders to help develop cultural
protection efforts. Topics included:
• What is cultural heritage?
• What should we do to preserve and transmit it to future generations?
• Meeting local citizens who are interested in the research work of local historical
and cultural properties. 8
Dr. Joan Schneider, an archaeologist from the California State Parks, coordinates a
cultural protection program and team in the Ikh Nart Nature Reserve Protected Area.
She is also working with local herder communities, Mongolian and other cultural
specialists to identify and protect cultural resources and to minimize negative impacts of
mining activity. Her team’s work was presented at a conference in Hawaii in early
2013. Dr. Schneider cited the newly developed Ikh Nart Management Plan 9 as being
instrumental in identifying critical areas of focus. Only with on-going and sincere
efforts will outcomes from this type of collaboration prove beneficial.
A much debated pastureland law is attempting to strengthen seasonal pasture rights for
families and herder groups. In addition to the impacts on mining and development,
there are fears that historic pastureland may become privatized. This will mean less
ability to move herds in traditional ways based on variable need. Adaptive pastoral
management -- a form of co-management in cooperation with local government,
researchers and others -- is gaining support and is being replicated in many areas.
Adaptive co-management begins at the field or pasture level. Academic activist H.
Ykhanbai has said that pastures in Mongolia are a common pool resource shared by
many users, while private ownership of livestock allows herders to manage their own
business.
Sustainable management of herds depends on the carrying capacity of pastures and on
the interactions of those who rely on the same resources. Ykhanbai points out that there
is a limited capacity of herders and local government to sustainably manage pasture
resources. Other stakeholders, however, from mining, development, education,
business, government, and governmental organizations can help. Working together,
perhaps many have the ability to manage resources more effectively.
Collaborating in adaptive co-management may give herders a more representative voice
when evaluating short and long-term impacts that are crucial to them and the
sustainability of their livelihoods and lifestyles. Groups of nomadic herding households
can graze their livestock in rotation throughout seasonal pastures. Then they can gather

8
9

Oyu Tolgoi LLC Cultural Heritage Program Phase 1 Report February 2011
Management Plan for Ikh Nart Nature Reserve 2012-2016 (UNDP SPAN Project)
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in winter and spring camps with their livestock sheltered and then return to adjacent
areas in summer and autumn with the fresh water and greening pastures.
According to Upton and others, Mongolian government policy is also promoting
intensified livestock production. When this occurs it increases tensions between
movable and more sedentary livestock production in rural areas. This intensification
raises questions about the nomadic pastoral culture and its very identity in a modern
Mongolia. Intensification of production requires, among other things, changes in how
pastureland is allocated, leases, flexibility and mobility.
Conclusion
Rapid development of mining activity and resource extraction in Mongolia has an
immediate impact on the issues of historic pastoral land rights, the survival of the
pastoralist culture and environmental sustainability. Mongolia’s neighbors -- primarily
China and its huge demand for copper, gold, uranium, and other minerals and its
political influence -- is a driving pressure for increased resource extraction. The same
applies to China’s increasing demand in Africa, where it is vigorously pursuing needed
natural resources. But the Mongolia case is a conspicuous, dramatic example.
Adaptive co-management groups are becoming more prominent as a solution to
evolving questions of land rights, herder relocation, natural resource protection, and the
preservation of cultural resources. Both the future of Mongolia’s pastoral herding
culture and the country’s evolving civilizational transformation are linked to evolving
policy, the capacity to manage, and decisions being made today. Overall, there is
growing recognition of the value of pastoral life and heightened recognition of its
cultural, historic and on-going traditions.
History shows that we tend to protect what we value. There are competing civilizational
values and there are so-called “global values”. Does pastoral life have a right to exist or
must it compete with the innovations and demands that arrive with modernity? We
know from studying the past that dominant civilizations prevail. The more influential
the voice, the more protection is afforded. The voice of pastoralism in Mongolia is
talking, but is it destined for extinction or will it continue to be heard?
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Taking Ownership of Distance in the Stone Age
With Spear, Atlatl, and Archery:
Prehistoric Weapon Systems and the Domination of Distance
Harry Rhodes

harrydet@hotmail.com
The history of weapons is of crucial importance to the study of comparative civilization.
Some of the most important technological advances in all civilizations were the result of
human beings attempting to gain military advantage. In this paper I will look at three
key weapons, the spear, the atlatl and the bow and arrow. While there is a fair amount
of research on the spear and the bow and arrow, there is relatively little on the
importance of the atlatl. This paper corrects the deficit. We will show that in addition
to the spear and bow and arrow, the atlatl played an important role in increasing the
distance from which one could attack or defend against an enemy, prey, or predator.
In the beginning there was a rock. A rock is an efficient weapon as far as it goes. Part
of my family hails from Northern Ireland and the modern counterparts of the rock,
specifically the cobblestone and the brick, have served valiantly in that locale as
projectile weapons, delivered with sometimes surprising aerodynamic stability and
accuracy by those on both sides of the political difficulties. But rocks and their modern
counterparts are inelegant and more importantly very difficult to carry around in
constant readiness. Further, the “technology” of the unfinished rock was available to all
equally, and so gave its possessors little comparative advantage. It is not surprising,
therefore, that in the earliest times alternatives to the rock were developed.
Three significant weapon systems appear during the Stone Age, which, in concert with
other basic survival strategies, helped early humans to survive and then thrive under
often extremely adverse conditions. These three weapon systems were so significant
and of such simple and technologically sound design and importance they would
continue in recognizable form and be used in the military operations of civilized peoples
well into the second millennia of the Common Era. These three systems are the spear,
the dart thrower (atlatl), and archery.
Critical not only to the survival of our very early ancestors, these basic systems and
their realized potential would help form military thinking and actions in civilizations
which would eventually follow. These systems existed as tools and, as in any craft, the
product of the craftsman is shaped in good part by the tools, materials and technology
available to him. These systems would help shape the world in which we live today.
These systems were probably developed and improved over time by many generations
of humans, some of whose innovations speak to the exceptional genius of early
humanity. From the perspective of our modern world, where almost every student (in
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an industrialized country) has virtually limitless knowledge available at his or her
fingertips, and so much food that obesity is becoming epidemic, it is difficult to imagine
or truly appreciate the immensity of these innovations or the circumstances and
conditions under which they were made.
Each of these three systems offered critical technological advances and aided early
humans to survive, to dominate areas they chose to occupy, and to thrive through the
ability to take adequate game, thereby providing sufficient food. The systems were so
sound in their basic concepts and designs that they would work effectively in extremely
varied environments and could be manufactured from a wide assortment of raw
materials.
When used alone, each system was limited in the extent of its performance. The spear,
although a near perfect close-quarter weapon and always ready for use, had a very
limited range and area of domination. The atlatl, though having incredible range
compared to the spear, and sharing the spear’s constant state of immediate readiness,
was limited in how many projectiles could be carried by a hunter, and it could not
perform well as a close-quarter defensive weapon.
Archery, having the highest level of technology of the three systems, the longest
accurate range, and the potential to carry larger numbers of projectiles, had serious
deficiencies in that the bow could not, in most cases, be kept in strung condition, and
therefore was not always immediately usable. In addition, the bowstring, even into the
medieval period, was vulnerable to water and needed to be kept dry. When two or all
three of the systems were used in concert, they complimented each other and could give
man an almost unbeatable edge in defense against animal predators and an advantage in
hunting as well as in conflict with other humans not so equipped.
Technology alone is never sufficient on its own. Technology requires clever,
motivated, intelligent, and responsible human involvement, direction, and operation.
The weapon systems described were created at times and in conditions where there was
no guarantee humans would survive as a species. The successful operation of these
very basic tools required an understanding and respect for the natural world, its
resources, and the animals with which they shared the world.
Motivations and Resources
Members of our species, when so inclined, are potentially the deadliest predators on the
planet. However we are physically designed more in the image of prey. We lack claws,
fangs, antlers, horns or tusks, are comparatively weak and slow, and carry just enough
muscle mass and fat to make killing us profitable to predators searching for meals.
Perhaps our natural frailty and vulnerability is the motivation to develop survival
technologies.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013

51

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 69 [2013], No. 69, Art. 17

Comparative Civilizations Review

47

What we, as humans, do have in our favor is more important than natural weapons,
speed or strength. We have physical endurance, the will to compete and survive, hands
with which to manipulate our environment and the raw materials within it, and, most
importantly, brains with which to think and imagine. We have the ability to visualize
that which has never existed before, to see potential in inanimate objects, and then to
fashion and create the artifacts imagined in our thoughts. We confront problems, create
solutions, modify materials, adapt to change, and overcome obstacles. We also have the
ability to communicate with other members of our species by physical demonstration,
signs, and language.
Evolution gave humans the advantage of greater intelligence, but otherwise humans are
the perfect physical prey; thus man must rely on survival strategies rather than natural
strength. Survival strategies include many avenues such as making and using fire,
twisting or braiding fibers and sinew into thread and cord, flaking and grinding stone or
carving bone and antler into tools, fashioning efficient, tailored clothing against the
cold, making storage containers, and drying and preserving food.
In wild, predator-inhabited environments, distance becomes a significant key to
survival. If man can control and dominate distance he can avoid the fangs and claws of
predators, and the horns, antlers and kicking hooves of those animals he wishes to use
for food. Distance can be controlled and dominated by the use of weapon technologies,
and here it is all about distance.
The ownership and control of distance is not only of importance to survival, hunting,
and human conflict applications, it is also a proto-concept that leads slowly but
inevitably to settlements and the eventual creation of civilizations. It is not much of a
conceptual leap to go from, “this area is mine right now (by force of arms),” to this area
(property) is mine.”
The seeds of the concept of real property exist in the very first deployments of
sharpened sticks to defend those small pieces of ground where early man refused to turn
and run away. At that point man began his pursuit of dominion of the earth and the long
climb to civilization.
As humans we understand that we will die. It is unequivocal and inevitable and in the
immediate world of the Stone Age was something faced on a daily basis. On the other
hand, when a lion or bear charges, it does not think it might die on the human’s spear.
The human holding the spear and bracing for contact clearly knows his survival is not
guaranteed, that he may die, and he understands the impact his death would bring to his
small, fragile family group. Thus there is clearly motivation for humans to develop,
perfect, and effectively use technology.
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Technological Connections and the Evolution of Armaments
The spear, the atlatl and archery are more closely related than they might at first appear.
A closer look at the three systems reveals very strong relationships between the systems
and the likelihood of an evolution amongst them as opposed to independent
development.
The spear: alpha and omega of the three early weapon systems
The spear is the alpha of the three systems because of its simplicity and because it was
the first of the three systems to be developed, as early as 500,000 to 780,000 years ago.
It is the omega because unlike the dart thrower and archery, which currently exist
primarily for recreational uses, the spear in its modern manifestation continues to exist
in a tactical environment around the world as the bayonet on a battle rifle. Over the
millennia the defense concept represented by the spear has kept its value. The
bayonet’s purpose is to kill but its true value is in defense.
The spear is the first truly significant early weapon system. A rock can kill small and
medium size game, but a rock thrown by human hands is unlikely to stop a large
charging animal. Rocks of sufficient size to be adequate killing weapons are not
practical to carry around and would need to be used at prepared ambush sites or as
weapons of opportunity, if available, during times of need. The spear was the game
changer because it did what no other early weapon system could do: it could be easily
transported, kept close and ready at hand, and it put a physical barrier between man and
predator (or man and angry, charging game). For the dangerous animal to get to man it
must then first overcome the spear.
The spear is the first weapon system used to effectively establish the concept of area
denial. It is a small area to be sure, but in concept as well as in implementation (with a
skilled, healthy and lucky hunter-warrior) it is an absolute. There is no argument or
discussion. Entry is simply denied; the human’s first personal space is enforced. As
weapon technologies advance, the area under man’s control increases proportionately
(until the point where human challenges human and then comes argument, discussion,
and too frequently the tactical employment of weapon technology).
For the spear to work effectively, it must have certain simple but necessary
characteristics: the shaft must be strong and of suitable diameter for maintaining a grip
in violent encounters and it must be long enough to keep threats at a “safe” distance. It
also requires a sharp and lethal point. The spear must be maneuverable as not all
attacks are frontal charges, especially when made by predators operating in hunting
teams or packs.
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Modern military and police tacticians use the term “close quarter battle” (CQB) to
define conflict in immediate proximity to threats. The basic stone-age spear existed in
this type of CQB environment. Threats were immediate, attacks direct, indirect, and
dynamic, and to kill or be killed was the rule.
The spear can be used as a stabbing, thrusting, and throwing weapon as well as a
moveable barrier or impalement weapon, making it a perfect CQB system. A
significant benefit of the spear is that, once fashioned, it is always ready to use. If well
fashioned and designed, and constructed of suitably strong materials, there is little to go
wrong with it.
The most significant limitation of the spear is that it controls very little area, even when
used as a throwing weapon. If used as a throwing weapon, secondary or alternate
weapons need to be available to replace the thrown spear.
The spear alone did not give man an edge in defense against predators so much as it
effectively leveled the playing field for the first time. Before adopting the spear, man
existed in an asymmetrical relationship with predators, with the advantage on the side of
the predators. The spear gave man a fighting chance to survive against most dangerous,
aggressive predators. The spear became man’s de facto fangs and claws.
Considering the vast variety of hunting spears developed through the ages and across
the globe, diversity was also likely in very early times as well. As humans, we adapt to
changing conditions and opportunities as they avail themselves. Early spears evolved
into many specialist forms including spears with multiple barbed prongs for taking fish
and eels, and long, light throwing spears for taking water fowl and other game at short
distances. Throwing spears existed for larger game but were proportionately heavier to
be effective.
It is very likely that spears primarily designed for throwing evolved into the darts used
in atlatls. Small game throwing spears and atlatl darts share many of the same
characteristics, and all of the same objectives. Throwing a spear and throwing an atlatl
dart is also basically the same physical movement on the part of the hunter. The
difference in the throw is the addition of the atlatl, which acts as a jointed extension of
the throwers arm. Technologically the increase in power is obtained by the atlatl
contacting the back of the dart (rather than the throwers hand holding the shaft of the
spear) allowing the dart to bend against resistance and load energy. The hunter does
touch the shaft of the dart but only enough to hold it in place on the atlatl prior to the
throw.
The atlatl dart system most likely came from people with a vigorous and aggressive
hunting tradition where taking game at greater and greater distances was a desired
objective (or a survival imperative), and it is more than likely that they already used
efficient throwing spears before developing atlatl technology.
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The Atlatl: the evolutionary bridge between spear and archery

The dart thrower, commonly referred to in English speaking countries as the atlatl, is an
offensive weapon used to deliver lethal force at a distance. It has value in both hunting
and military contexts. Tests have shown that the atlatl provides an increase of 60% in
thrust. The atlatl thus increases the range at which man may take game or initiate hostile
engagement with enemies. It is not an effective defensive weapon in close confines; its
darts are generally too weak, light and flexible to serve as spears or efficient stabbing
weapons.
Darts used in the atlatl are generally long, flexible, and light. Like an arrow the darts are
usually fletched with feathers at the back of the shaft for stability in flight. Oddly,
unlike arrowheads, there is little correlation between dart tip size and shaft size.
General observations from current atlatl enthusiasts, including my own observations and
research, indicate that most atlatls are and likely were somewhere in the 20 plus inch
range but the variation in atlatl lengths is significant. The shortest reliable artifact atlatl
I located during research was seventeen inches long (Peru) and the longest forty-four
and a quarter inches (Australia). Longer atlatls tend to make for harder, longer and
more powerful throws. Shorter atlatls tend to make for more accurate throws. Since
both power and accuracy are desired characteristics of a working weapon system a
compromise is necessary between the two.
Atlatl darts are generally much longer than modern day arrows although some South
American arrows still in use today can rival the lengths and appearance of some modern
atlatl darts. Modern traditional style dart shafts are mostly fashioned from wood or
river cane and have stone, bone, antler or copper points.
The observations of modern atlatlists indicate the atlatl is by any measure an impressive
weapon system, and the archaeological record testifies to the effectiveness of the atlatl.
Archery: perfection at the end of evolution?
Archery is very old, going back at least 64,000 years. As practiced in early prehistoric
times, archery consisted of a system whereby arrows were propelled with accuracy and
power from a bow for the purpose of hunting or warfare.
Unlike the spear or the atlatl system, archery required a more involved technological
process to make a working weapon system. Arrows were fairly straight forward to
manufacture, being in form, construction, and function very much like smaller versions
of atlatl darts and using the same general techniques to manufacture. The bow and bow
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string, however, were a new type of technology requiring the ability to manage much
stronger stresses.
The spear, atlatl and atlatl darts had been fairly simple to manufacture, as were the
arrows for the new weapon system of archery. The spear, atlatl and darts, and the new
arrows, all faced relatively simple stresses in use. The spear was required to stand up to
the torque of vigorous combat once a penetration was made, but it was very much just a
strong tool-handle used to deliver a tool-head in the form of a point. The atlatl faced the
least amount of stress in these early systems, being in effect a small hand tool that used
a spur to throw a light and flexible dart. The atlatl dart did load energy during a throw
but its purpose was swift flight to deliver a sharp point accurately and at a velocity
sufficient to penetrate and kill.
With the bow, weapon technology entered a whole new world, a world of energy stored
under pressure. A bow had to be bent without breaking in order to be strung. It then
needed to be bent even further, under greater pressure, with an arrow placed on the
string and when the string was released it needed to transfer energy from the bow,
through the string to the arrow. At this point in the operation the arrow acted much as
an atlatl dart did when it was thrown. The arrow would bend against the bow loading
energy and then straighten as it left the bow flying toward the target.
The string of the bow needed to be incredibly strong but could easily be made from
sinew or other naturally strong fibers.
The bow was as significant an advance in technology as had been the atlatl. The bow
could deliver an arrow faster and farther than possible with an atlatl dart, and with great
accuracy.
Very early arrows were likely close in appearance to atlatl darts, especially in regions
where suitable shaft material was abundant. In parts of South America, where
prehistoric technologies continue to be practiced by indigenous peoples, the arrows used
are frequently as long as six feet. The availability of materials from which to fashion
arrow shafts and bows varied by region as well as by changing climate conditions. In
many areas suitable materials for the construction of darts, bows and arrows may have
been very limited, requiring innovation or the use of less desirable materials. Some of
the earliest arrow shafts discovered in Europe, used in association with reindeer hunting,
were made from pine.
As the spear changed through the ages so did the bow and its arrows. Bows were
fashioned from a variety of materials including wood, bone, sinew, and horn, and recurve technology was introduced where the two ends of the bow were bent forward to
give even greater speed to the arrow. In time most arrows became shorter and some
arrow points became very small. As arrows decreased in length and weight their range
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and speed increased dramatically. Bows of any significant draw weight could still not
be left strung for long periods of time without seriously weakening the weapon’s power,
and the bowstrings remained vulnerable to water but their value was unchallengeable.
With the development of the quiver to hold arrows in readiness, and the large scale
manufacture of arrows in early civilizations, archery took its place as a critical military
asset. For the first time a weapon existed that could reliably deliver large numbers of
accurate, long range, and deadly projectiles. With ranks of archers shooting
standardized bulk arrows the game changed again.
Imagine a relief carving of an Assyrian warrior with braided beard, re-curved composite
bow and a quiver of matching arrows. At his side is an innovation, a sword. He is with
other warriors, some with bows and some with spears and shields, and they are
members of an advanced, ordered, and civilized military system. History begins but the
technological innovations of prehistory have left their mark and shaped the future.
Conclusions
Most importantly, the spear, the atlatl, and archery allowed humans to survive and
subsequently to form our civilizations. The spear and the atlatl were especially
important to our survival during the Ice Age. During the Younger Dryas (12,900 to
11,600 years ago), a still critical time for humans with extreme cold inhibiting an
increase in the population, archery appears in Europe, replacing the atlatl in reindeer
hunts as a more efficient weapon system. The spear, the atlatl and archery, in their own
times, and in concert with other survival strategies, allowed humans to survive.
The three weapon systems had another long term effect influencing society. Hunting
was initially of critical importance to man in supplying animal protein, and in places
remains so today, but after the domestication of animals its critical importance in
obtaining food diminished significantly, although as a male dominated activity it
continued to thrive. Hunting large animals, especially with spear, dart, and archery, is a
violent and brutal activity and perfectly suited for rites of passage, as well as to train
and harden warriors.
Weapon systems had immeasurable effect on group society and in the long run on
civilization. In any endeavor the methods we use are defined, as well as limited, by our
tools and these items are the tools of war, defining by how they work military thought
and the way wars are fought. Without the development of the spear and subsequently
the atlatl and the bow, our concept of war would be different. Imagine the Legions of
Rome, the Mongolian horsemen of Genghis Khan, or the English soldiers at Agincourt
armed with bags of rocks.
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It does matter to us that these technologies were developed. Without their development
it would be a different world. The fact that early civilizations developed at all beyond
small cities was influenced in great part by their ability to conduct war, to directly
control large geographical areas and to press their influence beyond their borders.
The early civilizations, using chariots, were devastating in their military capabilities, but
the chariot was primarily a delivery system for a warrior using arrows and spears. On
its own, the chariot was technologically interesting but without weapon systems it
would lack much of its purpose.
Brigadier General Chuck Yeager, USAF, once said that an airplane (in a military
context) was just a platform on which to mount a gun. That is no different in concept
from an Assyrian, Hittite, or Egyptian chariot delivering the weapon systems of spear,
javelin and archery. Distance is dominated by weapon systems, and in large scale
conflicts, whether in the ancient world or the modern, by the ability to transport men
and weapon systems to where they are desired. The conquest of distance is therefore
the key to understanding the importance of early weapons technology. It was the ability
of humans to carve out spaces of their own that made the concept of property viable. It
was the ability of humans to defend an area that made the development of cities
possible. And with the rise of cities and greater cooperation, further technological
developments became possible. But in the beginning were the spear, the atlatl and the
bow.
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Megacities: A Survey and Prognosis
Laina Farhat-Holzman
Lfarhat102@aol.com

Introduction
The role of geography phases in and out of civilizational studies, always competing with
the roles of the individual and those of politics and culture. Today, modern geography
is getting another run as a major player in how civilizations behave and interact. Jared
Diamond’s important work, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies,
1997, took on the question of geography’s role in the civilizational advantages of
Eurasia over the New World and Africa. Robert D. Kaplan’s The Revenge of Geography
(2012) shows the inevitability of much of today’s geopolitics that loom even above
individuals and events.
One aspect of geography includes the evolution of megacities in developing countries
and how such cities affect the behavior of their residents, including those attempting to
govern them. Climate, aesthetics (an ignored topic), sociological issues, population
explosion and the new fertility crash impact populations only recently living a village
life.
Demographic changes are part of the study of geo-politics, as are the physical features
where cities are located. Megacities must be studied by demographers, economists,
medical practitioners, educators, and political scientists, which makes the discipline
complicated and interactive. This paper can only provide an overview of a topic that
will weigh most heavily on civilizationists for years to come.
Megacities
The rise of megacities is not a new phenomenon in the world. One fascinating study by
Tertius Chandler1 traced the world’s largest cities back to the first in 3100 BCE. Since
there were few censuses before the end of the 18th century in Europe, he used travelers’
estimates, data on the number of households within cities, the number of wagons
carrying foodstuffs for cities, the size of the military, the area of city walls, church
records, food supplies distributed to the citizens, and even estimates of lives lost during
disasters. These estimates include most of the suburbs as well.
Chandler provides a fascinating list, part of which is offered on the next page:
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City
Year it became No. 1
Memphis, Egypt
3100 BCE
Ur, Babylonia
2030
Babylon, Babylonia
612
Changan, Xian, China
198 CE
Rome
25
Constantinople
340
Baghdad
775
Cordova, Spain
800
(no more megacities until 15th century.)
Beijing, China
1425
Constantinople
1650
Beijing, China
1710
London, England
1825
New York
1925
Tokyo
1965

55
Population
>30,000
65,000
First over 200,000
400,000
450,000
400,000
First over 1 million
700,000
600,000
700,000
900,000
First over 5 million
First over 10 million
First over 20 million

Of course, since 1965, many other cities have joined the list of megacities, some of
them with severe problems in managing these communities. The difficulty in assessing
the accuracy of these numbers can be seen in almost every printed table, such as that in
Wikipedia, which posts conflicting figures from a number of sources. Those numbers
provided by the United Nations are the most problematical and are at the moment on the
low side. The UN numbers have been provided by the host nations themselves (I called
and asked), which aside from the developed world, make little pretense of taking a
census.
However, other institutions have posted their estimates for the largest metropolitan areas
in the world today, and a number appear to be over 20 million: Cairo, Egypt; Dhaka,
Bangladesh; Istanbul, Turkey; Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo; Lagos,
Nigeria; Lima, Peru; Mumbai, India; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Shanghai, China; and
Tehran, Iran are among these. In addition are a rising number of other, some new, cities
in China.
In all of these cities, the countryside farming villages are emptying out, creating huge
slums in their country’s major cities. As terrible as these slums are, life there appears to
offer more possibilities than life in feudal villages. Furthermore, as these countries are
pushed into democratizing, the new city dwellers will vote, a daunting prospect for
democracy’s future.
Says Forbes, urbanization is continuing rapidly, and it is estimated that by 2030, 60% of
the world’s people will be city dwellers, “billions of people will be living in vast slums
in the developing world, facing a long list of urban ills on which starvation may be just
another bullet point.”
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Forbes further notes that there is some hope that the developing world might learn from
the most developed countries some techniques for surviving such growth. Tokyo, in
1900, was the world’s seventh largest city with 1.5 million people (London was the
largest that year with 6.5 million). Today, Greater Tokyo is the world’s largest city with
a population of 35.2 million. But Japan is having a population crash, which means that
the growth of Tokyo is beginning to slow down. But even with 35.2 million, Tokyo is a
modern, very well run metropolitan area. This is not so for the majority of countries,
such as a number of those listed above. For example, Lagos had 300,000 people in
1950; it now has an estimated 16 million people, and it is a city already crumbling into
chaos.
The New Left Review3 ran an article by Mike Davis, “The Third World’s Megacities,” in
2004, with an ominous first paragraph:
Sometime in the next year, a woman will give birth in the Lagos slum of
Ajegunle, a young man will flee his village in west Java for the bright lights of
Jakarta, or a farmer will move his impoverished family into one of Lima’s
innumerable pueblos jovenes. The exact event is unimportant and it will pass
entirely unnoticed. Nonetheless, it will constitute a watershed in human history.
For the first time the urban population of the earth will outnumber the rural.
Indeed, given the imprecision of Third World censuses, this epochal transition
may already have occurred.
See also: Koonings, Kees, and Krujit, Dirk, Megacities: the Politics of Urban Exclusion
and Violence in the Global South, Zed Books, 2010.
The fate of megacities appears to be a game changer indeed.
England’s Experience
Even well before the Industrial Revolution, during the time of Henry VIII, the nobility
were enclosing grazing lands for the wool industry, forcing villagers to flee to London
to find work. London had its first growth then. But by the beginnings of the Industrial
Revolution in 18th century England, the countryside further emptied into cities with little
infrastructure to care for them. Throughout Europe, this burgeoning growth made
worse the problems of crime, filth, and diseases caused by crowding, lack of sanitation,
and contaminated water. The Black Death cycles were over by then, but typhoid,
tuberculosis, typhus, and other diseases cut swaths through urban populations.4
Fortunately for Europe, these problems were addressed by the emerging scientific
revolution. For the first time since Rome fell, cities began to have safe water and real
sanitation systems. The discoveries of modern medicine began to treat the nastier
endemic diseases. Today, modern cities in the developed world have become
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increasingly livable. The rural exodus has been absorbed, educated, and integrated into
the urban world and its suburbs. While not perfect, modern cities are by and large a
triumph of order and the best of them continue to attract and flourish. This is not the
case with the megacities of the developing world.
Africa
Probably the worst problems of mega-city explosions are found in sub-Saharan, Central,
East and West Africa. The population explosion and the end of colonial occupation
have pushed millions of people from villages into urban slums of such appalling
ugliness that it boggles the mind. An American NGO that helps the handicapped
around the Third World to make artificial limbs, wheel chairs, and promote awareness
of the needs of such people, has an uphill struggle. They sent me a picture of a man on
crutches (which is a rarity because the handicapped are hidden) trying to cross a main
street in Lagos. There was a panorama of wall-to-wall cars, gridlocked against any
pedestrian crossing, especially one who could not run, not to mention hobble.
It is a tribute to the innate health of many urban Africans that they have not been swept
with infectious diseases from their inadequate water and sewage systems. But already,
diseases such as AIDS have plagued the continent with devastating consequences,
particularly for women and children.5
India
Again, it is a tribute to the hardiness of those who have survived childhood in village
India that they can survive their megacities! India, with a population of over one billion,
has few modern sewage systems. Children often run barefoot through slum streets full
of raw sewage, in the shadow of the latest skyscrapers and lavish penthouses.6
The rivers of India are so polluted that it is a miracle that the millions who travel to the
confluence of these rivers to take a sacred dip in the waters do not succumb. But then
again, in Medieval Europe, most people survived the polluted holy water in the
cathedrals. In both cases, this must be the power of faith over science.
Unlike some of the megacities in the developing world, Mumbai, however, is somewhat
unique and planning is going on. Planners estimate that by 2031, the metropolitan
region will increase to 34 million. The geography of the city precludes urban sprawl,
something that may make transport strategy feasible. I would hope that by then India
might have finally addressed its failure to have clean water and sewage systems.
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China
Population explosion has created such demands on what were once China’s great rivers
that some are now going dry before reaching the ocean. Those not dry are heavily
polluted. But worse than the water issue in China is the air pollution in their megacity
Beijing, now reaching levels that are already bringing an early death to the vulnerable
young and old. This pollution is beginning to have political ramifications on China’s
ruling party.
One would think that having a command society (the government makes all major
decisions) would make city planning easier to implement. However, there are major
complaints of political corruption and the consequences of bad planning create disasters
so terrible that the generally stoic Chinese public raises the specter of public
demonstration. Most of the megacities being built in western China today are of
dangerously sloppy construction, a factor that outrages victims of earthquakes or floods
in these regions and is beginning to create political problems for the government.
Aesthetic Consequences of Megacities
When I see pictures of the slums of Mumbai and those of Nigeria and the Congo, I
wonder what the effect of such ugliness and barren landscapes is on children. Even
filthy medieval European villages and towns had beautiful countryside around them---a
place to escape when city life became too horrible. In addition, medieval cities had
splendid cathedrals open to all people where something beautiful could be seen. Not so
in today’s megacities, which must have an effect on a child’s psyche and perhaps play a
role in the brutality of life in such places. This is an issue that warrants investigation by
psychologists.
Geo-Political Case Studies: Turkey, Iran, and Russia
Turkey
The problems of both Turkey and Iran are related. Both are countries with clear
national identities and histories. Both countries face an emptying of rural populations to
the cities, the majority of them in the national population centers. Such population
explosions strain infrastructure and bode ill for political security.7
Turkey began with the Ottoman seizure of Byzantium in 1452 and soon became an
enormous Ottoman Empire, comprised of numerous ethnicities and in some cases
peoples with prior national histories (Greece, Armenia, Egypt, Morocco).
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of World War I, the army retreated to
their original national homeland, today’s Turkey. They drove out the lingering
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population of former occupants, Christian Greeks and Armenians. The Kurds, an
Iranian tribe, remained, because they were Muslim. The Kurds comprise the only ethnic
problem faced by Turkey today, and it is still unresolved.
Turkey’s main problem stems from the unevenness of its development. Western Turkey
was the beneficiary of enforced modernization, at the hands of a respected president
(with the army behind him), Kamal Ataturk. Western Turkey, and particularly Istanbul
(once Constantinople), were brought up to western standards in literacy, health, and
relatively orderly governance. All visible signs of Islam were banned: the veil, the fez,
and Arabic script. Islam was deliberately relegated to the realm of the personal, and its
beautiful edifices to near museums.
Eastern Turkey has a strikingly different geography from the West. It is actually part of
the Iranian geography of water-lean high plateaus. Agriculture has become increasingly
difficult as population increases and water sources prove inadequate. A grand
government water project is not yet finished, despite decades in the making. People are
leaving the villages for great cities (including those in Europe), living in slums on the
outskirts of metropolises.
But unlike the slums of India and Africa, Turkish slums are clean and orderly. This is
in part attributed to Turkish culture, which is mostly law abiding and generally not
volatile. Villagers have also brought with them the one familiar institution in an
otherwise alien modern city: traditional Islam. Herein lies conflict with the secular
modern Turkey.
Because of democratic elections, these overwhelming hordes of traditional Muslims
have elected one of their own, the first Islamist prime minister, Recep Erdogan,
reluctantly permitted by the professional military who were once the guardians of
secular Turkish democracy.
The Islamist leadership has undertaken a careful, slow eroding of the secular nature of
Turkey. He has intimidated and reorganized the army, rendering it his tool rather than
the nation’s protector. The headscarf has returned in the public sphere and the prime
minister has made it clear that women should be at home having babies for their country
(in the face of a sharp crash of fertility).
In this orderly country, one issue has emerged that reflects the worst consequences of
the new megacities: abuse of women. Turkey is near the top of the global list for
murder and battery against women; I do caution, however, that they are on such a list
because statistics are being kept by secular women’s organizations who publish them
for the world to see. Such attention is not permitted in such other countries as Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, and Iran, all of whom may well have even worse numbers than Turkey,
although without watchdog statistics.
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The Anatolia News Agency (July 13, 2013) reported that incidents of domestic violence
in Turkey increased from 48,000 in 2008 to over 80,000 in 2011, representing an
increase of nearly 70 percent. This data was gathered from Turkey’s law enforcement
agencies. The majority of this abuse appears to be worst in the more pious rural areas of
the country.
Wife abuse statistics may not indicate that conditions are worse for women today than
ever before. The difference is that someone is counting. It is also possible that if this
problem has increased, it may be the result of stress: stress of removal from rural
villages to unfamiliar city slums; stress of women learning that they do not have to
suffer abuse in silence; stress on the men who find any challenges from their women
and daughters insufferable; and stress on the economy to absorb their numbers. Women
are just the canary in the mine when it comes to stress.
Iran
Everything that applies to Turkey also applies to Iran. Iran also went through a steep
modernization period under Reza Shah Pahlavi and his son, resulting in their first
population explosion in centuries. Because modern technology does not require the
peasant labor that farming required in the past, villages have emptied out, swelling
every city, particularly Tehran. I lived in Tehran when the population of the city was
two million. It is now perhaps 14 million for the city proper, and close to 20 million
including suburbs, with a combination of modern amenities such as highways, trains,
airports, water systems, sewage systems, skyscrapers, and city parks. However, it also
has air pollution nearly as deadly as Beijing’s.
Unlike Turkey’s creeping Islamization, Iran’s was born in a 1979 revolution that
restored Islam’s old power, including interference with the educational system, the civil
service, courts, and most egregious of all, removal of women from equal status, along
with a return of the oppressive Muslim dress code and curtailment of personal freedom.
This process is not sitting well in cities; it is difficult to give up certain social freedoms
once one has had them. The educated class is unhappy, but so are the new slum
dwellers from the countryside. For them, religion is their only familiar institution, one
that is not only provided by Muslim operatives from their villages, but by politicians
who provide benefits to curry votes in the make-believe democratic elections.
The stress of trying to bring former peasants into urban life is a global issue. It is
alienating and stressful to people who have experienced one culture for centuries and
are now plunged into modern urban society that frightens and repels them.
Women are the hot button issue that makes such stresses especially painful. Modernity
demands the equality of the genders, an equality that threatens power structures down to
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the family level. It is very difficult for women without education or the means to
support themselves to abandon the former culture of male dominance. They recognize
the devil they know, not the devil they do not know. On men, however, this stress is
worse because they have the most to lose in modernization. It is difficult to give up
total, life-and-death control over one’s family in patriarchal societies. Islamic and
traditional Hindu village cultures are having the most difficulty with this loss of control,
and their frustrations are being acted out against “enemies” considered easy targets,
their womenfolk.
Russia
According to the editors of Stratfor (a strategic forecasts think tank), Russia's
population of 143 million is expected to decline nearly 10 percent by 2030. The drop is
mainly among ethnic Russians; however, for the moment, the population of Muslims,
both indigenous and immigrant, is actually increasing. The decline of ethnic Russians
and the increase in the Muslim population means Muslims may comprise 16 percent of
the population by 2030. Some estimates put this figure at more than 20 percent, due to
illegal immigration.8
Of course, little noted by these estimates is that if the Muslim population modernizes,
their fertility rates will resemble those of the Russian population.
Today, however, the increasing Muslim share of the Russian population has spawned an
ultranationalist backlash. Over the past three years, large nationwide protests have
demanded immigration reform and an end to subsidies for Muslim parts of the North
Caucasus. A rise in ultra-Orthodoxy played into this, with religious-based vigilante
groups trying to take responsibility for Russian security.
What happens when the Russian military must find recruits in a declining population of
ethnic Russians? Stratfor notes that Moscow has to downgrade its ambitions from
maintaining a million man army to maintaining an 800,000-strong one. The country's
demographic changes have also prompted debate inside the Kremlin regarding whether
and how Muslims should be integrated into the army.
Stratfor further notes: “In another major demographic change, the first generation born
after the fall of the Soviet Union is coming of age. Approximately 21 percent of
Russians were born after the fall of the Soviet Union. This shift has changed the mindset of the population. The new generation never knew a world dominated by Russia and
the United States during the Cold War, and they were too young to understand much of
the chaos of the Yeltsin era. Most of this generation's experiences occurred under a
stable and relatively strong Russia under Putin. Thanks to the Internet, the younger
generation also has had many more opportunities for exposure to the outside world than
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were previously possible.” More than 50 percent of Russians now use the Internet, up
from less than 10 percent in 2006.
Stratfor again: “Because of these changes, political discourse has become much more
varied inside Russia -- something that has put extraordinary pressure on the Kremlin.
Anti-Muslim sentiment, the generational changes and the expanded political
consciousness all came to a head in 2011 and 2012, when large anti-Kremlin protests
swept the country. The protests seemingly caught the Kremlin off guard. Moscow
scrambled to respond, instituting a series of sweeping changes to government policy,
demoting or purging key government members, and then cracking down on the
protesters. In light of the new situation, the Kremlin has reconsidered how best to
maintain control.”
Predictions
Modernization is inevitably on the move and tradition, both autocratic and Islamist, is
fighting a losing game. But in the interim, conflict will be a norm. An unexplained
fertility crash in the worst of these places will provide eventual relief.9
A declining population will take the stress off modernization and may well raise the
status of women. In addition, Islam is facing an increasing demand for a reformation in
which the religion can live with modernity. The current spate of Islamist governments
in the wake of the Arab Spring is being challenged by people who do not like what they
see in theocracies.10
Traditional Asian societies such as China and South Korea have made the transition to
modernization successfully. It will be more difficult for the Muslim world, but the
trajectory is inevitable.
But most important of all, there are predictions that today’s dysfunctional megacities
will eventually adopt the city planning methods of the developed world and will have
much better outcomes than those we see today.11
The first necessary change is to recognize the problems. That is happening today.
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Europe as a Civilization
The Revolution of the Middle Ages & The Rise of the Universities *

Toby E. Huff

thuff@fas.harvard.edu
Introduction
Although "Western Civilization" has long been a commonly used term, the idea of
"Europe as a Civilization," I believe, needs articulation. This requires both a
serviceable definition of a "civilization" and a historically and conceptually rich analysis
of the formation of the European tradition. As I shall argue, Europe in the Middle Ages
underwent a radical transformation that up to the present has been inadequately
understood and insufficiently articulated.
I start with the long neglected "Note on the Notion of a Civilization" published in 1913
by Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss. 1 In their short essay Durkheim and Mauss hit
upon three seminal ideas indispensable for the new civilizational analysis of the last
three decades. Without those insights viable criteria for classifying cultural groupings
as “civilizations,” or as societies, are absent. Consequently, other writers doing
civilizational analysis tend to follow the pattern established by anthropologists and
ethnographers who mainly try to identify any distinctive cultural group, ancient or
modern, and call that group a “civilization” without utilizing the deeper analytic insights
of Durkheim and Mauss. What Durkheim and Mauss noticed was that
social phenomena that are not strictly attached to a determinate social organism
do exist; they extend into areas that reach beyond the national territory or they
develop over periods of time that exceed the history of a single society. They
have a life which is in some ways supranational. 2
Here the defining criterion is a transnational or supranational emergence that goes
beyond the original group that generated the symbolic capital. Consequently, the
authors claim that, “A civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a
certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the
whole.” 3

* An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Conference on "The Academy and Western
Civilization," St Vincent's College, Latrobe, Pa, April 11-13, 2013.
1
Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss "Note on the Notion of Civilization,” Social Research vol. 38, no. 4
(1971): 809-813; translated by Benjamin Nelson.
2
Durkheim and Mauss, ibid, p. 810.
3
ibid, p. 811.
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This is, of course, what Europe as a civilization came to be. Moreover, Durkheim and
Mauss observed that not all social phenomena have the same ability to be transported, to
be universalized to other social or national groups. They laid out a major task, still
unfulfilled, which is, to explain on what this “unequal coefficient of expansion and
internationalization depends.” Put differently, this idea of a “coefficient of expansion”
possessed by some social phenomena suggests the striking process of universalization,
without which civilizations and civilizational phenomena would not exist. Moreover, it
is important to consider the degree to which the universalization of civilizational
complexes has been a voluntary process in contrast to an imposition by an expanding
empire. From today’s perspective, we know that even those civilizational complexes
that have the ability to be assimilated over time and over vast stretches of territory also
have their limits; and yet certain of these phenomena, whether they be described as
aspects of “Westernization” or “globalization,” seem to have still more potential to
expand voluntarily around the globe.
In Benjamin Nelson’s reformulation of these seminal ideas, civilizations are composed
of “the governing cultural heritages of 2+n societies, territories [or] areas which
generally enjoy or have enjoyed a certain proximity” to each other. 4 Furthermore, what
gives a civilization in this sense an identity is the existence of a set of shared
civilizational complexes, such as religious commitments, legal concepts and processes,
intellectual categories and modes of logic. Sometimes Nelson referred to these cultural
phenomena as the “directive structures” that shape human thought and action. 5
However, one could also refer to these internationalizing and globalizing
transformations as contributions to "world culture" and "world polity." Considered in
this light there have already been impressive moves in this direction, attempting to
describe and understand the construction of world culture as elements of the Western
tradition became firmly established in the emerging global polity. 6
Although the scholars working on this research program have not articulated an
appropriate civilizational context, and have seriously truncated the requisite historical
time frame needed to unravel these developments, they are aware of the need to "study
the origins, expansion, and characteristics of the world polity," to understand how these
cultural elements evolved out of Western civilization and served to create a "coherent
world culture, society, and set of institutions that might plausibly influence nation
[states]." Furthermore, they are keen to explore "in which substantive areas [of] world
4

Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," Sociological Analysis 34, #2
(1973): 82; reprinted in Huff, editor, On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science and Civilizations.
Selected Writings of Benjamin Nelson (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, reprinted 2012), chapter 5.
5
ibid., On the Road to Modernity, Chapter 2.
6
See for example, John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., Constructing World Culture. International
Non-Governmental Organizations Since 1875 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); and Gil S.
Driori, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, Evan Schofer, Science in the Modern World Polity.
Institutionalization and Globalization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
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society norms [have] been clearly worked out, codified, and institutionalized." 7 It
remains to be seen how this agenda could be fulfilled without paying much more
attention to the early legal foundations of international law that underlie virtually all
international business and diplomatic negotiations worldwide.
Furthermore, it is evident that, though the exponents of this research program refer to
"world culture," they point out that the participants recorded in the datasets of
international organizations come "mainly from Europe and North America." 8 This
suggests that in fact this "world culture" is basically "internationalized" European
culture among countries that have historically been part of "Europe overseas." The task
of studying the spread of European (or global culture) to non-Western civilizational
areas, to China, the Islamic world, Russia, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent,
has hardly begun.
That said, it is evident that serious scholars with highly sophisticated methodological
techniques have lent considerable currency to this effort of exploring how transnational
phenomena expand across the world.
The task remaining is to focus on
intercivilizational encounters and transmissions.
In what follows, I have attempted to synthesize several strands of European history that
coalesced at the core of the European experience, and in doing so, laid the foundations
for Europe's institutional uniqueness and civilizational design. That was, above all,
rooted in its unparalleled legal structure. Unfortunately, many scholars who have
written with great insight and authority about this period have entirely neglected the
singular legal history of Europe and its centrality to all the developments of that era. 9
Hopefully in the future that history, which includes the foundational ideas of human
rights, due process of law, and constitutional democracy, will not be so neglected.
The Revolution of the Middle Ages
Any broad evaluation of the social, legal, and political development of Western Europe
that took place in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries will show that it witnessed
sweeping legal reforms, indeed, a revolutionary reconstruction, of all the realms and
divisions of law - feudal law, manorial law, urban law, commercial law, and royal law 7

Evan Schofer and Elizabeth H. Mceneaney, "Methodological Tools for the Study of Globalization," in
ibid, Science in the Modern World Polity, p. 47.

8

John Boli, "Globalization and World Culture," International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral
Sciences (New York: Elsevier, 2001), pp. 6261-6266 at 6261.
9
For this neglect, see Thomas Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century. Power, Lordship, and the
Origins of European Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); and Robert I. Moore,
The First European Revolution, c. 950-1215 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). For an appreciation of the
European tradition, see Ricardo Duchesne, The Uniqueness of Western Civilization (Leiden/Boston: Brill,
2011).
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and therewith the reconstitution of medieval European society. 10 It is also true that
neither Islamic law nor Chinese law passed through an equivalent radical
transformation. 11 Consequently neither of those systems of law ever recognized the
broad variety of competing legal jurisdictions found in Europe; for example,
commercial, urban, public, and professional jurisdictions were recognized throughout
Europe.
In any event, it is this great legal transformation that laid the foundations for the rise and
autonomous development of universities, but also the pursuit of modern science, the rise
of constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy, the foundations of what we know as
due process of law, the very idea of elective representation in all forms of corporate
bodies, the legal autonomy of cities and towns, and a vast array of additional legal
forms unique to the West.
At the center of this development one finds the legal and political principle of treating
collective actors as a whole body - a corporation (universitas is the medieval Latin
term). The emergence of corporate actors was unquestionably revolutionary in that the
legal theory which made them possible created a variety of new forms and powers of
association that were distinctly European.
Furthermore, the legal theory of corporations brings in its train organizational principles
establishing such political ideas as constitutional government, consent in political
decision making, the right of political and legal representation, the powers of
adjudication and jurisdiction, and even the power of autonomous legislation. Aside
from the scientific revolution itself, and perhaps the Reformation, no other revolution
has been as pregnant with new social and political implications as the legal revolution of
the European Middle Ages. By laying out the conceptual foundations for new
institutional forms in legal thought, it prepared the way for the two other revolutions-the scientific and the economic.
Consider for a moment what this idea of “autonomous legislation” means. It means that
some public body -- some corporate entity, some group of citizens -- is capable of
composing and promulgating new laws that transcend Biblical injunctions, customary
law, Quranic legal prescriptions, or even edicts issued by an Emperor in China. But of
course, that power of autonomous legislation did not exist either in Chinese or Islamic
law of the early modern period.

10

This assessment was first announced by Harold Berman in his landmark study, Law and Revolution.
The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
11
I discussed these different legal systems in The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the
West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition 2003), especially chapters 4 and 7. I am
currently working on separate essays to outline these differences more completely.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013

73

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 69 [2013], No. 69, Art. 17

Comparative Civilizations Review

69

Some Phases of Development
Let me now sketch out some stages of the European legal and social revolution.
Because this period has not been studied sociologically and systematically as a case of
social, political, and intellectual revolution, it is difficult to determine where one should
begin. So let me start in AD. 1000.
Around 1000 AD commerce began to revive in southern Europe and then to spread
northward. This was conjoined with the rise of commercial fairs and the rise of new
cites and towns. But there was also a profound wave of economic growth in the
Hanseatic cites in the north centered on Hamburg and which expanded south and
eastward at the same time. 12 First, however, we need to focus on some earlier farreaching intellectual developments.
As we may recall, back in the early 6th century A.D. the Emperor Justinian told his
legal experts to radically trim down and consolidate the existing Roman legal code, and
especially to prune away the unending commentary of judges and scholars. The end
result was the Roman Corpus Juris Civilis (the Roman Civil Law) that Justinian put into
effect across the empire in 534 A.D. 13 However, the code did not fair well in the
Western empire because it was collapsing. Consequently, with the collapse of the
Roman Empire in the West (after 476), the Corpus Juris Civilis was lost, not to be
recovered until about 1070 AD. But when it was found and recovered it jolted legal
scholars into action.
At first the scholars did not understand it and so commentators known as the Glossators
set about writing marginal commentaries, perhaps correcting grammar, explaining the
new conceptual terminology, but most of all, trying to master the 2000 pages of this
extraordinary legal system. But they also began teaching it. It is in the circle of these
early legal scholars that we indeed find the earliest seedbeds of the universities. Notice
also that these legal scholars were civilian or secular scholars who were free to move
around as they were not committed to a particular town, much less a building. They
were a community of scholars and students, most of whom came from outside town and
12

Among others see Robert Bartlett, The Making of Europe. Conquest, Colonization and Cultural
Change 950-1350 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 292ff.
13
See among others, Aldo Schiavone, The Invention of Law in the West (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2012); James Brundage, The Medieval Origins of the Legal Professions. Canonists, Civilians, and
Courts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); idem, "The Teaching and Study of Canon Law in
the Law Schools," pp. 98-120 in the History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-1234,"
edited by Wilfried and Hartmann and Kenneth Pennington (Washington: Catholic University Press of
America, 2008); Michael Hoeltlich and Jasonne M. Grabler, "The Establishment of Normative Legal
texts. The Beginning of the Ius Commune," pp. 1-21 in ibid. History of Medieval Canon Law; Charles
Radding, "Legal Science 1000-1200. The Invention of a Discipline," Rivista di storia del diritto italiano
63 (1990): 409-32; and Judith Herren, "Roman Law," in Herren, Byzantium. The Surprising Life of a
Medieval Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 70-79.
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even outside Italy. They could move on a moment's notice to another town where
social, legal, and economic conditions might be better. 14
By 1200 these legal scholars had become a distinct literate class of specialists; they had
mastered the Roman legal corpus, and in a great many ways, had modified,
systematized and transformed it into a new legal science which was now to be taught for
the first time in universities across Europe. The initial leading center of this new
science of law was at the university in Bologna. There, legal scholars taught the new
science focused on secular issues and everyday social and economic causes.
But at the same time, a scholar and monk by the name of Gratian took it upon himself
to rethink the whole great amorphous body of laws then known to him, and to create
what he called a Harmony of Discordant Canons-- first issued in about 1140. Here the
word canons simply means "rules," but especially rules that had been adopted by the
Christian Church, which in a very short period of time became a standard legal text used
all across Europe, though the Church never officially promulgated it.
What Gratian had done was to collect legal texts from Church councils, papal letters, the
writings of Church Fathers, passages from the Bible, and a host of secular sources such
as Roman and German law. His great effort was designed to point out the
contradictions in these legal rules, to remove them, and to find the underlying legal
principles that ought to prevail.
All of this is an example of what the great German sociologist, Max Weber (and many
other scholars) called the rationalization process; i. e., the process by which legal rules
and procedures were made more coherent, consistent, and rationally explicable.
So now Europeans had a new legal science based on new texts, all of which became
what legal historians call the ius commune, the common law of Europe that began to
spread from south to north, to Germany, Britain and Scandinavia. Moreover, law
students across Europe now had to learn both the Canon Law and Civil law, because (1)
the Church universal had courts all across Europe, and (2) lawyers specializing in the
civil law might be called upon to defend a case in an ecclesiastical court.
Here then we have the first and second legs of this medieval revolution. First we have a
new legal science that was being taught in the free floating schools (later universities)
and applied across Europe in both secular and ecclesiastical courts. To the degree that
14

On the complicated early history of this university, see J. K. Hyde, "Commune, University, and Society
in Early Medieval Bologna," pp., 17- 46 in Universities in Politics. Case Studies from the Late Middle
Ages and Early Modern Period, edited with an Introduction by John W. Baldwin and Richard Goldwaithe
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); and Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in
the Middle Ages. A New Edition in three volumes edited by F. M. Powicke and A.B. Emden Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1936).
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this new legal system established new institutional foundations for the emerging
European civilization, it was legal scholars in the schools who underwrote this whole
development.
Second, the medieval legists recognized the legal rights of collective actors, that is,
legally autonomous entities, sometimes called "fictive personalities." Among these we
find cities and towns, charitable organizations, professional associations of doctors and
lawyers, as well as merchant guilds-- all of which could create their own rules and
regulations. These new entities were treated as collective individuals, and they had a
whole new bundle of rights: the right to own property, to sue and be sued, to make their
own rules and regulations, i.e. to act as legislative entities. Such entities had the right to
be represented by attorneys in courts, and before the king's court regarding taxation. 15
Furthermore, these entities were said to be governed by the principle of, "what concerns
all should be considered and approved by all" -- a Roman maxim. 16 While today we
think of corporations as primarily significant for commercial enterprises, their original
impact was in the sphere of public law, where their presence radically transformed the
whole basis of political, constitutional and economic life in Europe. For it was the
presence of these new entities that established the foundations for parliamentary
democracy. Indeed, the first European parliament was founded in1188 in Spain quickly
followed by many other regional parliaments in Spain, then in Portugal, Sicily, southern
France, Paris in 1298, then the Estates General in 1302 as parliaments became a panEuropean institution. 17 Indeed, the effort to establish constitutional regimes in which
the people were deemed to have a legitimate voice was a great struggle carried on
broadly across Europe from the Middle Ages onward with the final culmination in the
revolutionary new political thought of Scotland, Holland, France and then England in
the 16th and 17th centuries. 18
Third, the canonists and civilians established new principles of due process of law that
applied to all individuals who were involved in legal proceedings. By the end of the
12th century this new system had been formally articulated as the ordo iudiciarius (the

15

See Gaines Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought. Public Law and the State, 1100-1322. (Princeton
University Press, 1964); and Berman, Law and Revolution. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1983), pp. 214-221.
16
Berman, Law and Revolution, especially p. 221; and Gaines Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought,
chapter 4, and pp. 51ff.
17
See Jan Luiten van Zanden, Eltjo Buringh and Maarten Bosker, "The Rise and Decline of European
Parliaments, 1189-1789," The Economic History Review 65 #3 (2012): 835-861; and also Joseph Strayer, The
Medieval Origins of the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
18
This path has been traced out by, among others, Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political
Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), esp. v. 2.; and Philip S. Gorski, "Calvinism and
Revolution. The Walzer Thesis Reconsidered," pp. 78-104 in Meaning and Modernity: Religion, Polity
and Self, edited Richard Madsen, et. al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
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system of legal procedures). 19 According to this legal doctrine (which was established
in court cases and Papal decretals), every trial must involve a plaintiff and a defendant,
advocates for those two parties, the appearance of witnesses, the presence of court
recorders such as clerks, proctors and notaries who record the names of those present at
the trial, what each person said, and if written evidence were presented, it too would be
redacted into the court record. Again, this was established legal procedure by the end of
the 12th century-- all worked out by legal scholars usually attached to the schools and
emerging universities. Such formal legal procedures did not exit in Islamic or Chinese
law then or later. 20
In addition, the procedures established the right of any accused person to be notified of
a complaint, the right to appear in court and testify, and, above all, to be represented by
a legal expert. By 1200 it was firmly established that anyone appearing in a court could
elect to have legal assistance and was well advised to do so. But if he did not do so he
was forewarned, as one writer put it in 1169
If someone is brash enough to presume to rely on his own devices even though
he is inexperienced and does not wish to have an advocate, let him do so.
Everyone is free to muck up his own case. 21
Here then we have the outline and details of due process of law, assumed to be
universal, that must be applied in all legal proceedings -- all set out by the end of the
12th century.
But -- fourth-- this process went even further toward the establishment of additional
legal principles that applied to the Prince and Pope alike. The most important case
establishing that these principles applied to the Prince as well as ordinary citizens
concerned King Henry of Luxemburg and Robert of Naples. In 1311 King Henry
moved to be crowned Emperor of the Holy Roman empire and in doing so intended to
displace Robert of Naples and his kingdom. In the process Henry condemned King

19

Among others see Pennington, The Prince and Law: 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western
Legal Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Susan Reynolds, "The Emergence of
Professional Law in the Long Twelfth Century," Law and History Review 21 #2 (2003): 347-366;
Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London: Longman, 1995): 205.
20
I have set out some of these strong differences in "The Rise of Europe and Institutional Divergence,"
Paper presented to the University of Zurich (Applied History Lecture: The European Miracle.
Vorlesungen über die Europäische Epoche der Welt), October 18, 2012. For the complete absence of such
formal safe guards of due process in contemporary China, see the August 2012 case of Madame Gu,
accused of murdering a British business man. At her trial her lawyers were removed, no defense was
possible, and no court recordings (written or voice) were permitted. Andrew Jacobs, "Fast-Paced Trial in
China Leaves Shadows," New York Times, August 9, 2012, p.1.
21
Brundage, The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession, p.152.
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Robert, declaring him to be a traitor and an outlaw to the Empire. Pope Clement V did
not agree with these declarations and tried to mediate between the two parties. 22
Luckily-- or unluckily-- Henry died (in 1313) before he could move to displace Robert
forcefully; but Pope Clement V stepped forward with legal opinions curtailing such
presumptuous condemnation of an adversary. The Pope solicited opinions from the best
legal scholars and all of them averred that the right of self-defense, both physical and
legal, was a right granted by natural law and it could not be taken away. Hence King
Henry's rulings were without merit and were annulled. Furthermore, Pope Clement
went on to issue several more legislative rulings, clearly stating what due process of law
entails and how it must not be abridged. In his final ruling, indeed a constitutional
document called Saepe contingit, he established these principles, which of necessity
must be upheld by the Prince. Legal scholars have concurred that this legal ruling of the
very early 14th century was "the most important single piece of medieval legislation in
the history of summary judicial procedure." 23
In a word, by the opening of the 14th century, European law had established legal
principles restricting the actions of the Prince, but not only that, the Pope. The principle
that the Pope too is subject to natural law and may not abridge a defendant's right of
self-defense was established in a notorious case involving the Medici's and the attempt
of the Pazzi family to eliminate them violently. The result was that Pope Sixtus IV
(who had condemned Lorenzo de Medici without a trial) had to back down while
acknowledging that, just as Adam of the Bible had to respond to God's summons to
judgment, so too "neither Pope nor Prince could dispense with this part of the judicial
process because no one can ignore a precept of divine law." 24 In other words, the earlier
legal principles that restricted the actions of the Prince applied in the same way to the
22

This case has been spelled out in considerable detail by Kenneth Pennington in "Due Process,
Community, and the Prince in the Evolution of the Ordo iudicarius," Rivista internazionale di diritto
commune," 9 (1998): 9-47; and Pennington, The Prince ad the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights
in the Western Legal Tradition.
23
Stephan Kuttner, "The Date of the Constitution 'Saepe'...," Melanges Eugène Tisserant IV (1964): 427452, p. 427. Technically, the ruling concerned "Summary proceedings" which are special proceedings
held in unusual circumstances, possibly entailing threats of violence and or public harm.
24
This is the judgment of the 15th century legal scholar Francesco Accoli, said to be the greatest legal
scholar of his time; as paraphrased by Pennington, The Prince and the Law. Sovereignty and Rights and
in the Western Legal Tradition, p.188. Also see Lauro Martines, April Blood. Florence and the Plot
Against the Medici (Oxford, 2003).
This case occurred in 1478 and concerns what has been called the Pazzi Conspiracy. This bloody
episode took place in April 1478 when members of the very wealthy Florentine banking family, the
Pazzi's, tried to assassinate the Medici's while in Church on a Sunday. They did kill one of the Medici
brothers in the Cathedral, but the leader of the family, Lorenzo the Magnificent, escaped and proceeded
to declare war on his enemies, including the Papal State. However, some of his supporters kidnapped an
Archbishop, who was soon hanged. Pope Sixtus IV summarily condemned and excommunicated Lorenzo
without a trial, despite Lorenzo's claim that he was innocent.
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Pope. Neither he nor the Prince could issue summary judgments without actually
holding a trial. Here again we find unique European contributions to international legal
development and above all, the idea of legal restraints on the highest officials.
Now in recounting this legal history I do not suggest that the people of Florence in the
15th century were particularly law abiding -- they most definitely were not.
Nevertheless, a precedent had been established and future rulers who wished to be
regarded as lawful occupants of elective or appointed office had to abide by such rules.
Of course, it took time for the rule of law as we understand it to become widely and
deeply established; nevertheless, the institutional apparatus had been constructed, civil
and ecclesiastical courts had been established all across Western Europe. And let us not
forget that the lords of England forced King John of England to submit to the Magna
Carta (in 1215) which, likewise, restricted his sovereign powers and required the
establishment of a jury system for legal proceedings.
Law, Commerce, and Self-government
Before we get to the universities more directly, it is important to note that the revolution
of the Middle Ages that I announced at the outset, was indeed a society- or civilizationwide transformation. This new legal regime had powerful implications for every aspect
of social, political, and economic action, so I need to say something about the impact on
ordinary business transactions. Of course, the new legal science, both Canon and Civil,
spread unevenly across western Europe, but the trend and result is clear.
As we know, it is imperative for those engaged in business dealings that they have a
secure sense of their rights to ownership, the possibility of regulating trade, and the
availability of legal officials who can authoritatively adjudicate business conflicts. As
legal scholars know, the very foundations of business transactions establish what are
sometimes tedious conceptions that set out what kinds of transactions can be carried out,
the limits of individual and collective action, what happens to collective assets when
people die, and so on.
What happens, for example, if a business partner dies? Islamic law dictates that if any
partner dies or withdraws, the partnership and the enterprise completely dissolves, 25
whereas European business partnerships and corporations have lives of their own.
Moreover, economic historians have shown that during this same period of time, the
12th and 13th centuries, and especially in Holland and the Low countries, villages and
urban conclaves were forming in which people were acting collectively to self-govern,
25

The classical statement of these rules is Abraham Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). For further analysis of the effect of these restrictions on
economic development see Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence. How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle
East ((Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
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to regulate collectively-owned grazing grounds known as "the commons," to regulate
grinding mills, riverways, and other assets that were considered jointly owned by the
community. Such communities formed their own judicial bodies; bought, sold and
rented property; hired clerks, even an occasional police officer and other agents who
worked for the collective public enterprise. 26
To us moderns this seems normal, but the fact is that this kind of legitimate communal
self-organization, bound by law with articulated rights and prerogatives, was a wholly
new thing not witnessed elsewhere. This whole new legal arrangement proved to be a
boon to the rise of early modern capitalism, to the whole commercial revolution of the
13th century and 14th centuries that would include all sorts of new collective trading
entities. These would include extra-familial firms (otherwise known as legally
recognized companies), as well as joint stock companies and formally organized banks
whose records constituted legal documents available to public scrutiny. 27 Clearly, the
legal revolution of this time had very far reaching consequences for political, economic,
and intellectual development.
Indeed, recent scholarship has added considerable weight to the assertion that Europe's
legal revolution in all its dimensions contributed measurably to the economic
ascendance of Europe in the early modern period in comparison to other parts of the
world. 28 Whether one attributes a causal link between the new legal science or the rise
of the universities and the teaching of the new legal system, the evidence suggests that
the availability of the new legal conceptions, lawyers, and courts greatly facilitated
economic growth in Germany and other parts of western Europe. 29

26

Among others, see Tina De Moor, "The Silent Revolution: A New Perspective on the Emergence of
Commons, Guilds, and Other Forms of Corporate Collective Action in Western Europe," International
Review of Social History 53: 179- 212; Bas van Bavel, "The Medieval Origins of Capitalism in the
Netherlands," BMCN/LCHR (2010) v. 125: 45-79, especially pp. 60-66; and idem, Manors and Markets.
Economy and Society in the Low Countries, 500-1600 (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 93-99.
27
In addition to Bavel's work noted above, see R. Lopes, The Commercial Revolution, 950-1350
(Cambridge University Press, 1977); Raymond de Roover, "The Commercial Revolution of the
Thirteenth Century," in Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings in Economic History, edited by
Frederic Lane and Jelle C. Riemersma (American Economic Association, 1953): 80-85; idem, "The
Organization of Trade," chapter 3 in the Cambridge Economic History of Europe (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1953); Abbott Usher, "The Origins of Banking: The Primitive Bank of Deposit, 12001600," The Economic History Review 4 #4 (1934): 399-428.
28
For estimates of world economic development, see Angus Maddison, Historical Statistics of the World
Economy, 1-2008 (http://ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm)
29
For a test of the proposition that legal rules and legal scholarship had an impact on European economic
development see Davide Cantoni and Noam Yuchtman, "Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions and the
Commercial Revolution," NBER Working Paper 17979 (http://nber.org/papers/w17979); and Hans-Bernd
Shäfer and Alexander J. Wulf, "Jurists, Clerics and Merchants. The Rise of Learned Law in Medieval
Europe and Its Impact on Economic Growth," (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242110) (2013).
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Universities and the Scientific Agenda
As the previous discussion has suggested, the universities were both a product of, and
agents of the great legal revolution that swept across Europe during this era. Ever since
the late 19th century, scholars have referred to this great revival and renewal as "The
Renaissance of the Twelfth Century." 30 One aspect of that renaissance was the rise of
the universities which was the product of a demographic and educational revolution that
has no better description than the following:
At the beginning of the century [i.e., 1100], numerous urban schools appeared in
Western Europe to challenge the supremacy [that] monastic schools had enjoyed
since the early Middle Ages. These new schools dominated the intellectual
scene until the beginning of the next century, when those at Bologna and Paris
were transmuted into universities. 31
We should recall that the Cathedral schools taught the seven liberal arts (i.e., grammar,
rhetoric, and logic along with arithmetic, geometry, music and, astronomy), but a new
crop of scholars, drawn from all over Europe began traveling to the centers of learning,
usually the cathedral schools where they had heard outstanding scholars were teaching.
This movement had begun in the 11th century, but in the early 12th we have many
reports of outstanding scholars, in small towns around the periphery of Paris (such as
Chartres, Laon, Reims), who were attracting these foreign visitors. It is said that the
students "traveled to hear of new techniques and new texts, [as well as] the manner of
applying them to the study of law, medicine, the Bible, or the nature of the physical"32
world. On the one hand, we have these young people showing up uninvited to study
with a learned master, causing a certain amount of conflict and friction with the local
townspeople in the context of the need for food, lodging and of course, drink.
On the other hand, some of the scholars themselves, including some of the tutors of the
aspiring students, had ambitions to create their own following and set about doing so by
challenging the masters in the cathedral schools. The most famous of such people we
usually hear of was Peter Abelard (d. 1142), who first challenged Master Anselm at his
school in Laon (about 30 miles outside Paris). When that did not work, he set about
30

Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1927); Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages. New Edition in Three
Volumes edited by F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1936), especially
volume 1.
31
John W. Baldwin, "Masters at Paris 1179 to 1215: A Social perspective," pp. 138-170 in Renaissance
and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, edited by Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable with Carol D.
Lanham (reprinted, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).
32
R. W. Southern, "The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres," pp.113-137 in Renaissance and
Renewal, at pp. 116.
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making his name in Paris, starting in about 1098, by attempting to dispute and displace
William of Champaux who was the leading scholar at the school of Notre Dame.
Abelard was just one of many outstanding scholars who emerged during this time and
challenged the authorities with regard to every aspect of religious and classical learning.
Abelard is, of course, the author of the famous Sic & Non-- "Yes and No"-- treatise that
listed many opinions of the Church fathers and other religious texts which were clearly
in conflict with each other. Some of the scholars of the time thought Abelard was just
being a skeptic, undermining Church authority, whereas his real mission, he claimed,
was to get to the truth, to use dialectic and the tools of reason and logic to sort out the
truths of faith. As many scholars have pointed out, this band of philosophers around
Paris transformed theology into "the queen of the sciences."
Among the pioneers of this movement one finds Master Bernard of Chartres (d. after
1115); Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109); John of Salisbury (d. 1180); Hugh of St.
Victor (ca. 1096-1141); and Peter Lombard (d. ca. 1160). This story of the
transformation of Christian religious thought into systematic theology has been told by
many scholars. 33 The thrust of this transformation, beginning in the late 11th century,
is revealed by Anselm of Canterbury's bold move to use reason to demonstrate the truth
of faith and to transcend the authority of Scripture. Anselm said that he took this path
because of the request of fellow monks; and so he composed a treatise,
in order that nothing in Scripture should be urged on the authority of Scripture
itself, but that whatever the conclusion of independent investigation should
declare to be true, in an unadorned style, with common proofs and with a simple
argument, be briefly enforced by the cogency of reason, and plainly expounded
in the light of truth. 34
This ascendance of rational argument over the plain simplicity of the Scriptures never
emerged in Islamic religious thought and still remains an impediment to religious
innovation in Islam. 35
33

Among others see M-D. Chenu, Man, Nature and Society in the 12th Century (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1968), "From Text to Sacred Doctrine," pp. 279- 91; David Knowles, The Evolution of
Medieval Thought (New York: Vintage, 1962); also Edward Grant, God and Reason in the Middle Ages
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapter 6; F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, v. 2.,
Medieval Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1962). Also Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas
Aquinas, is another version of this transformation; see his chapter 2, "Faith and Reason,"
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~aversa/scholastic/gilson/
34
St. Anselm, Proslogium; Monlogium; An Appendix in Behalf of the Fool Guanilon; and Cur Homo, as
cited in Grant, God and Reason, p. 54.
35
The fundamental problem is that kalam, "theology," was never freed from subservience to fiqh, the
strict legal interpretation of the tenants of Islam. It was not destined to become, as in Christianity, the
queen of the sciences. See Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science, pp. 110-11; and Huff, "Reformation
in Islam?" Society, 44, Number 5 (July/Aug) 2007: 62-69. The stagnation of Islamic theological thought
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Still another powerful spur to this rationalistic strand in Christian religious thought is
found in Peter Lombard's "Sentences" (ca. 1150), pointing the way toward reconciling
biblical passages with philosophical questioning. Subsequently his theological
reflections became the most cited text for the next several centuries, all the way to
Luther who also commented on it. 36
In this sense, the 12th century witnessed a multidimensional intellectual revolution,
including a "theological revolution," as scholars emerged who pioneered new ways of
thinking about every aspect of law, religion and the natural world using the tools reason
and logic. The result was the gathering of many students in places like Paris, which in
turn attracted more scholars who created their own following of students. Nevertheless,
these scholars and their students remained outside the control of the official schools
sponsored by the cathedrals. These itinerant scholars coopted the teaching of many
subjects, bringing new methods to bear, taking the educational process out of the hands
of church officials who had dominated education up to that point.
As a floating community of scholars with lots of student followers, they could easily
move on, leave Paris, or a particular location, if Church officials tried to interfere or if
the locals (landlords, shopkeepers and restaurant owners) treated them or their students
badly, which did happen from time to time. It was out of this fear of such flight that
officials in Bologna enacted laws forcing scholars to swear an oath that they would not
leave town.
What became the University of Paris was this floating community of scholars and their
students (perhaps 2-3000 students at the end of the 12th century) who quietly banded
together forming a corporation -- a universitas or a studium generale and that gave it a
perpetual state of legal autonomy. 37 With their experts on Civil and Canon law among
them, the scholars knew how to use the legal instruments of the day, and thus used them
to garner the masters a broad bundle of rights, such as the ability to make their own
rules and regulations, to establish matters of curriculum, to sue and be sued, and of
course to own property-- and much more.
Furthermore, whenever public conflicts arose the King and other officials, including the
Pope, were eager to confirm the rights and privileges of these scholars, for they brought
fame and recognition for Paris and to the Church. The King did so by granting various
charters to the scholars that gave them privileges and immunities that also compensated
is also stressed by Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p.
151-54; just as Islamic ethics were aborted, ibid., pp.154ff.
36
Among others see Philip Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); M.
Colish, Peter Lombard (Leiden: E. J. Brill,1994) 2 vols; Grant, God and Reason, pp. 209- 212.
37

Gaines Post, "Parisian Masters as a Corporation, 1200-1246" in Studies in Medieval Legal Thought,
Chapter 1.
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for being foreigners with diminished legal rights, though they did have what is called
the benefit of clergy. These privileges and immunities included exemption from local
taxes, freedom to teach and to move about in the city, and perhaps most important of all,
immunity from the obligation to pay the unpaid bills of a countryman who had left the
city in debt. Not least of all was the right to be tried in an ecclesiastical court if one
should be arrested for a misdemeanor or more serious offense.
In brief, the University of Paris evolved into the most prestigious university of its time
in Europe and became a model for others. Of course, there were many other patterns
and different universities specialized more in one subject than another, but in all cases,
whether establishing a new law school or a new medical college the same legal
structures were put into place, granting the new freedoms of inquiry while encouraging
the perfection of the new modes of thought that were blossoming all across Europe.
From the 12th century onward to the middle of the 17th century, there was a continuous
rise in the founding of universities all across Europe. If one plots the number of these
institutions across Europe from that time, one will get a graph with a line rising at a step
forty-five degree angle. 38 It was a European-wide phenomenon.
The New Curriculum
Let us take a closer look at the curriculum that began to emerge as these new
educational institutions formed across Europe. In Paris the Masters created four
Faculties: the Faculty of Theology, that of Law, Medicine, and the Arts. While Paris
was preeminent in the teaching of Theology, Bologna outshone it in Law, and in
Medicine the university in Montpelier has generally been rated higher. Nevertheless,
the great scholars in logic, philosophy, and theology in Paris carried the day in
refashioning the arts curriculum so that in fact, the study of the natural sciences stood
out.
In effect, the longstanding Arts curriculum (composed of the trivium and quadrivium)
was transformed into the Three Philosophies: Moral Philosophy (or Ethics),
Metaphysics, and Natural Philosophy. 39 This adaptation was an equally transformative
outcome that reorganized the old Arts curriculum of the cathedral schools into a
progressive and indeed, scientific new orientation. It did this by introducing into the
curriculum the so-called "New Aristotle" and especially his natural books. What the
Europeans did was to institutionalize a whole new curriculum of naturalistic studies.
These inquiries raised all sorts of questions about the natural world. The same method
of compiling questions and working out answers that had been used in the study of Law
and Theology was now employed with equal vigor in the study of the natural world.
38

Phyllis Riddle, "Political Authority and University Formation in Europe, 1200-1800," Sociological
Perspectives 36 #1 (1993): 45-62, at p. 54.
39
See Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), esp. pp.47ff.
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For example, in naturalistic studies scholars asked "whether the world is round...
whether the earth moves... whether it is possible that other worlds exist,...whether the
existence of a vacuum is possible," etc. 40 What the founders of the new universities did
was to place at the center of this new curriculum the natural books of Aristotle which
included his Physics, his books On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, On the
Soul, Meteorology, The Small Works on Natural Things, as well as biological works
such as The History of Animals, The Parts of Animals, and The Generation of Animals.
It is with these books, Ed Grant observed, that we find "the treatises that formed the
comprehensive foundation for the medieval conception of the physical world and its
operation.” 41 This was indeed a core experience that was essentially scientific. Put
differently, the Europeans institutionalized the study of the natural world by making it
the central core of the university curriculum. 42
Moreover, this curriculum was unique in the educational history of the world because
the Muslim world prohibited the introduction of Aristotle's natural books into the center
of its teachings in the madrasas, while the Chinese did not have a philosophical tradition
equivalent to Aristotle's natural books; nor did it mandate the study of naturalistic
questions for the state-sponsored Civil Service Examinations that served to select
scholars to become government officials. 43
Despite the impressive reorganization of higher learning in Europe during this era, some
have claimed that the medieval and early modern universities inhibited the study and
pursuit of science; yet when we look at this question from a comparative and
civilizational point of view, there is no evidence of such retardation. By and large those
who have raised these criticisms have based their claims on a faulty understanding of
Aristotle and his work, and on anachronistic and unrealistic comparisons between
medieval and modern universities. More plainly, the comparisons have been made on
the basis of caricatures of medieval scholars rather than what the leading intellectuals
actually laid out.
Moreover, if one looks carefully at the record, one will see that there is a direct
continuity between many of the questions raised by the 12th and 13th century naturalists
and the experimental pursuits that were carried out in the 17th century during the
scientific revolution. These included experiments with magnetism and the discovery of
40

For the long list of such naturalistic questions, see Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 199-209.
41
Edward Grant, “Science and the Medieval Universities,” in Rebirth, Reform, and Resilience, p. 78.
42
J. A. Weisheipl, “Science in the Thirteen Century,” in the History of the University of Oxford, edited by
J. I. Cato (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 435-469, at 438-39. This is a revised and expanded
edition of “Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century, Medieval Studies
26 (1964): 143- 185.
43
See Huff, Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution. A Global Perspective (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), chapter 4; and Benjamin Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Service
Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
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electricity, the study of pneumatics, air pumps, and the vacuum, and of course, all the
post mortem examinations of human bodies that had been going on in universities
across Europe since the 13th century (and earlier), 44 and were also encouraged even by
Church officials.
If we look at the actual comparative and historical record, 45 what we find is that the
teachings of the universities from the 12th century onwards served to inculcate a spirit
of scientific inquiry-- that is, it instilled a fundamental intellectual curiosity that was to
persist all the way to the present, while conversely, that same spirit of innovative
inquiry did not take hold outside of Europe. In the case of European universities, one
might even suggest that the effect of studying natural philosophy there, in the period
leading up to 1600, was so strong that many of the pioneers of the 17th century
revolution were highly educated laymen, not scholars attached to the universities. This
is not to suggest that the universities of Europe had become less important, but rather
that the ethos of science had jumped the bounds of strict university identification. This
assertion regarding the effects of the medieval universities on scientific innovation
might seem a controversial proposition, so consider the following test.
A Test Case
A few years back I came up with what I see as an acid test of this proposition. It
concerns the invention of the telescope by a Dutchman in 1608. Just as soon as this
invention appeared, people like Galileo, but not only he, quickly saw its importance for
astronomical inquiry. It was in fact a discovery machine, though of course it had to be
improved (as it was) and focused on new astronomical phenomena, which is what
Europeans did throughout the 17th century as the scientific revolution unfolded.
As we recall, Galileo used the telescope to discover the rough cratered surface of the
Moon, the four satellites of Jupiter, the phases of Venus, and a bold conjecture about the
rings of Saturn. Consequently, the arrival of the telescope and Galileo's early
astronomical announcement of his discoveries (in 1610) set Europeans on fire with
excitement. They wanted to know, are these claims of Galileo true or mere
fabrications? So other astronomers, religious scholars, merchants, and ambassadors
quickly acquired their own telescopes and set about testing Galileo's claims. Within a
year of Galileo's announcement (it was called the Starry Messenger), all of these
44

For an overview of European medical education and postmortem examinations, see Huff, The Rise of
Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993/2003),
pp.189-208
45
The direct connection between the medieval Aristotelian study of the science of motion and Galileo has
been traced out by Marshall Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison: Wisconsin
University Press, 1959); and Ernest Moody, "Galileo and Avempace: Dynamics of the Leaning Tower
Experiments," in Roots of Scientific Thought: A Cultural Perspective, edited by Philip Wiener and A.
Noland (New York: Basic Books, 1957), pp. 176-206; and idem, "Galileo and His Precursors," in Galileo
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discoveries had been confirmed both by other scholars and Church officials. What was
controversial was the claim that these surprisingly results -- the cratered surface of the
Moon, the Satellites of Jupiter and the phases of Venus-- were fully supportive of the
Copernican worldview, which they were.
Some Church officials disputed that, but they did not dispute the observational reports
of Galileo that Roman College officials themselves had seen. Indeed, Galileo was feted
at the Roman College in 1611, some time before religious reactionaries who knew
nothing of Galileo's work raised a number of fundamental metaphysical concerns. The
controversy went on for some time but the fact remains that the telescope's arrival
provoked a new series of inquiries all over Europe, and this led to the transformation of
the practice of astronomy, turning it from a slow plodding inquiry into a new science
looking for more astronomical discoveries. And of course there was a race to make
bigger, more powerful telescopes. 46
But then, we ask the question, what if the telescope were taken to other parts of the
world, to China, India and the Ottoman Empire in these same early years of the 17th
century? As I have spelled out elsewhere, 47 nothing happened. Telescopes became
available all over Mughal India from 1615 onward; Europeans translated a report on
Galileo's observations into Chinese and published it in Peking in that same year, while a
new (Keplerian) telescope arrived in China in 1619; and we know that telescopes were
available all over the Ottoman Empire as early as 1630 when a European merchant was
executed for looking at the Royal harem with his telescope.
Yet neither the Chinese (with lots of tutoring by the Christian missionaries), nor the
Mughals, nor the Ottomans found the telescope to be particularly useful as a scientific
instrument. Neither did they make any improvements on the telescope or use it in any
way to advance the science of astronomy as practiced in those civilizations.
This contrasting set of outcomes I attribute to the very different educational systems of
Europe in comparison to China and the Muslim world. As I noted earlier, it was the
unique Europe commitment to the study of the natural world that resulted in the
instilling of a broad sense of intellectual curiosity that made the difference. Nothing
like the broad scope of naturalistic curiosity among the Europeans was instilled in the
Islamic madrassas or in the Chinese cram schools designed to teach students to
memorize thousands of Chinese characters in order to past the standard Neo-Confucian
state Civil Service Examinations.
Now someone might say, well this is just a one-off situation concerning astronomy. So
I looked at a half dozen other fields of inquiry: optics, anatomy, microscopy, hydraulics
46
47
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and pneumatics, and electric studies. Here again we find no advances in those fields
outside of Europe in the 17th and 18th century.
If one were to make a roster of outstanding contributors to the leading edge of the
scientific transformation in Europe in the 17th century and sought counterpart
achievements in other parts of the world, there would be no equivalent to the advances
in astronomy of Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, Huygens, or Newton; in electrical studies,
no William Gilbert, Otto von Guericke, or Francis Hawksbee; in pneumatics and
hydraulics no Torricelli, Blaise Pascal, Robert Hooke, or Robert Boyle; nor any
counterpart in microscopy and anatomy to William Harvey, Marcello Malpighi, Regnier
de Graaf, Jan Swammerdam, or Antoni Leeuwenheock. This is the short list of stellar
scientific pioneers but it makes our point.
Now I do not make these assertions in order to tout the extraordinary European
advances that should be well-known, but rather to correct false impressions that are
conveyed by revisionist titles such as Islamic Science and the Making of European
Renaissance; 48 The House of Wisdom: How Arabic Science Saved Ancient Knowledge
and Gave us the Renaissance; 49 The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization; 50 or The
Central Asian Origins of Science in the Medieval World. 51 Both old and young readers
will no doubt be impressed by these overstated titles that bear little resemblance to the
historical record.
Instead of writing improbable books about the "Eastern" sources of the West, scholars
ought to be probing far more seriously the nature of the Islamic tradition, Confucianism,
Buddhism, and Hinduism and asking probing questions: not just why these traditions
did not give rise to modern science, but also why they did not give rise to modern
constitutionalism, parliamentary democracy, due process of law, the concept of human
rights and the public sphere supporting freedom of expression. Clearly Western Europe
did emerge as a civilizational entity at the heart of which are a unique set of cultural and
institutional structures that set it off from other civilizational entities across the world.
Those with interests in comparative civilizational studies can surely find an abundance
of comparative topics to study here.

48

George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of European Renaissance (Cambridge: MIT Press,
2007). My review of that book, The Middle East Quarterly, 15 #4 (2008): 77-79.
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Jim Khalili, The House of Wisdom: How Arabic Science Saved Ancient Knowledge and Gave us the
Renaissance (London: Penguin Press, 2010).
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John H Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization (New York: Cambridge University Press,
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). My review of Beckwith: The American Historical Review
2013 118: 919-920.
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University Reform in the 18th and 19th Centuries
Before concluding, it should be pointed out that the universities did not remain
unchanged after the 17th century. After being the midwives to the scientific revolution
itself, the universities in the 18th century witnessed the founding of new, more
experimental, research oriented institutions, especially in Göttingen, Germany. The
University in Göttingen (founded in1737) took a more hands-on approach to medicine,
for example, and went on to invent the research seminar that served as a model for other
progressive universities all across Europe. This shift toward expecting both faculty and
students to engage in original research in seminars was a new thing that was quickly
adopted in major universities across Germany and in other parts of Europe. It resulted,
especially in the 19th century, in the linking of cutting-edge research with industrial
development. 52
That research model, albeit with modifications, was transported to the United States
after the 1870s, with the result that by end of the 1930s, American researchers,
especially physicists working on quantum theory, were held on the same high level as
their European peers, soon in fact to surpass them. 53
Conclusion: Civilizational Analysis Revisited
Over the last millennium Europe as a civilizational entity solidified around a fusion of
Greek philosophy, Christian thought, and Roman law. During the twelfth to the
fourteenth centuries Europe experienced an extraordinary social, political and economic
revolution that fused those strands of philosophy, religion, and law into a unique
civilizational entity, whose further development was guided above all else, by a unique
legal system just coming into its own.
The rise of the universities and their scholars were both part of that revolution and
architects of it. The legal revolution created the institutional tools for parliamentary
democracy, for constitutionalism, and for self-government among citizens and officials
in local towns and cities. All of these developments created a far more secure situation
for all sorts of economic actors, for merchants, traders, and bankers. The legal devices
used by these economic actors did not exist in either Islamic or Chinese law, making it
52
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exceedingly difficult to see how the "East" could have supplied any aspect of the
foundations for Western civilization (in law or scientific inquiry).
Likewise, the legal scholars (mostly affiliated with universities) were the architects of
what we rightly call due process of law. That in itself is a major accomplishment for
human kind, but one that must be constantly revisited. In addition, there is now a very
substantial body of legal studies showing that our Western conception of human rights
was first articulated in this same period extending from the 12th to 14th centuries. 54
The task of articulating, protecting and extending human rights is never finished, but it
is a sure bet that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights issued by the United
Nations signatories in 1948 would not have appeared without this deep historical
background.
Lastly, let us not forget that there were multiple institutional locations in the West, early
on, for the development of a public sphere, a zone of intellectual, religious, scientific
and political discussion that is freely open to the public, and in which participants of all
stripes are deemed capable and legitimate contributors to the public discourse.55
Because this zone of public discourse has not been fully and adequately contextualized,
it has not been properly appreciated as another major Western contribution to modern
social, political, and economic development.
No matter how we draw the shifting boundaries that constitute the core territories of
Western civilization, Europe as a distinct entity has survived nationalist wars,
revolutions, a reformation followed by religious wars, fascist takeovers and economic
collapses, yet it has emerged as an increasingly integrated configuration, distinct from
all other civilizational entities. Those who have been primarily concerned with statist
rivalries and politics have overlooked this internal coherence.
There has indeed been rivalry and competition between the states of Europe, and Europe
overseas: i.e., the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In this regard, the
United States has served for the last century or so as the spearhead of Western
development in every respect. And while many Americans think of the United States as
the "exception" to many aspects of European culture and politics, its great success has
indeed been made possible because of its thorough adoption of the Western legal,
scientific, and religious heritage. That amalgam is always evolving but it remains the
touchstone of all the major trends of the world, including the current phase of
apparently rapid globalization, and the Web-based Information Technology revolution.
54
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Before one takes too seriously the alarms appearing under the heading of the "decline of
the West," one should notice that in that broader category of "the West" there resides
not only the European Union, but the United States, other parts of North America and
the Antipodes. To take but one example of the shared achievements of that broader
entity, the development of modern science: the number of Nobel Prize winners of that
entity since the inception of the Prize proves to be far more than 90 percent. Put
differently, "whether measured in people or events, 97 percent of the accomplishment in
the scientific" sphere occurred in Europe or North America. 56 A similar achievement
occurred in the arts.
Civilizational analysis could profitably focus on how and why the other major
civilizations of the world --Islam, China, India, and Russia, for example, and their
indigenous traditions of Islam, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism -- did not give
rise to modern science, but also why they did not give rise to modern constitutionalism,
parliamentary democracy, due process of law, the concept of human rights and the
public sphere supporting freedom of expression.
The West has indeed been uniquely productive in the creation of institutional
arrangements that forwarded scientific inquiry but also preserved some of our most
cherished values: democratic constitutionalism and the advance of due process of law,
vital anchors for long-term economic progress. This does not mean that Western actors
never fell from acceptable standards of conduct, but that over time they did establish
universal values, cherished by all, that even today, are sought by many across the world.
Indeed, it remains a major agenda of civilizational analysis to trace out the early origins
of "world culture," the emergence of an autonomous body of international law beyond
Europe, the transformations of many local and regional legal systems so that they could
encompass democratic constitutionalism, human rights and due process of law. By that
latter conception one should mean "rule of law," not "rule of men." Likewise the whole
history of the dissemination of the legal concept of legal autonomy in non-Western legal
contexts remains a huge gap in historical studies, not to mention political science and
sociology.

56

Charles Murray, Human Accomplishment: The Pursuit of Excellence in the Arts and Sciences 800 B.C.
to 1950 (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), p. 252.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013

91

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 69 [2013], No. 69, Art. 17

Comparative Civilizations Review

87

Letters to the Editor

Veni, Vidi, Vici?
Andrew Targowski
andrew.targowski@wmich.edu
I read with some surprise a paper on “Civilization Defined” written by Dr. Abbey
Perumpanani in the Comparative Civilizations Review issue of Spring 2013, No. 68.
The author claims that he was told by members of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations that they have made numerous previous attempts at
their annual meetings to generate a consensus definition of civilization—without
success.
I would like to remind all those members and the author as well as the editors that a
paper reviewing about 25 definitions (provided by early civilizationists and our
members) has been published. My article “Towards a Composite Definition and
Classification of Civilization” was also in the Comparative Civilizations Review of
Spring 2009, No. 60.
Based on all those contributions, the composite definition of civilization is as follows:
Civilization is a large society living in an autonomous, fuzzy reification
(invisible-visible) that is not a part of larger one and exists over an extended
period of time. It specializes in labor and differentiates from other
civilizations by developing its own advanced cultural system driven by
communication, religion, wealth, power, and sharing the same
knowledge/wisdom system within complex urban, agricultural infrastructures,
and others such as industrial, information ones. It also progresses in a cycle
or cycles of rising, growing, declining and falling.
A graphic model of civilization is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 A Model of Civilization

As we see this definition is very comprehensive and thoughtful, much more isomorphic
than one provided by Dr. Perumpanani, who states that “A civilization is a dynamical
system that supports endogenous cultural development through economic activity
aggregated across elements of its data.”
Also, the mentioned author argues for a mathematical definition of civilization. He
provided two formulae for computing the rates of economic and cultural changes. It is
necessary to point out that our member Stephen Blaha has published several books on
the mathematical modeling of civilizations.
These works include, among others:
• The Life Cycle of Civilizations (2002)
• SuperCivilizations: Civilizations as Superorganisms (2010).
Also, I have published some chapters on mathematical modeling of civilization
dynamics (tested upon current civilizational data) in my book entitled Information
Technology and Societal Development (2009).
Just one of the examples of the kind of modeling used in the latter book is exemplified
on the following page:

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013

93

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 69 [2013], No. 69, Art. 17

Comparative Civilizations Review

89

Pt
Pt

Pk

Pd
Ps

Pw

Pid

T
tz

Figure 1-12 The Distribution of the Total Power of a Civilization, where:
Pt - total power, Pid - idle power, Pw - working power,
Pd - disposal power, Pk - coordination power, Ps - secure power

A civilization that cannot maintain its necessary level of secured resources will decline
into lower stages of existence, but this decline can be arrested. A civilization can also
lose its strength and pass into transition or arrest if its idle power (Pi) exceeds its
working power (Pw). This is the case for the Roman (31 BC - 476 AD) and Soviet
(1917-1991) civilizations. These considerations allow a definition of civilization
secured power Ps:
Ps = Pw + Pid
[1]
A relation of the working power to secured power we will call a coefficient of power
supply:
r Pw / Ps
[2]
Hence, the working power Pw is defined as follows:
Pw = r Ps
[3]
Inserting the expression [3] into the formula [1] we obtain a formula for secured power:
Ps = Pid / (1 – r)
[4]
If r = 0, the taking in of resources from the environment does not require any work.
This means that the existence of a civilization depends upon the size of its secured
power which only needs to cover idle power Ps = Pid. This is the case for the Islamic
Civilization and its abundant oil resources at the beginning of the 21st century.
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The bigger r is, the more work is needed to take in energy from the environment. This
means that a civilization must take in more energy and its secured power (Ps) must be
bigger.
If r approximates to 1, in other words, when the taking in of energy by a civilization
requires vast work, then secured power approximates to infinity. This means that a
civilization does not have idle power (Pid) regardless of how much secured power it is
taking in from the environment. This is the case in arrested civilizations, such as the
Mayan, Andean, Yucatec-Mexican, Eskimo, Indian, and Polynesian specimens. To a
certain degree it also represents some parts of the present African civilization.
There is some surplus of power, which remains after total power covers secured power.
The remaining power we will call coordination power Pk:
[5]
Pk = Pt - Ps
Then, the total power Pt of a civilization can be expressed as follows:
[6]
Pt = Ps + Pk
If we substitute the expression [1] for Ps then:
Pt = Pid + Pw + Pk
[7]
The disposable power Pd of a civilization is defined as follows:
Pd = Pw + Pk
[8]
All components of the total power are shown on Figure 1 - 12.
To survive, a civilization must produce total power no lower than its secured power (Pt
Ps), which depends upon existing civilization power (Pc). However, a civilization can
reduce its secured power (Ps) by triggering changes in the environment that cause
civilization power to increase. This means that a civilization may move into a territory
with better resources or it may invade another civilization with such resources. This
strategy explains clashes among civilizations. To engage in a clash, a civilization must
spend some power, which we called coordination power (Pk).
The more coordination power that is at the disposal of a civilization, the more changes it
can invoke in the environment. Mastery of information distribution and utilization are
at the heart of coordination power, and it produces a positive feedback cycle: more
coordination power produces more civilization power; this in turn requires less working
power and less secured power. As a result, coordination power becomes bigger. This
effect means that a civilization reaches its maximal coordination power and civilization
power at the same time it has its minimal secured power.
This is a highly desirable situation where a civilization uses its coordination power to
secure the best environmental conditions and increases its own existence timeline. In
the long run, mastery of information increases awareness and knowledge, which results
in wiser decision-making about all civilization system components. Most civilizations
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last for many years, enduring decisions of varying quality, but information coordination
provides capacities to eventually turn data into wisdom for the benefit of a given
civilization.
As one of the results of mathematical modeling, the Civilization Index has been
developed and depicted in the following table, which has a very practical application.

Communication
System

Knowledge System

Guiding System

Power System

Logistic System

Infrastructure

Total

CI as % of
Potential (max 77)

Ranking

WesternWest
WesternJewish
Japanese
WesternCentral
Eastern
WesternLatin
Chinese
Islamic
Hindu
Buddhist
African

The Civilization Index CI

Existence System

Civilization

Table 3-9

29

7

7

7

7

6

7

70

0.91

1

27

7

7

7

6

6

7

67

0.87

2

21

6

6

7

5

6

7

58

0.75

3

20

5

4

6

5

3

4

47

0.61

4

23

5

5

1

7

3

3

47

0.61

5

15

4

4

6

3

2

4

40

0.52

6

17
13
13
9
8

4
3
2
3
1

2
2
3
3
1

2
4
7
5
1

6
4
3
2
1

1
3
1
1
1

3
4
3
2
1

35
33
32
25
14

0.45
0.43
0.41
.32
0.18

7
8
9
10
11

A comparison of civilizations at the end of the 20th century permits us to draw the
following conclusions:
1. The Western-West civilization is at the stage of "saturation," indicating that it is
either ready to expand into other civilizations or to enter into social unrest. This
civilization has an almost perfect Index: CI = 91%.
2. The Western-Jewish (CI = 87%) and Japanese civilizations (CI = 75%) are very
well developed and will approach the "saturation" point in the near future.
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3. The African civilization is either at the beginning of the developmental process
or at the stage of disastrous development. Taking into account its very short and
tumultuous history, both statements may be correct (CI = 18%).
4. The remaining civilizations have a good prospect for further development or
redevelopment. This is presently taking place in the case of the Western-Central
civilization after the collapse of the Soviet civilization. Civilization Indexes of
these civilizations vary from CI = 32% to 61%.

All these mentioned books take into account many more systemic components in
characterizing a civilization than the two ones offered by Abbey Perumpanani. Will Dr.
Perumpanani continue his quest for a better definition of civilization using mathematical
modeling? Modern science develops by the additive accumulation of contributions.
Andrew Targowski
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Dynamic Definitions?
A Response to Abbey Perumpanani’s Article, “Civilization Defined.”
Wallace Gray
wallace.gray@sckans.edu
By a happy coincidence, I have been asked to comment on Dr. Abbey Perumpanani’s
stimulating article, “Civilization Defined.” The coincidence is that the editors chose to
print my “End Note” in the same issue with Perumpanani’s lead article of the
Comparative Civilizations Review (No. 68, Spring 2013). My little essay, “Seeing
Nagasaki: A Tale,” enabled one to consider what may be learned from Nagasaki about
becoming “civilized” in an evolving or devolving, compassionate or brutal world.
There are many facts about the city to learn, including that the atomic bomb
dropped on Nagasaki was meant to strike a munitions area, an important shipbuilding and servicing complex. Instead, winds carried the atomic bomb to a
Catholic area, to the north. As a result, the bomb apparently fell on a Christian
hospital and medical university. . . .
As the paragraph implies, the shadows cast by Nagasaki then have darkened and
lengthened almost exponentially for the world we live in now.
Rediscovering Civilization in Nagasaki and Beyond
In the midst of that project I realized I could not well proceed without careful attention
to some of Dr. Perumpanani’s main points. Two stand out -- how he began and how he
ended his piece.
The “inclusive scientific definition” heading his Introduction reads: A civilization is a
dynamical system that supports endogenous cultural development through economic
activity aggregated across elements of its data.
It becomes quickly apparent that this physician and mathematician is an exponent of
what in his conclusion (p. 19) he calls Mathematical History. This term is carefully
explained in the body of the essay but at its outset (p. 9) he states it “can bring about a
convergence in the widely differing historical views of civilization.”
In his conclusion, he stops short of insisting that those of us who are not proficient in
math need to master the intricacies of calculus and its mysterious grammar. Several
times, in fact, he illuminates his own meaning by translating the calculus into less
intimidating language. Then he adds, “A more efficient approach, I believe, is to open
the door from the other side—to import from other disciplines academics with an
interest in history, and to foster interactions through them. Such importation,” he
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continues, “has happened before, and to great success: von Ranke’s background in
philology, for example, significantly energized his approach to history.” (p. 19)
In his very last sentence the doctor characterizes his interest as one of “Mathematical
History—a common platform to objectively discuss our shared past.” Since my
perspective is that of a Christian Humanist, the contrast between us is interesting. It
may stimulate both fresh dialogue and even insight.
My approach now will be not so much a pro or con production as an inquiry into the
body of what the good doctor proposes within his beginning-ending framework.
First, do I correctly understand what is being put forth?
Second, what are my points?
Here’s a partial list plus some samples of how I develop my thoughts and defend them. I
do welcome Dr. Perumpanani’s clarification of his position and his supporting
arguments, as well as his critiquing of mine.
1. The city of Nagasaki’s violent yet peace-producing history is parallel in important
ways to the efforts of many able scholars to answer the still unresolved question:
“What is civilization?” (This has become my thesis statement based in part on some
translation I have done from the Japanese. That labor of love in turn has inspired me
to engage in further comparative historical research.)
2. I share an important perspective with Dr. Perumpanani. I fully concur with his hope
to bring about a “convergence in the widely differing historical views on
civilization.”
3. However, I suspect that my own approach has more in common with thinkers such
as Rob Bell, Huston Smith, Ray Kurzweil, and Eiji Hattori than with Professor
Perumpanani.
4. As I see it, the issue is much more tangled and perplexing than the professor’s
mathematical and scientific approach. Göedel’s Theorem seems to me to overturn
some of his hopes at the outset of his project.
By means of complicated arguments using the tools of math and symbolic logic,
Göedel concluded that since logic requires us to deduce every statement from some
other statement, there has to be what I would call a Mother Statement. If it is
derived from within a system (for example, the system of scientific methodology
itself), where is the “Grandmother” of that system? Oh, of course, “outside the box”!
Then we are into an infinite regress, aren’t we?
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From what ultimate axioms do these disciplines derive? To the answer, “From some
kind of intuition, revelation, or discovery,” a next question naturally arises. That is,
“From what will any new discovery or set of axioms arise?” To appeal only to
former discoveries or assumptions is not only circular, it loses the dynamic quality
Perumpanani emphasizes. It has more the ring of a static deductive system.
Dynamism is also weakened by the title Civilization Defined; I would have preferred
Defining Civilization.1
5. To give him the full benefit of the doubt, let us assume I have grossly misunderstood
what the lead article is saying. Dr. Perumpanani may only wish for us to face the
fact that a “perfect” definition ever eludes even the best minds and that, in a
calculus-like way, we may move forward without ever touching any graphic
perpendicular. In that case we simply have to settle for a real-life graph in which we
arrive by infinitesimal jumps closer and closer to what we need until we reach what
suits us “for all practical purposes”.
6. Let us then use this “dynamic” interpretation to peer through an intellectual
microscope at Dr. Perumpanani’s seeming dismissal of comparative historians
indebted to Toynbee’s work. Did not Toynbee suffer from a far too simple
assurance that civilizations must be “the creative response of people to physical
challenges imposed upon them, in other words, a pattern imposed by geography”?
(p. 18). If Toynbee—or any other writer on civilization—is a geographical
determinist, I am on Dr. Perumpanani’s side of the debate. Any definition that has
geography as determinant (deterministic?) may be claiming either too little or too
much.
We do not need calculus or even algebra to understand this. Two technical terms in
definitional logic, denotative and connotative, should help us. To use a trite
example, if I say, “All men are mortal,” and you ask, “What do you mean by men?”
I might answer with some synonym such as “people” or “human beings” or I might
point to Sue or Joe as examples of what I mean. I would then have given a
denotative meaning of meaning. You might understand that I had displayed two
members of some kind of set (or collection) of individuals, but in exasperation, you
might respond, “That is not what I meant by mean! I recognize Joe but your Sue
may be some kind of realistic robot. How do you characterize the entire set of what
you call “human”?
Now matters become really messy. How close does a robot or “artificially
intelligent” device need to approach the way we are and the way we behave to be
1

For scientific progress alone all theories and procedures may be regarded, not as true or false, but simply
as useful until improved or replaced by subsequent developments. This pragmatic interpretation is fine,
but I assumed from the title and some of the text of “Civilization Defined” that Dr. Perumpanani was
seeking truth not simply usefulness.
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included with us under the designation “human” and/or “intelligent”? I do not
believe that science or social science will ever do full justice to either “human
beings” or “civilized human beings.” Consequently I do not believe either Dr.
Perumpanani or I will be able to say exactly how right or wrong, adequate or
lacking, a prolific writer such as Toynbee is in his approach to the meaning of
“being civilized.” Characterizations, brief or long, always veer toward saying too
little or too much.
As a person trained in the humanities and social sciences I will probably always
remain unsure as to whether Dr. Perumpanani’s conclusions do justice to Toynbee’s
total vision—a vision that involved the arts, humanities, and religion in an
inclusively global perspective. Nevertheless I sincerely believe that there is
something of both descriptive and normative value in the second part of the
definition that reads “. . . development through economic activity aggregated across
elements of its data. I would like to invite Dr. Perumpanani to explain what these
words mean. He has succeeded in giving such explanations in other parts of his
essay.

7. I tend to see most definitions as too simplistic in the sense of being out of touch with
reality as a complex dynamic process, which I view as an increasingly paradoxical
system retreating or advancing into more and more darkness, mystery, and perhaps
miracle.
Nagasaki itself is a paradox of hatred and love, toleration and martyrdom, war and
peace. Its history reveals an exercise of human reason, scientific and medical
commitments, and a wide range of deep empathy with others.
The Rotarian for November 2012 carried an important interview with Harvard’s
Professor Steven Pinker on his latest book The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why
Violence Has Declined. One trait that the evolution of cities has bequeathed to us is
the invention of treaties; city states give humanity longer and longer pauses between
wars. In the objective sense this has given students of civilization one criterion for
civilization’s definition. But “being civilized” can carry the humane and other
connotations that enter the moral and value realms. They transcend the purely
descriptive, quantifiable forms of definition which Dr. Perumpanani seems at times
to demand.
Even the history of Nagasaki contains surprises: “saintliness” spreading because of
the crucifixion of saints; tolerance and cooperation arising after very competitive,
violent struggles among religions—to name only two of the more obvious examples.
The Perumpanani tools include: the written and spoken language of English;
mathematics ranging from simple arithmetic through algebra all the way to calculus;
and technical languages suited to such fields as medicine, economics, and history.
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8. There is a remarkable and somewhat disturbing parallel between understanding
“civilization” academically and understanding each other’s native languages.
Somewhere in the earlier part of my academic career I became fascinated by
Japanese language, history, and culture. For a number of years I have found pleasure
and frustration in moving back and forth between English and Japanese. It has
amazed me how difficult it is to enter another culture or civilization from the
standpoint of one’s own background. This difficulty, I believe, must be squarely
addressed in “defining civilization”.
My contention is that change is so fast and unpredictable that without time-lapses for
attention to local variations in custom and culture, understanding each other will always
be a bit tardy even if just for practical purposes such as in business. Native Japanese
speakers use their word for “Yes” in a quite different way from American business
negotiators who have often, to their grief, understood the word to be a simple yes. They
suppose the Japanese hai is an equivalent to our Yes. However, depending on context,
the Japanese word can mean yes, no, I’m paying attention, or simply maybe. In a
business situation “yes” or “hai” may sound like “Let’s sign the agreement and go out
for a game of golf”! On Japanese ground—and sometimes even in New York City—a
smiling Japanese negotiator may only mean, “We understand what you are saying” even
when the “understanding” is a mirage. In any case the word for “yes” almost never
means, “Let’s draw up the contract before we go to lunch.”
Even more confusing is the lack of verbs in many Japanese sentences as well as the
paucity and ambiguity of pronouns such as: I, you, they, or it. The uninitiated may
scratch his or her head and wonder, “Who indeed said or did that?” Or, “What does that
Japanese speaker think is happening?” I am, of course, referring to an utterance in
which the speaker uses no verb.
Fumiki-san, the author of “Seeing Nagasaki,” illustrates some of what I am saying in an
even more dramatic but literary and aesthetic fashion: A pine-covered hill was visible in
the foreground of the painting, and in the far distance, the blue-green ocean seemed to
frame the islands that dotted the scene. I remembered a poetic quotation from an eightvolume collection of joyful, auspicious poetry. Here’s the quotation:
Toward the interior of this brightness there is a simplicity,
an artlessness as the koto is played.
The sound must emulate Autumn’s beauty.
In such stillness the koto seems to tingle.
I, Fumiki Narita, enjoyed this stillness while it lasted.
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Further Reflections On Defects In Any Purely Mathematical Theory Concerning
Life or Civilizations
Note that Fumiki’s interest in stillness is explicitly mentioned only in the last line
of the poem. Fumiki is speaking of his feeling as he enjoys a pictorial representation of
scenery. Since there are fewer Japanese kanji (Chinese characters) than usual in this
poem and more Japanese phonetic symbols, we may infer that the poet was a woman.
Only men were supposed to be educated enough to use Chinese characters. Some ladies
knew quite a few of these kanji but were demure or canny enough not to go public about
their achievement.
We should add that the wording of the poems is so difficult and archaic as to suggest a
quite early date in the evolution of written Japanese. Some historians have even
hypothesized that the second bomb would not have been dropped on Nagasaki were it
not for a linguistic misunderstanding between the leaders of Japan and the U.S.!
In addition, feelings do not easily or adequately yield themselves to quantifiable
mathematical expression.
More important still is the fact that science itself seems more and more to be yielding,
facing up to self-contradictory findings, as fully problematic as any in religion.
A number of years ago I wrote out a sixteen-page doubled-spaced lecture on the
question, “How Nearly Identical Are Religion and Science?” My tentative conclusion
was probably fairly modest when I first presented it in Japan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore. Even then I agreed with Allen Watt’s Zen-like observation, “When someone
draws attention to the implicit unity of polar opposites we feel something of a shock.”
(Alan Watts, The Two Hands of God (New York: Collier Books, 1969, p. 46)
Allow me to add the word “science” to the word “technology” in the following
quotation from Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen’s Contemporary German Philosophy (Bonn:
G. Bouvier u. C. Verlag, 1970, p. 171) and you have a sentence remarkably prophetic of
my position in 2013: “The preeminent philosophic task of the present is to unite a high
estimation for the actual, inner human values with a mastery of modern sciencetechnology and its possibilities.”
In today’s world I believe this would lead not only to movement toward Dr.
Perumpanani’s goal of a convergence of understandings about civilization but also to a
whole basketful of “impossible possibilities” in the advance of scientific knowledge.
To face a true ethical dilemma in von Rintelen’s sphere of human values is not like
putting potatoes on a scale to determine which is heavier. Nagasaki’s Dr. Takashi Nagai
illustrates dramatically the continuing relevance of the city’s history, as intimated in
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Point 1 above. His The Bells of Nagasaki explains this scientist’s awareness that his
research into the medical uses of radiation for treatment purposes could also be turned
astray for hugely destructive purposes. Surely civilization’s ethical cognate “civilized”
is in an entirely different category from measuring the weight of potatoes.
To be civilized is to estimate the amount of good one’s actions will bring as opposed to
harm. At first, Dr. Nagai, along with the rest of us, had no idea how close the world’s
top scientists were to being able to develop an A-bomb. His ignorance of what lay
ahead made his decision to continue a merely academic inquiry into the beneficial, even
benevolent uses, of radiation relatively easy. Should he have dropped this mere
academic stuff for the urgently needed preparation in first-aid and the saving of life?
That would be an unreasonable ethical expectation in the light of his total ignorance of
the pending tragedy.
Ignorance allows all of us to disregard ethical quandaries about the honest weighing of
potatoes (before the existence of merchants or quantitatively accurate scales); by the
same token, before the evil consequences of nuclear developments were existentially
experienced, Nagai could in no way be held ethically accountable for horrors not yet
known or even generally imagined.
When Dr. Nagai’s healing services were hopelessly disturbed -- in fact, virtually wiped
out -- what he and other survivors faced was almost too high a mountain to climb, “a
possible impossibility” if you will. I put the word “possible” first because, with his
leadership, the almost “walking-dead” among his medical students and first-aid staff
rallied to form a working group, then saved lives, bound up terrible wounds, reduced
pain and, when possible, helped the dying die with some awareness of loving care.
They even respectfully handled the remains of the dead though it was all but largely
impossible due to scattering and loss.
When we approach the self-contradictory discoveries of modern science, they may seem
trivial compared with nuclear threats to us and our environment.
Rob Bell takes a mockingly frivolous approach to uninformed “knowledge” about
science and religion in his critically acclaimed What We Talk About When We Talk
About God (Harper One, 2013). His conclusions ultimately converge with God-talk and
ethical sensitivity.
Before that convergence, all readers can enjoy Bell’s “quirky talking about a quirky
society and culture.” One thing he undermines, at least for the general public, is
“scientism”, a dogmatic heritage from the Enlightenment. To be a thoroughly modern
Millie –at least a rational person—you can entertain no ultimate dilemmas or paradoxes
in true science or matters of “fact”.
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Let’s look at a few emerging facts he has fun with.
The chair you are sitting in is made of atoms, and “atoms, it turns out, are 99.9
percent empty space.” (p. 43).
We earthlings think we have some grasp of gravity and the size of things
affected by it, but the universe contains some bodies called neutron stars.
These stars “have such strong gravity at work they collapse in on themselves”
and “can weigh more than two hundred billion tons—more than all of the
continents on earth put together. . . . and fit in a teaspoon.” (p. 27)
“If an atom were blown up to the size of a stadium, the nucleus would be the
size of a grain of rice, but it would weigh more than the stadium.” (p. 33)
Can “scientific” rationality survive one more conundrum? Niels Bohr and other
quantum physicists “realized that particles are constantly in motion, exploring
all of the possible paths from point A to point B at the same time.” (p. 36)
They literally are not anywhere until you ask where they are now or next, so. . . .
“They’re simultaneously everywhere and nowhere.” (p. 36)
While Bell is the first to admit that he not a scientist and hence “only” secondary
source, his notes and bibliographies at the end coincide what I have independently
discovered in the literature. In order to prepare us for something of a shock when we at
last come face to face with most recent developments in physics and religion, Rev. Bell
uses two metaphors, your antique car and hum.
He introduces us to the comic absurdity of much of our antiquated 21st Century talk
about science, God and ethics. At least some of our readers still enjoy tinkering with
and even driving an antique Oldsmobile to car parades or public shows. Yet the same
individuals wouldn’t dream of substituting their precious toy for their 2011 Ford Focus
just in order that they might daily experience the thrill of driving it in TODAY’S
heaviest Los Angeles traffic.
Bell continues his satire on God-like Oldsmobiles with this story: “My friend Cathi
recently told me about an event she attended where an influential Christian leader talked
seriously about how he didn’t think women should allowed to teach and lead in the
church. Cathi, who has two master’s degrees, sat there stunned.” (p. 6) Increasingly, as
we’ve illustrated above, scientific discoveries are being made that have profound
implications for this century and even for our future lives on this planet and in the
cosmos.
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What is that hum I hear? Is it the antique Olds in my shop-garage? Or is it “what Jane
Fonda spoke of, being drawn to faith, because I could feel reverence humming in me?”
Bell speaks of his love of that phrase because “it speaks to the experiences we all had—
moments when we’ve found ourselves deeply aware of the something more of life, the
something else, the sense that all of this might just mean something, that it might not be
an accident, that it has profound resonance and that it matters in ways that are very real
and very hard to explain.” (p. 10). A humming resonance!
I predict that infinite— at least mysterious— non-circular reasoning will become more
and more of a challenge in dealing logically or scientifically with either the past or the
present. What about the future? (Some of the most recent controversies that have raged
concern the “God-particle”.)
Consider what the Economist editors have to say on p. 85 of their May 25, 2013, issue.
For time to be “real”, in Mr. Smolin’s sense, it cannot be relative. But nor can it
be absolute in the Newtonian mould, where the future already exists, by dint of
inexorable logic. This leads Mr. Smolen to some audacious ideas. He challenges
not ony Einstein’s relativity, but also the very notion of natural laws as
immutable truths. He also questions the usefulness of mathematics in modeling
the universe in its entirety. Models shed light on processes which recur; the
universe, by definition, happens just once.
It would appear, then, that neither logic nor science can lead us beyond controversy.
Progress in either discipline seems to lead us ever deeper into paradox and fruitful but
never fully resolved controversy. In the same Economist article on the future of
physics, “Beyond Numbers,” the future of science is addressed by this brief listing of
sources. Just the titles seem at some odds with each other, don’t they?
The Universe Within: From Quantum to Cosmos.
By Neil Turok. House of Anansi Press; Faber and Faber
Farewell to Reality; How Modern Physics Has Betrayed the Search for Scientific
Truth
By Jim Baggott. Pegasus; Constable
Time Reborn: From the Crisis of Physics to the Future of the Universe.
By Lee Smolin. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Lane
Beyond Numbers
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I wish to propose to Dr. Perumpanani the following exchange. If he’ll try to explain to
me in non-mathematical language what he means by the phrase (from his definition of
civilization), “economic activity aggregated across elements of its data,” I’ll try to
communicate to him why there may be a reverence that vibrates in all of us, though it
cannot be weighed. Perhaps it resembles in some ways that deep trembling that we feel
when those mysterious “plates” slide against each other. . . .
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Book Reviews
David J. Rosner, Conservatism and Crisis, The Anti-Modernist Perspective in
Twentieth-Century German Philosophy. Lexington Books, 2012.
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
It is fascinating that a book so specifically devoted to looking back to how the antimodernist fever in the first half of the 20th century led to something as nightmarish as
World War II, the Holocaust, and the deaths of millions of people around the world.
But what made this book even more interesting to me was its relevance to our own time,
and our own fever of anti-modernism that is causing war, deaths, and enormous human
misery.
While we are all aware of the negative consequences of such anti-modernism, Rosner
notes that these movements are a response to a natural and understandable human
emotion: the longing for certainty in the face of what many see as loss of everything
familiar and sacred. Such longing takes form in nostalgia, romanticizing the past, and
some kind of wish to reconnect with the natural world.
David Rosner is a philosopher, a specialist in German philosophy, a discipline that has
given much serious scholarship to the world. But it has also given something else:
philosophy that gave heft to the formless fear of modernity that gave rise to Nazism.
In his preface, Rosner asks:
When longstanding ways of life are extinguished and new paradigms have not
yet been offered to replace them, how is the world now experienced and
constituted by the individual subject? What happens when the only explanatory
framework a culture has ever known is slowly eroded? Interwar Germany’s
cultural collapse involved a number of serious concrete problems specific to
Germany at this time, such as a devastating financial crisis and a sense of
national humiliation in the aftermath of World War I associated with the treaty
of Versailles. Yet often accompanying such external factors in a cultural
collapse are the signs of the loss of an entire value system. Thus, the crisis of
Weimar signified the deeper loss of a spiritual center, a sense of wide-spread
pessimism and confusion, felt not only in Germany but throughout the West
after the fin de siècle.
Rosner talks about the aporia of modernity, a term that he defines as alienation, a sense
of loss, of homelessness. For many, modernity brought with it great gains: the
discoveries of the scientific revolution, industrialization, the lessening of the hold of
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traditional religion as a force for explaining the world, the emancipation of women, and
the opening of political participation to those who were never included before. But
these optimistic values were dashed by World War I, when civilized Europeans
descended into mindless horror. Empires collapsed, a whole generation of young men
died or were horrifically maimed, and everything familiar had changed.
From 1500 to 1950, the traditional world changed with ever-increasing speed, at a rate
too fast for ordinary people to understand and accept. There have been many times in
human history that such changes took place (the collapse of Rome, barbarian invasions,
the sudden rise of Islam, the discovery of the New World, the religious wars); however,
the changes in the 19th and early 20th century were the most rapid of all, and the
outcome of World War I threw millions of people into a world with no rational
explanation for why things happen.
Although Rosner focuses on Germany, this book can be read as an explanation for the
current aporia of so many people: conservative and sometimes neo-fascist movements
in Europe and the US, as well as the most obvious of all, the crisis within Islam, the
struggle between the modernizers and those who violently reject modernity.
The German philosopher Heidegger, who struggled with the loss of all that was familiar
in traditional rural Germany, is the key philosopher whose trajectory from despair to his
shameful romance with the Nazis makes him the central figure in this book. Rosner not
only reviews the work of Spengler, Schmitt, Jünger, and others who were influenced by
earlier Romantic movements, but in his scholarship he also cites numerous important
modern philosophers and analysts of the interwar period.
Rosner looks at secularism and its discontents: the sense of “disenchantment” that Max
Weber noted. For the disenchanted, the loss of the magic implicit in religion is a great
loss. With the loss of this transcending value come high levels of social decadence,
Rosner notes, such as “the sexual revolution and widespread drug abuse, both of which
left many shattered lives in their wake.”
In his final chapter, “Fear and Hope in Post Modernity,” Rosner explores the angst of
those who feel that their world has lost all values, all things worth having. But he also
looks at the solutions sought by some groups, and provides pros and cons for these
solutions. He explores Fundamentalism, the attempt to return to the roots of one’s
religion for answers to all problems. This process provides an absolute and unchanging
moral code that gives certainty to some; it provides a strong sense of community
(something lacking in reason and secularism); it affords a feeling of moral superiority, a
feeling of being among the “elect” and it provides a firm grounding in tradition and
longstanding religious practices that have stood the test of time.
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But on the negative side, he says that the absolutistic reactions can be even more
nihilistic than the original problem itself. He cites the violent excesses of Muslim
terrorists, some Israeli Jewish settlers, and Christian murders of abortion doctors. He
also notes that religious fundamentalism is a closed system, in which one must accept a
number of simplistic assumptions.
He then examines Stoicism as a possible solution: just living and taking in stride that
there is no meaning to be found, but that one should live as though there were. On the
con side, Stoicism has been seen as “tired.” It is never going to have great appeal.
His best solution seems to be seeing the sacred within the secular. He notes that “…the
Eco-philosophy movement has taken on an urgency rarely felt in the usually rarefied
circles of academic philosophy.” But even here, this movement has within it
“archaism,” an attempted return to an almost mythic ethos that is impossible to reclaim
at this late state in history.
Rosner concludes, as have many philosophers (going back to Socrates), with the only
possible solution: looking within. The sacred is within us, they have said. Finding the
authentic core of oneself is the best protection against despair and of either railing
against or getting caught up in mindless modernity.
Where I would argue with Rosner is that a case can be made that our modern world is
not just soulless, materialistic, and selfish. There is pure magic in the unfolding work of
scientists exploring the mysteries of the world and the universe. One can still feel the
magic of a full moon that is not spoiled by knowledge of the moon’s geography. One
can still marvel at the beautiful complexity and interconnection of our global systems of
oceanic streams, winds, and volcanism that global satellites are unfolding for us. And
one can have a magical experience looking at a newborn, in all of its perfection.
Knowledge just opens up more areas of wonder and the magic is by no means gone.
I would have liked more in the book about the phenomenon of hatred for cities and their
cosmopolitanism. The back-to-the-countryside philosophers, such as Heidegger and
earlier in German Romanticists, found cities alienating, in direct contrast with those of
us, from civilization’s beginnings, who find cities lively, exciting, providing us with a
fascinating mix of peoples. Great cities have always attracted great art, great ideas, and
tolerance of the new.
There is a connection between city hatred and focus on prominent Jews, who were
examples of cosmopolitanism and high culture. The Nazis honed in on this hatred and
they detested Berlin, their own cosmopolitan capital, for this very reason. Urban-Rural
antipathies are still a major source of violence in today’s Third World alienation.
Despite this, Rosner does go a long way toward explaining the fear and hatred and sense
of loss fueling the crisis of alienation.
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Conservatism and Rationality: Reflections on David Rosner’s Conservatism and
Crisis, The Anti-Modernist Perspective in Twentieth-Century German Philosophy.
Lexington Books, 2012.
Reviewed by J. Randall Groves
David Rosner has written a cogent account of the conservative response to modernity in
the Weimar Period. In this paper I examine the conservative arguments discussed in the
book and Rosner’s ultimate embrace of the anti-modernist critique. I will defend
modernism and its postmodern progeny and argue that conservatives’ responses to
modernity not only fail; they are dangerous. I will offer two responses to the problem
of modernity, a Nietzschean response and an eliminativist response.
There is no way to avoid living in an anti-foundationalist world, so any attempt to
conceptualize the world or to live according to some imagined foundation is bound to
take us into irrationality as well as lead us into inauthenticity and a loss of autonomy. It
also prevents us from embracing new truths that science and, yes, philosophy, discover.
Nietzsche tells us to embrace life without foundations. Those that do not embrace their
freedom or the new truths are Nietzsche’s “last men.” The antimodernist is therefore
simply an apologist for the last men.
Eliminativism,i a view in the philosophy of mind and of science, tells us that we must
embrace new ways of thinking about human behavior. As science undermines what the
eliminativists call “folk psychology” we will have to reconceive how we think about all
mental life, just as we have embraced scientific developments concerning non-mental
phenomena. The eliminativist does not lament the end of the soul, God, the afterlife,
foundationalism or enchantment; these are all illusions anyway. And we even know
why we came to have just those particular illusions.
The eliminativist embraces a probabilistic universe in which wisdom consists in
adherence to the best argument, which is whatever the most recent science says is true,
even if this means an end to long-held traditions. The eliminativist is happy, even
thrilled with this continuous updating because the world is always interesting. The
world of science is one that should inspire as much awe and respect as the world
presented by any religion or tradition. The eliminativist also knows that the failure to
understand or to accept what science tells us not only decreases our knowledge, it
decreases our autonomy. Without understanding the determinants of behavior, we are
unlikely to be able to take control of our lives. The Nietzschean and the eliminativist
both reject the anti-modernist critique. We not only can live without foundations, we
should.
David Rosner’s Conservatism and Crisisii is a concise treatment of the problem of
modernism, particularly as it is manifested in the German philosophy of the Weimar
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Period. The treatment, however, is a bit too concise. Rosner could have done much
more in the way of setting up the philosophical background. Kant’s conceptualization
of the modern as the trifurcation of reason and of its inherent limits began a dialogue
that worked its way through Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger, and this discussion, which
Rosner references, particularly the work of Robert Pippiniii, should have been filled out.
The logic of the conversation from Descartes to Nietzsche seemed to lead from the
assertion of certain foundations, a questioning of all foundations and, inevitably, to a
sense that there is a disconcerting groundlessness to reason, to all things ultimate. It
would have helped the argument if these moves would have been rehearsed in the book.
This philosophical conversation is often linked to historical events that came to a head
with the Weimar Period and its aftermath in horror, so it is important to get it on the
table.
On the other hand, the Weimar period was afflicted by much more than a philosophical
problem. It is to Rosner’s credit that he notes that one might well give a rather more
convincing economic argument for the events of that time, but Rosner, nevertheless,
still holds to the tradition that there is a connection between the philosophical and
political history of the time.
After Kant’s transcendentalism made the grounding of reason a serious problematic,
Hegel proposed a dialectical justification of reason that was only complete with the
development of absolute spirit. The massive metaphysical commitments of Hegel led to
a vigorous response from Nietzsche, who asked that we just admit to the groundlessness
of reason, that there are no facts, only interpretations. Nietzsche, more than any other
philosopher, made nihilism a philosophical problem. With Nietzsche, there is no truth
or meaning to be discovered, it must always be created. Nietzsche was not so naïve to
believe that the majority of the people could live such a groundless existence. Most
people do not have it in them to be “heroes” of valuation, creating value out of nothing.
Most people require an established tradition to help them make choices. After the death
of God, anything is possible, and for many, that is too much possibility. There is a
flight from such freedom.
Yet there are those who embrace the Nietzschean “overman” as a model for living, who
do try to live their lives according to values that they choose autonomously. Such
people are highly experimental and artistic. Indeed, art becomes the foundation of all
things as all reasons become aesthetic preferences. The decadence of the modern is to
be found in this experimentation. The experimentation of the modern is rather
unnerving to those who still cling to the old ways. Weimar decadence produced a
violent conservative reaction, ultimately issuing in the assertion of assertiveness
characteristic of the Nazis.
It is in this context that Heidegger’s philosophy and behavior come to the fore.
Heidegger was well aware of the Nietzschean challenge. As Rosner points out, it was
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Heidegger who interpreted modernity as a narrative of loss, and who seemingly glossed
over the possibility of living a Nietzschean life without falling into the trap of a return to
origins, foundations or paradise. Heidegger’s philosophy of being or Dasein
acknowledges the thrownness of human being. It also makes us aware that human
existence is highly temporal, and haunted by finitude, or being toward death.
Authenticity is difficult under such circumstances, particularly because modern life is so
determined by technology. And it is Heidegger who shows us why conservatism is so
problematic, for it seems too easy to fall into a totalitarianism from an overly
empowered conservatism. Heidegger’s quest for authenticity, for the truth of being, led
him into a false authenticity, the bald assertiveness of will.
Heidegger’s three mistakes were (1) to be completely tone-deaf to the modernist
critique of premodernism and (2) to ignore the Nietzschean possibility, or at least the
early Nietzsche’s possibility--that one could create one’s own values. Heidegger does
indicate that art reveals being in a primordial way, but he seems unable to get out from
under his sense of loss and embrace an aesthetic existence as a return to authentic
existence.
But the third mistake, and the most serious, is that the whole edifice of Dasein as a
central concept rests on a mistake. Heidegger believes that the first person perspective
reveals something more primordial than the third person perspective. The point of view
of intentional beings is to Heidegger more basic than the third person point of view of
subjects toward objects in the world (the world as presence). While phenomenal
experience is one source among many for understanding the human mind, there is little
reason to suppose that introspection will avail us more fruits than a system with
epistemological safeguards. This is the eliminativist view. In fact, the eliminativist
suspects that there is nothing special about introspection, seeing it as a source of
information about the mind that has all the faults that afflict ordinary perception without
the safeguards. Heideggerians will object that Dasein is distinct from introspection, but
attention without an object is almost definitionally introspection. On the other hand,
several of Heidegger’s points are worth considering, particularly his notion of
temporality. But even that can only be provisional. We need to test any claims about
the human experience of time with empirical research.
Rosner follows tradition in arguing that Heidegger’s philosophy is uniquely applicable
to the problems of modernity. But this author finds such a tradition problematic. One
wonders what role Dasein could possibly have as a sort of thing or intention that could
be undermined by an historical phenomenon even if the historical phenomenon was
profound. Heidegger’s status as a critic of modernity is problematic since the problem
begins with Plato and because Heidegger does not think the development of
technological existence could have been avoided.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013

113

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 69 [2013], No. 69, Art. 17

Comparative Civilizations Review

109

Heidegger’s first mistake is his failure to understand the benefits of modernism as an
advance over pre- modernism. Robert Pippin writes, “Nowhere does Heidegger seem
sympathetic to the modern experience of an intense and well-motivated disappointment
with the pre-modern tradition, the experience of long-entrenched and spectacular error,
or with the consequences of ‘methodologically unsecured’ belief.” For Pippin, science
“marks not a radicalization of metaphysical self-assertion, a final forgetting of being,
but a way of avoiding a disastrous, centuries-long self-forgetting” (1991, 141). It is
incumbent upon critics of modernism to show how their answers to modernism do not
fail to address the motivations for modernism in the first place. One could argue, for
example, that the Greeks’ development of a metaphysics of presence was essential to
the eventual development of modern science and thought. Modernism may have its
problems, but it was an advance on pre-modern traditionalism.
The reason for Heidegger’s second mistake is that he did not fully understand
Nietzsche.
Although the Darwinism of Nietzsche’s philosophy is sometimes
overplayed, one cannot neglect Nietzsche’s understanding of Darwin in interpreting
Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche saw in a flash, as the brilliant often do, the deeper
meaning and the long term implications of a new way of seeing the world. Nietzsche’s
Darwinism would always keep his overman humble. Consider the passage in the On
Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1883), “In some remote corner of the universe,
poured out and glittering in innumerable solar systems, there once was a star on which
clever animals invented knowledge. That was the highest and most mendacious minute
of ‘world history’—yet only a minute.
After nature had drawn a few breaths the star grew cold, and the clever animals
had to die....But if we could communicate with the mosquito, then we would
learn that he floats through the air with the same self- importance, feeling within
itself the flying center of the world. There is nothing in nature so despicable or
insignificant that it cannot immediately be blown up like a bag by a slight breath
of this power of knowledge; and just as every porter wants an admirer, the
proudest human being, the philosopher, thinks that he sees on the eyes of the
universe telescopically focused from all sides on his actions and thoughts.iv
Heidegger never understood Nietzsche’s Darwinistic humility. If in creating value we
must really be “little gods,” as he suggests in the Madman passage from the Gay
Science, then nihilism will be the result, for none of us is capable of creating such grand
meaning out of the events of our lives. And that is how Heidegger understands
Nietzsche. But if Nietzsche, instead of saying we are little gods, is instead saying that
we are mere mosquitoes who temporarily discovered reason and need to create some
rough guidelines in order to get through 70 or so years, then life does not become
nihilistic. But living this way can be messy, especially with previous value systems
hanging over our heads, constricting the lines of possibility. And it can breed a very
conservative backlash as the old values are trampled upon in the course of modernist
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experimentation. And we must remember that the “smallness” of the humble
Nietzschean response is a problem.
People want their lives to have meaning in the grand scheme of things, not just a
meaning that will satisfy a reasonable person trying to make the most of a short time as
a living human being. But this is the modernist mistake. The postmodernist makes it
very plain that grand narratives are no longer viable. But Heidegger never understood
this, never understood how it was possible to be both small and meaningful. And so
Heidegger fell in with Nazi “bigness,” the Volk. That was the philosophical mistake that
led to Heidegger becoming a Nazi. And it was ultimately a conservative mistake: it
failed to understand the need to embrace the radical truth, that there is no grand
narrative waiting to replace the failure of foundationalist modernism. Instead,
Heidegger and Germany embraced a fake substitute and the rest is history.
And this is the deeper problem with conservatism: the philosophy of the fake substitute.
Conservatism, somewhere deep in its subconsciousness, understands that the
foundations are no longer tenable, but it can’t imagine living without those foundations,
so it casts around for replacements. But there are no replacements, so any replacement
is a lie, possibly a noble lie, but a lie nonetheless. Conservatism senses that it is lying to
itself, and it replaces rational deferment with blind assertion. Most of the time this is
relatively harmless, but in times of economic distress, it can become dangerous. Is the
murderousness of some small modern religions, particularly some micro-sects of Islam
at this point in history, a matter of a hysterical rejection of the obvious failure of
religion to hold up to rational criticism?
Adorno, another critic of modernist Enlightenment, shows us another mistake in the
critique of modernism. Adorno is well-known for his criticism of jazz as irredeemable
mass culturev. Adorno and Heidegger, like many critics of modernism, fail to see the
gains and the possibilities that come with modernist standardization. For Adorno, the
tendency of jazz to utilize organizational formulas completely undermined the
possibility of real creativity. But Adorno was simply wrong. Jazz went on to become
one of the most creative activities one can engage in. Standardization of harmonic
forms enabled the development of great improvisational sophistication, a sophistication
impossible without modernist premises.
Conservatism thrives in spite of the fact that it is almost definitionally opposed to
beneficial mutation. In biology that is simply a death sentence. In the realm of culture,
however, Conservatism always has adherents resisting the future at all costs and so
manages to avoid the fate of extinction. How is this possible? Conservatism must
always lose in the end—as all evolutionary dead ends must, but the potential for another
temporary resurgence resides in every economic downturn, natural disaster or personal
crisis.
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Qualia of dissatisfaction can attach to any belief, no matter how rational, if it is possible
to just associate it with pain. This may require obfuscation of the true causality, but no
matter, humans do not operate rationally anyway. Or rather, there is no guarantee of
rationality and a whole lot working against rationality. Human thought is not conducted
by a syntactic machine with an empirically defensible perception of the world. The
human mind is a connectionist network that works by association of broad patterns.
These patterns are not necessarily scientifically defensible. They are the result of our
earliest associations, and have been selected merely because they useful to adherents in
some way—but not necessarily in the way it is imagined.
Daniel Dennett argues that there is a fallacy of misguided semantic precision that
undermines our ability to understand thinking vi. Our thoughts are a mess. We can see
this most clearly in all early examples of categorization. Think of yin and yang in
which femininity, yin, is associated with slow, soft, yielding, diffuse, cold, wet,
passivity, water, earth, the moon, and nighttime. This makes no sense to us now, but we
grant the ancients slack because they had no real science available to them. But notice
that it reveals a connectionist sort of associationism. Primitive people make all kinds of
crazy associations. In the experience of early peoples these associations probably made
sense. They were even selected for in a perverse fashion. We are victims of this
primitive associationism. It can rear its head at any time as we witness on all sides of
the political spectrum, but more on the conservative side recently.
More sophisticated conservatives utilize education to carry on a complex but ultimately
fallacious scholasticism of apologetics for tradition, at least according to my view.
From their point of view, they understand both the limits of society and human nature
more clearly than the liberal. But conservatism, even intelligent conservatism, always
stays too long at the party. It is in the nature of conservatism to not change a position
once a position has been taken. Any quick changes violate the virtue ethic of steady
character.
It is the case that a certain percentage of the population is going to be genetically
disposed to latch onto traditional and particularly religious doctrines. We know that a
certain percentage of people’s brains have a greater amount of certain chemicals which
cause them to see the world with an aura of sorts. It is the same effect people otherwise
constituted so that they do not have an overactive amygdala are able to duplicate with
drugs like alcohol, marijuana and LSD. In any case, thanks to mirror neurons, such
people with this condition appear to have charisma, which seems to be able to create a
good feeling that comes with the aura even in those not so easily disposed toward
religious consciousness.
This is a prettier world than the rest of us live in. Ideas which affirm this prettier world
get strong purchase in such people. It also affects others—conservative ideas are
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powerful even without the genetic assist, but this visceral appeal of conservatism would
probably be enough even without the genetic component of the explanation.
What would have to be true for the conservative tendency to be a rational response?
The world would have to only intermittently lend itself to human control. If we really
cannot control nature or society without disastrous consequences, or at least without
suboptimal consequences, we should therefore keep our organized interactions with the
order of things to a minimum. If the world is like that, resistant to our best efforts, with
losses outweighing the gains from change, then conservatism follows. But if the world
is malleable, if we can change people’s circumstances to improve their lives without
generally making them worse off, then we ought to do so. I will not try to decide that
fundamental and difficult question here.
Although conservatism is conceptually defensible depending on the factual dispute
about the nature of the world and of people, conservatism is still resistance to the best
argument when the best argument is critical of the status quo. At its most defensible,
conservatism is resistance to the quick implementation of actions based on the best
argument if that best argument is too recent. How can that be a good thing? In the past,
we have had some hare-brained ideas, so it is likely that a fair percentage ended
spectacularly mistaken when quickly implemented. Conservatism is good at preventing
worst case scenarios of this particular type. But this scenario only obtains part of the
time, and it cannot be regarded as a permanent condition because after a certain amount
of consideration we can no longer be said to be rushing things.
Rosner correctly points out that the 19th century conservative thinkers were responding
to the collapse of traditional values and subsequent problem of nihilism. These thinkers
made the wrong choice, and Rosner follows them in making the mistake. Rosner
writes, “Rorty’s neo-pragmatist solution is, again, an epistemological version of Musil’s
modernism—that is to say, piecemeal, tentative answers are all we’ve really got, and all
we can hope for and all we really need....Perhaps it would be easier and preferable with
tentativeness and uncertainty, with piecemeal answers, with spiritual aporia, with a void
of ethics. But unfortunately I am not. I believe the human mind requires a fixed point
of belief, a coherent grounding of its assumptions and world-view.” (96) Rosner and
the conservative are mistaken. They could have seen modernity as a liberating
renaissance, but instead let their disappointment with reality cloud their analysis of
modernity. From the conservative point of view, the radical liberty of the Weimar
libertine was too much. Weimar had the conservatives’ “hare-brained idea” detector
flashing red. It was too radical for them. It seemed to confirm their conception of
human nature and to indicate that tradition was not a world well lost.
The narrative of loss is a deep culprit in the conservative critique of modernity. With
Heidegger, it is a perversion of being itself, the West having taken a wrong turn at some
point and yielded to what the Frankfurt School calls technological or instrumental
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reason. The loss is the loss of an unmediated relation to Dasein or being. But how
likely is it that we had a special relationship with Dasein and then lost it to a dominating
technology? What is this Dasein and what does it have to do with one’s attitude to
modernity? Heidegger seems to indicate that modernity undermines the possibility of
authentic Dasein. This would be a deep loss indeed if Heidegger is correct in his
assessment of the importance of Dasein. But it is unlikely that Heidegger is correct.
Human perceptions and orientations to the world come from senses that evolved from
systems for something else. They are askew to the world. There is nothing like a
perfect fit between organism and world. Evolution can work wonders, but design is not
one of them.
The evolution of consciousness has yielded a phenomenal aspect to human life that is
quite rich, but we would be wrong to think that other creatures don’t also have a rich
phenomenal life. It is true that they do not have a consciousness for which Dasein is a
question, but that is a much higher level consideration anyway. This creates a dilemma
for Heideggerians: If Dasein is basic, it is something that cannot be in danger from
modernity. If it is a higher level consideration of a being living a middle class German
life in Weimar Germany, then it is not so basic after all.
It should be noted that Weimar conservatives are responding to modernity at a very bad
time. Weimar Germany was wracked by the Versailles Treaty and subject to
overwhelming inflation and unemployment. I believe that part of the negative reaction
of Heidegger and others to modernity is because in their view it was ill serving them
and because economic and political woes tended to reinforce the groundlessness.
Rosner, to be fair, notes this economic and political dimension, but I think much more
needs to be made of it. One thinker conspicuously missing from many discussions of
modernity, including this one, is Marx. Marx too addresses modernity and provides an
answer: unalienated labor. Marx would argue that the meaning of human existence is to
be found in unalienated labor, labor that fulfills Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectic in which
the slave (laborer) wins the ultimate recognition through the embodiment of the
laborer’s ideas in material (or ideal) reality.
The problem with the Marxian answer is similar to the problem with Heidegger’s,
namely historical refutation. Stalinism and Maoism discredited Marxism as a real
option for modernists just as Nazism did much to discredit Heidegger. But we can
separate Marx’s account of alienated labor from his theory of history and the theory of
the dictatorship of the proletariat. We need a “small” Marxist answer to modernity, a
Marxist answer shorn of its grand narrative clothing. A “small Marxist answer” to
modernity is to find a way of making a living that is not only adequate to one’s needs,
but personally fulfilling.
Marx also gives us a better and less confused understanding of the relationship of
consciousness to technology than Heidegger. Heidegger imagines modern technology
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol69/iss69/17

118

Review: Full Issue

114

Number 69, Fall 2013

to mark a major break with previous forms, but he also imagines that technological
reason to be a necessary result of the metaphysics of presence, which Heidegger traces
back to Plato. What Heidegger misses is the extent to which the evolution of
technology and of humanity have been complimentary. We started becoming human
when we began making stone tools, and the tools made us smarter, made us more than
we were. We became more human yet when we acquired the tool of language. We
have been in the process of becoming fully human ever since, and our relationship to
technology has been incredibly important at each stage. Marx is right that the history of
the social forms can be understood partly as a result of changing technology. Marx’s
understanding of technology is therefore more consistent with contemporary
archaeological and anthropological understandings which link cognitive development
with tool use.
Marx also provides us with a start towards a response to tradition. Marx, like Hegel, is
a historical thinker. Understanding any form of life must first place that form of life in
its historical context. This aspect of Marx’s philosophy supplies an empty spot in
Nietzsche. Nietzsche never came up with an adequate way of engaging with tradition
and history when creating values anew. There is no view from nowhere. Both Hegel
and Marx knew that we must start from somewhere. Unlike Marx, however, I would
avoid economic reductionism and look for the lessons to be derived from key periods
and episodes of intellectual history. Like Habermas,vii I read history as a learning
process. We can build meaning from a view of history.
The conservatives of German philosophy and Weimar turned recently discovered
existential truths into starting points for the conservative critique of modernity. But
those same existential truths are sometimes taken as liberating, as they were by
Nietzsche. In fact, one could argue that the Nietzschean response is more appropriate to
the premise of nihilism—the idea that there are no objective values. But the choice
between the Nietzschean and Conservative responses in a given person might very well
ride on how good or bad his or circumstances have been recently. The Conservative is
the person who, when thrown in the water, senses nothing to hang on to and drowns,
while the Nietzschean just starts swimming. Yes, it is true there is no firm spot on
which to stand, but that does not mean we cannot get from point “a” to point “b.”
The critique of modernity consists in the fact that it does not supply a replacement for
the loss of meaningful values that comes with the modernist victory over premodernism. But what counts as meaningful? If the only thing that will count as a
meaningful value is one that has the status of the former eternal verities, then no,
modernity cannot supply that. However, part of modernity’s message is a call to a
greater humility. We are not eternal souls on trial before God for our actions and
thoughts over a lifetime. Human life is not so grand as that.
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We are simply human beings with 70 or so years to come to terms with our finitude.
And that’s it. What does any single human life matter in the cosmic scale of things?
Not very much at all. But it matters a bit, if only to ourselves. And it is that humble bit
we must first accept if we are to come to any proper understanding of things. That is
what Nietzsche learned from Darwin. But this is precisely what Conservatives cannot
do. They want that loud, low bass note on the root of the chord signifying resolution
that says they are important, of even cosmic significance. They want to be with God
forever and they want to be at the center of God’s perspective. And they want justice:
they want the evil in the world to end in hell forever. And they want Truth: they want
what is true in the past to be true forever. But our smartest, deepest thinkers have told
us to settle for rather less than that. And many people are perfectly fine with a changing
landscape, especially those directing the change or gaining by the changes, but also
those who can ride the wave, so to speak.
Modernity can replace our former values with something much better anyway: a
glimpse of some very powerful ways of looking at the universe, and boundless awe at
what we see. Ask any scientist if their view of the universe does not inspire them to
ecstatic heights of appreciation. The reason for their rejection is that they are asking
modernity for something it refuses to supply. It will not supply the undifferentiated
lifeworld and the magical feeling of tradition, the secure feeling of belonging that comes
with the pre-modern, uncritical acceptance of one’s social role. The problem is
believing that an undifferentiated lifeworld and static social roles are good things. They
are not.
Habermas characterizes modernity as the tripartite division of the lifeworld into three
types of reason: scientific, aesthetic and moral. This has been the Enlightenment’s selfunderstanding since Kant. The Enlightenment understood that it was a good thing to
break Humpty Dumpty, as it were, into three pieces. Otherwise we will confuse our
categories. But splitting the world this way took all the magic out of things. The
German people wanted the magic, but they were unable to put Humpty Dumpty back
together again. So were the German philosophers. But who needs Humpty Dumpty
anyway?
David Rosner has written an excellent brief treatment of the critique of modernism in
Weimar Germany, utilizing primarily the philosophical perspective, but also giving
economic factors an important role in causing the groundlessness that the
antimodernists reject. Working primarily with Heidegger, Rosner explains quite clearly
why he believes modernism is deeply problematic. This work will be useful for
students and researchers interested in the conservative critique of modernism. Although
I have tried to show the mistakes of the conservative critique of modernism, Rosner is
adept at presenting the conservative argument, and that makes the book a worthwhile
read.
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Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen, Intelligence: A Unifying Concept for the Social
Sciences. Ulster Institute for Social Research, London, England, 2013.
Reviewed by Michael Andregg
This book is a magnum opus. It is the climax work of a pair of social scientists who
take the word “science” seriously. Lynn is a psychologist and Vanhanen an emeritus
political scientist, who have labored for decades to bring light to a long taboo domain –
relationships between intelligence and social phenomena like wealth and health and
political institutions and such. Mindful of these taboos, and that some scholars rebel
against any definition of “intelligence” much less its measurement by IQ or any other
metric, the authors are rigorously and relentlessly quantitative, which makes parts of the
book a tough read for those who may be allergic to correlations or numbers.
It is well worth the effort, however, because the authors are very well aware of the
difficulties of definition and measurement of any psychological or sociological variable,
much less the explosive IQ, and of the limitations of correlation analysis. So they use
the tools of their fields as meticulously as possible. They are also extremely ambitious,
setting out to unify the disparate social sciences around a core concept of intelligence
(both individual and national) much like physics was unified by first, identification of
fundamental forces (mass, gravity, energy, etc.) and, later, by the theories of relativity
and quantum mechanics.
So they do not limit themselves to IQ and the Wealth of Nations (the title of a previous
collaboration by the authors, published in 2002) but rather ask whether significant
correlations can be found between IQ and educational attainment, criminal proclivity,
religion, public health and many other socioeconomic or cultural variables that have
been measured by others across individuals and nations.
Since it is so quantitative, the book includes 15 figures and 61 tables dense with data
and meticulously referenced to over 500 sources. Their bibliography alone takes 66
pages. So the work would deserve a place in any social science library on its merits as a
meticulous review reference alone. But it is much more than that. It is a serious
attempt to break through a taboo that has stunted several social sciences for at least two
generations. That is the taboo on systematic (much less quantitative) discussion of
intelligence as a meaningful variable, and of IQ as a way to measure that variable.
Their prose is clear, concise, and much easier to read than the rafts of tables and
regression charts. They are quite frank about critics without being unduly defensive or
judgmental. They appear to me to be relentlessly sincere about their overarching
mission, which is to unify the disciplinary chaos that now constitutes social “science”.
Their most determined critics would still benefit from the wealth of data and references
they present to support their theses.
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Since they think that “intelligence” is fundamental to many social variables of interest,
the authors cast a wide net to find correlations between IQ and (brace yourself; this list
is long): economic development, educational attainment, poverty, income inequality,
unemployment, political institutions, democratization, gender inequalities, corruption,
national health statistics such as life expectancy and infant mortality, crime, cognition,
liberalism – conservatism, religion, happiness, and indices of human conditions
developed by the UN and others. Each of these sections introduces literature by other
scholars who have tried to define and quantify such difficult variables. Those are then
correlated with and sometimes regressed against the authors’ (and other scholars’)
estimates of national average IQs.
This is a genuine magnum opus that strives to break out of the self-imposed box canyon
of social science created by those who reject the very concept of “intelligence” as
intrinsically unknowable. We are all intimately familiar with fears that racism might
contaminate statistics or that sinister political goals might compromise clear-eyed
consideration of sensitive subjects, like the obvious fact that intelligence varies among
individuals and across groups. But we also be should be brave enough to face the
wealth of evidence that intelligence matters, both for individuals and for groups as large
as nations.
Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen are brave enough, and they have done the very best
they could to pass decades of study of these difficult topics on to us. Whether their core
concept results in more unity among the disparate social sciences is up to others. But I
recommend “Intelligence: A Unifying Concept for the Social Sciences” to all serious
scholars and research libraries, without any reservations at all. Be prepared to learn a
lot about the real world of human beings and institutions that we share.
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Laina Farhat-Holzman: WORLDCHANGERS: Ten Inventions That Changed
Everything.
The Civilizational Press, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 2012.
Reviewed by George Von der Muhll
Laina Farhat-Holzman’s Worldchangers is an ambitious book. In barely 90 pages she
sets out to make a case for her selection of the ten technological inventions that most
profoundly and extensively changed the course of human history. The range of her
conspectus is broad indeed. It encompasses the globe, and its chronological scale runs
from the Stone Age forward. Expositing the nature and significance of each invention
she highlights obliges her to display some familiarity with the science underlying it as
well as the more general state of contemporary scientific knowledge in that epoch.
Moreover, her titular commitment to showing that the innovations she is discussing
changed “everything” presupposes familiarity with many key elements of the diverse
social orders impacted by the innovations she chooses to examine. In all, her project
entails identifying the broadest, deepest, and most powerful currents giving form to
world history. To an impressive extent she succeeds in her quest.
In pursuing this goal she throws in sidelight observations and intriguing connections
that materially add to the stimulus of her central argument. She moves confidently and
comfortably from Phoenician explorations to the Viking slave trade, from ancient
Harappan irrigation projects in the Indus Valley to the invention of multi-staged
fireworks rockets in 16th century Germany and to an evolutionary explanation for a
possible selective genetic advantage enjoyed by women in learning second languages.
She displays a sharp eye for striking statistics. Her concise, unpretentious, readily
accessible prose enables readers to undertake long journeys in short order. Whatever
prior knowledge they may have of the subject, they are likely to be grateful to an author
who instructively and provocatively draws together so many informative insights in so
undemanding a format.
Farhat-Holzman’s declared objective differs appreciably in its emphasis from many
earlier histories of technology. Rather than dwelling on the intrinsic importance of the
inventions she examines, why these inventions occurred at a particular time and place in
world history, and the previous developments required to make them possible, she takes
them as points of departure for tracing the shock waves they generated in moving
toward ever more distant outposts of the societies within which they were brought to
fruition. Her central thesis is that technological innovations have too seldom received
their due as progenitors of many of the most fundamental transformations of the
worldwide social order. Though she does not explicitly say so, she bypasses the
challenges posed in such studies as Abbott Payson Usher’s A History of Mechanical
Inventions and (for the most part) S.C. Gilfillan’s The Sociology of Inventions to align
herself with the tradition founded by the young Marx and carried forward in Lewis
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Mumford’s classic Technics and Civilization and David S. Landes’s The Unbound
Prometheus.
Her starting points for developing this argument -- i.e., her list of ten “world-changing
inventions” -- will not startle most readers. The criterion she uses to determine that
status is the extent to which the invention functioned as a “game-changer” in the history
of humanity. An invention had this impact, she writes, to the extent that it gave “rise to
all sorts of smaller technologies that enlarged what human beings can do” (2). Thus the
first such invention--the “domestication” of fire through devising wooden fire drills to
start fires when needed (and only then!)--was obviously in itself an intrinsically
significant development in human history insofar as it provided protection at night from
predatory animals, warmed dwellings so as to make living in cold climates tolerable for
“naked apes,” and extended lifespans through enabling humans to cook raw meat before
consuming it.
More crucially to her thesis, however, the invention of the fire drill led over time to
improvements in weaponry (fire-hardened sticks for use in hunting), to boiling and
stewing food (through hardening clay cooking vessels into non-porous pottery), and to
parching wild grains so as to render them edible for humans. At some later point,
Anatolians and their neighbors discovered the art of putting fire to use in smelting
metals, thereby dramatically refining and extending the range of tools and weaponry
that smelting could produce and the undertakings in which they could be put to use.
Similar analysis leads to placing the adapting of wild plants to the nutritional needs of
human beings on her list; in conjunction with what she calls “water technologies”, these
adaptations made possible the “agrarian revolution” that provided the infrastructure for
settled agrarian societies that in turn could support cities as stable sites for diffuse
innovations. The printing press and the telescope make an expected appearance in her
discussion of the origins and efflorescence of the European Renaissance. Inventions
permitting communication at a distance, the systematic development of new forms of
energy, their controlled application to transportation, and the invention of the computer
bring her list to a concluding, broadly inclusive tenth category embracing the
prospective societal impact of innovations in space rocketry, brain “geography,”
medicine, and molecular biology.
Claiming to have identified “the” ten innovations with the greatest qualitative impact on
society predictably raises questions transcending whether her “tenth” category in fact
expands her list to half again its declared length. Was the invention of the telescope, for
example, more qualitatively significant, whether as mechanism or as metaphor, than the
mobile mechanical clock (which curiously receives no mention in these pages)? To be
sure, telescopes stimulated a lens-grinding industry in the Lowlands. They aided sea
captains in their explorations and military commanders on the field of battle. They
notoriously contributed to the anti-scientific drift of the Vatican Counter-Reformation.
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But these in themselves were hardly world-historical transformations, and the
telescope’s role in them was neither as a necessary nor as a sufficient factor. It was
certainly not as far-reaching and pervasive a “game-changer” in its societal impact as
were the possibilities opened up by increasingly reliable clocks that made possible
precise coordination of terrestrial with celestial movements among thousands of
interdependent human beings out of view of one another, and the complementary
meshing of decisions with initiatives in military strategies as well as in the “satanic
mills” of the Industrial Revolution.
However enticing and instructive such disputations might prove in individual cases, this
reviewer will not pursue them further here. It seems almost axiomatic that such debates
will arise while reading a work as ambitiously comprehensive in geographical scope and
chronological scale as this one. More instructive issues are raised by the instability of
Farhat-Holzman’s causal variables. Her chapter on “water technology” illustrates a
specific form of a more general problem. The chapter begins with a discussion of
irrigation (surprisingly making no mention of Karl Wittfogel’s celebrated thesis that
control of irrigation gave rise to “oriental despotism” and later to Soviet Communism).
It then shifts to the special advantages enjoyed by inhabitants of the European
peninsulas at the western end of the Eurasian landmass in developing sea-going
commerce; but advances in waterborne transport in this instance are presented more as
productive adaptations to geomorphological configurations than as autonomous
innovations with an independent impact on societies. After an intrinsically interesting
discussion of the phenomenon of piracy that seems to have rather little to do with
“water technology”, the chapter concludes by inviting attention to coming “water wars”
in the arid Middle East and the flooding of Bangladesh—topics that once again are
associated with the importance of water as a commodity but not with innovations in
water technology and their impact.
An inherent problem in designating any invention as a “game-changer” lies in showing
that a particular invention thus singled out was more causally crucial in promoting the
stream of innovations that followed than other inventions that chronologically preceded,
succeeded, or were nearly contemporaneous with it. As a practical matter, patent
offices must struggle with such questions all the time. Occasionally, a single invention
stands out so dramatically—one thinks of the Wright Brothers’ first mechanicallydriven flight at Kitty Hawk, the first atomic bombs in July-August of 1945, and yes,
Galileo’s use of the telescope he devised—that most observers will not quarrel too long
over what was special about the invention and what further improvements and ancillary
technological developments to attribute to it.
But when, exactly, was the computer produced, and at what point did its potential
impact as a “game changer” become clear? With the mechanical embodiment of binary
number systems in calculators? With the creation and refinement of silicon
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information-holding micro-chips for such machines? With Shannon and Weaver’s
development of information theory to the point at which “computers” ceased to be
calculators limited to providing answers to problems formulated in a numerical
language?
With the production of affordable personal computers and the
institutionalizing of the Internet?
Allied with an image of “an” invention as distinct from a set of interacting and mutually
reinforcing technological developments is the temptation to simplify and over-dramatize
the role of such inventions in societal change. Thus many historians became intrigued
by the proposition that the invention of the stirrup produced medieval European
feudalism because it enabled heavily armored knights to ride their steeds into battle.
Farhat-Holzman is not free from this temptation. It is to be found in several chapters,
but perhaps most conspicuously in presenting the telescope as the key progenitor of the
17th century scientific revolution in Europe (40-41).
This tendency leads to what might be described as an unbounded evolution and
expansion of themes in her chapters. Thus the chapter that begins with the impact of the
telescope on European society ends a few pages later with a section on death rates in
childbirth and the consequences for women of the displacement of servants by the
washing machine. The chapter on “water technologies” ends with a section on the role
of “heavy water” in the production of the atomic bomb.
Attributing long chains of outcomes to a single specific invention also obscures what
has often proved to be the single greatest impact of a technological innovation—its
demonstration that a widely recognized problem is soluble through technical means.
The historic importance of Edward Jenner’s demonstration that inoculation--not
incantations or consuming ground-up precious stones or burning witches--can be the
key to checking the spread of infectious diseases lay in its role in stimulating
widespread searches for analogical techniques for eradicating other diseases while
generating feedback loops improving the original innovation itself.
Such models would seem to serve better than straightforward chains of cause and effect
to explain the “lumpiness” evident in the history of technology. They account for the
nearly simultaneous outburst in the Industrial Revolution of inventions centering around
the steam engines. They help us to understan the rapid advance in the early 19th
century in precision engineering--whether in producing clocks or Colt pistols--in
Switzerland and Connecticut, and later the emergence of Wilhelminian Germany as the
leading technological center of Europe through a multitude of interdependent inventions
derived from systematic and sustained use of chemical analysis to produce new products
with specified properties.
The societal “impact” of an invention therefore cannot be described in terms of
Newtonian necessity as a straightforward function of its properties. As studies of the
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Industrial Revolution have shown, that impact may well depend much less on the
metaphorical “mass” and “force” of the invention itself than on the structure of the
economy in which it is invented and the coexistence of other technological advances
with which it is interdependent and for which it creates a demand. As the history of the
last two centuries has shown, patent laws, military procurement practices, and the
degree of institutionalization of technological research in universities and large
corporations are likely to play critical roles in transmitting. accelerating, and diffusing
(and thus determining) the impact of an invention.
It must also be acknowledged, however, that taking full account of many of the points
raised in this review would require a book of at least twice the length of this
intentionally slender volume. Taken for what it is and aspires to be, then, reading
WORLDCHANGERS is an enriching experience not only in itself but for the questions
that linger in the mind long after one has reached its last page.
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Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia.
New York: Picador, 2003.
Reviewed by Mariana Tepfenhart

Orlando Figes is the author of many best-selling books and a professor of history at the
University of London. He is also a contributor to such major newspapers as The New
York Times and The Washington Post.
Natasha’s Dance received outstanding reviews from some of the most important
newspapers and literary personalities of the United States and Great Britain. “A
sweeping cultural survey of Russia … thought provoking” (The Economist), “A big
bold interpretative cultural history” (Foreign Affairs), “ Stunning and ambitious” (The
Atlantic Monthly), “Staggering” (Los Angeles Times), “Captivating” (The Washington
Post) “ Breathtaking” (Independent on Sunday), and “Awesome” (The Times). And the
list goes on and on. It is difficult to find new words to express admiration for this book.
The title of the book was inspired by a famous scene in Tolstoy’s masterpiece, War and
Peace. Natasha Rostov, an aristocrat from the elite society of St Petersburg, visits her
uncle who lives in a wooden cabin in the forest. There she is treated to Russian
specialties and folk music. When the music performed by the serfs of her uncle starts,
Natasha instinctively starts to dance, although she was totally unfamiliar with this style.
Tolstoy’s idea was that there is a national consciousness that surpasses class differences
and unites a people. Like Tolstoy, Figes is interested in presenting the inner life of the
nation as it is perceived not only through monuments of art, but also in customs,
beliefs, religion, myths, habits that were passed down from generation to generation.
Figes divided his book into eight chapters that cover the time period from Peter the
Great to Brezhnev. Each one of them focuses on a specific theme. The author is not so
much interested in following the exact chronology as in rendering the main trends of a
period. To achieve this, he uses different individual lives as memories that would
define a certain period.
The first chapter, European Russia, deals with St. Petersburg, Peter’s “paradise.” The
new capital of the empire was built with specific instructions from the tsar regarding the
style, the construction materials and even the colors. It was intended to be “a negation
of medieval Muscovy,” a city rooted in spiritual traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy, dark
and backward. St. Petersburg was very European, vast, with bold colors. In terms of
scale and grandeur, St. Petersburg’s magnificent waterfront has few equals. The canals
and rivers are like mirrors, reflecting facades of the palaces.
The city offers a fusion of architectural styles but the author focuses on The Fountain
House, the palace of Nikolai Petrovich Sheremetev, one of the richest men in the world.
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The palace was decorated with European wall paper, sculptures, and paintings and had a
library with over 20,000 books. It was not only a residence but a cultural center of the
city where concerts and plays were performed on a regular basis.
Peter’s reforms generated a huge debate regarding the identity of the Russians. Do they
belong to the West or to the East? Peter was revered and eulogized by the liberals who
envisaged him as a champion of light against darkness. The Westernizers, as they were
known, considered Peter a hero who took the country from a backward stage to a
modern era in a record time. For the educated Russians the West was their ideal, the
source of inspiration. Russia should develop in the context of the Western civilization,
not in opposition to it.
The Slavophiles considered that Peter destroyed the true principle and way of life of the
Russian people. One of the Slavophiles, Alexander Herzen, a nineteen century writer
and philosopher, said that Petersburg is an artificial copy of the West, and that it “differs
from all other European towns by being like them all” ( Figes, 9). The West was
corrupt and false. Gogol stated that Paris had “only a surface glitter that canceled an
abyss of fraud and greed” (Figes, 65). For the Slavophiles, the Russian future lay in the
return to native principle, in overcoming the dying West.
The year 1812 marked a turning point in the cultural trends of Russia. It is the year
when Tsar Alexander I defeated Napoleon, after a long and devastating war. But
disenchantment with the French culture started earlier, during the reign of Catherine the
Great. Although she considered herself an enlightened monarch and was in contact with
the most important philosophers of the time, the bloodshed of the French Revolution
turned her against the French and their Enlightenment.
Alexander I, Catherine’s grandson, was also educated in the spirit of the Enlightenment,
but he also changed when he saw the consequences of the French Revolution and, later,
the imperialistic policy of Napoleon Bonaparte. The year 1812 brought a patriotic
climate. The use of French was frowned upon. Fashion, house decorations,
entertainment, cuisine, music, literature and art had to be Russian. There was a
conscious effort to assert Russianness. It was the beginning of a quest for Russian
nationhood.
The officers who accompanied Alexander to Paris realized Russia’s backwardness and
its lack of basic rights. They wanted a constitutional monarchy. Those officers were
disappointed with Tsar Alexander, who gave the French a very liberal constitution, but
not the Russians. They formed a revolutionary group that came to be known as
Decembrists. The rebellion failed because they lacked strong leadership and had little
social backing for their ideas, which shows the feebleness of the Russian middle class at
that time.
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The next chapter focuses on Moscow. After the building of St. Petersburg, the
population of this old capital declined and it became more a provincial city. Pushkin
compared the city to a faded dowager queen, in purple mourning clothes, obliged to
curtsey before a new empress (Figes, 153). But many looked at the city as the
embodiment of the spirit of the old Rus. For instance, Mussorgsky found Moscow to be
a “realm of fairy tales” for its Russianness (Figes, 175). Moscow was a Russian city
while St. Petersburg was a foreign city. The difference between Moscow and St.
Petersburg is well defined by Gogol:
Petersburg is an accurate, punctual kind of person, a perfect German and he
looks at everything in a calculated way. Before he gives a party he will look
into his accounts. Moscow is a Russian nobleman, and if he is going to have a
good time, he will go all the way until he drops, and he won’t worry about how
much he’s got in his pockets. Moscow does not like halfway measures….
Petersburg likes to tease Moscow for his awkwardness and lack of taste.
Moscow reproaches Petersburg because he does not know to speak Russian…
Russia needs Moscow, Petersburg needs Russia. (Figes, 157)
The chapter “The Peasant Marriage” presents life in the country, the patriarchal nature
of the peasant family and its impact on the culture. Traditionally, the rights of husband
over wife were enforced through the Church, customs and the civil laws. The husband
had absolute authority over the family. According to the Digest Laws of 1835 the duty
of the wife was to “submit to the will of the husband” and to stay with him under any
circumstances (Figes, 251).
Wife beatings were not only common but recommended. The 16th century manual for
the household, Domostroi, contains rules of how to tame the wife and keep her
obedient. There were proverbs, with advice and justifications for violence. For
instance:
1. Beat your wife like a fur coat, then there will be less noise (Figes, 252).
2. A wife is nice twice: when she is brought in the house (as a bride) and when she
is carried out of it to her grave (Figes, 252).
The same chapter introduces the reader to a new trend in Russia and Europe, the neonationalists. The artists of this trend are fascinated with the folk art, primitive and
exotic elements. The trend is exemplified by the famous Ballets Russes--The Firebird,
Petrushka, and The Rite of Spring.
The Rite of Spring, presented in Paris, 1913, was conceived as a re-creation of pagan
human sacrifice. The music was composed by Igor Stravinsky, costumes by Nikolai
Roerich -- an artist of prehistoric Slavs, and the choreography was created by the world-
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renowned ballet dancer, Nijinsky. It was powerful, exotic and shocking. The West had
never seen anything like this.
Chapter 5, “In Search of the Russian Soul,” is dedicated to the influence of Christianity
in Russia. The Russians formally accepted Christianity from Constantinople around
988. The Byzantine influence was not limited to the Christian church but permeated all
aspects of social and cultural life. Some church historians argued that religion retained
a superficial hold on the masses who remained heathens in their daily practices and
convictions. The author also presents different interpretations of concepts like death,
immortality and God, as they were perceived by writers like Dostoevsky, Tolstoy,
Chekov and others.
The influence of the Mongols in Russian history is the focus of Chapter 6. For over 200
years they ruled Russia. There is no consensus regarding the role of the Mongols in
Russian history. Some point to the devastation and the destruction brought by the
Mongols. Others proclaimed the fundamental affiliation of Russia with Asia. They
emphasized the transforming of Russia from weak and divided to a powerful autocratic
state. It was also a reaction against the rejection of the Russians by the West; they were
labeled “Asiatic barbarians.” The intelligentsia turned back to the ancient times to
stress their Scythian roots and be proud of them. They saw the world of the Scythians
as a realm of spiritual beauty which could be a source for the regeneration of the West.
Chapter 7 deals with World War I, the Russian Revolution, World War II and Stalin’s
terror. Through the life and work of Anna Akhmatova, the reader is introduced to the
events that destroyed an entire civilization, to the harsh conditions under which people
lived during the wars and the Bolshevik regime. Unlike others who fled the country,
Akhmatova remained and struggled to survive the ordeal. She was a symbol of
endurance and human dignity. The fate of those who left the country is the topic of the
last chapter. The author traces the lives of some of them, their alienation, their longing
for Russia and poverty. The Russia they knew was no longer. They lived with their
memories.
Natasha’s Dance is superbly written and documented. The style resembles more a
fiction book than a history book, but the reader will derive more information about
Russia from this book than from a regular text book.
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Call for Papers
44th Annual Conference of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations
June 11-15, 2014
Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey, USA
Can Collective Wisdom Save Civilization?
Jonathan Lear, in his book Radical Hope (2006), wrote:
We live in an age of deep and profound angst that the world itself, as we know it, is
vulnerable and could break down…We are confronted with global warming, nuclear
conflagration, weapons of mass destruction…and even the demise of civilization
itself…events around the world – terrorist attacks, violent social upheavals…have
left us with an uncanny sense of menace. We seem to be aware of a shared
vulnerability that we cannot name.” (p. 7)
What is the way out of this deep sense of contemporary crisis?
What exactly is “wisdom” and how can wisdom be promoted on a global level to deal
with a number of serious crises now facing the future of civilization?
What have been some different definitions of wisdom? This is an ancient topic, but how
can it be specifically applied today?
What, if anything, can be done to solve these problems collectively?
Some applications may be (but are not limited to) the following questions:








What exactly is human nature and how is this relevant to civilizational futures?
What are some possible solutions to overpopulation and the related problems of
over-industrialization, resource-depletion and environmental degradation?
What are some possible solutions to the problem of inequality, economic and
otherwise?
Why do a few have so much while so many have so little? Do rich nations have
any responsibilities to the poor ones?
Is Capitalism really working today? What did the “occupy” movements signify?
Why are many western economies currently floundering?
How have technological advances (especially increasing automation)
contributed to the current jobs crisis?
Does material accumulation really bring happiness? Why/why not?
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Is humankind naturally prone to conflict or cooperation? How are organizations
like the United Nations faring with regard to international responses to regional
problems?
What is a Utopia? Dystopia? How are these terms relevant today? What roles do
utopias and dystopias play for the future of society?
Have our leaders run out of inspiration? Is fear now the main rhetoric?

In the 20th century, humanity saw the rise of several grand ideologies: Communism,
Fascism, Liberalism, etc. We also saw the dismantling of many of the institutions built
on these grand visions. Have today’s leaders given up on grand visions? Is narrow selfinterest and small scaled-down retraction now the trend? If so, what are the implications
of this? Is this ‘realpolitik’ or just the politics of disillusionment?
And of course, papers concerning all questions relevant to civilizational studies are also
welcome!
These could include:
• Studies of great civilizationalists, e.g., Spengler, Toynbee, Sorokin. Quigley, etc.
• Analyses of particular civilizations and/or comparative studies of civilizations.
• Decline and progress of civilizations.
Please send abstracts via email by April 1, 2014 (300 words) to:
Prof. David J. Rosner
Metropolitan College of New York
ISCSC President and 2014 Program Chair
drosner@mcny.edu
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Membership Information
If you are not a member if the ISCSC please consider joining. For a $50
yearly membership fee members receive a one year subscription to this
journal, are invited to attend the annual conference, receive the ISCSC
Newsletter, and may participate in ongoing dialogues. Membership is
open to all interested in civilizations. Visit www.wmich.edu/iscsc for
further information and to join the Society.

To Obtain Issues of This Journal
Soft cover issues of this journal may be purchased from Amazon.com,
bn.com or from other Internet booksellers. CD and other electronic
copies of this issue may be obtained from the H.W. Wilson web site at
www.hwwilson.com or the ProQuest website at www.proquest.com.
Coming soon to EBSCO Electronic Journals Service.
This issue, and all previous issues, may be accessed, searched by
keyword or topic, and read at the following web URL:
https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR.
We thank the Brigham Young University for providing this service for
free to all who are interested in the topics our journal covers.

Upcoming 2014 ISCSC Conference
The 44th Annual Meeting of the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilization will take place June 11 to June 15 at Monmouth

University, West Long Branch, New Jersey. The major topic this year will
be: Can Collective Wisdom Save Civilization? See conference information
and the Call for Papers on pages 127-8.
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